



Khrushchev Brezhnev Years, 1953 - 1984

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Chapter VII

"HEATING UP" - 1953-1964

§1 Victories and defeats in the struggle for a new course of development of the country

- ✓ Changes in social and political life;
- ✓ Arrangement and clash of forces in the political leadership;
- ✓ Beginning of the overcoming the "cult of personality".

The first 11 years after Stalin's death went down in history as the time of Khrushchev's "thaw", the relative liberalization in domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. However, reforms in the political and economic spheres, carried out from above, proved inconsistent. The tradition of authoritarianism, inherent in Russian political history and reinforced by the "Stalin era", firmly held the heirs of Stalin's rule and was especially strong in the party-state and other apparatuses.

The heirs of Stalin's power declared their readiness to exercise collective leadership of the country. Meetings of the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Soviet government met weekly, regularly convened plenums of the Central Committee and Party Congresses. From the very first days of working together, however, a struggle for political leadership began. The main rivals in it were L. P. Beria, G. M. Malenkov and N. S. Khrushchev, who were in Stalin's inner circle and were involved in unfounded repressions. At the same time, more than the older generation of politicians, A. A. Andreev, K. E. Voroshilov, V. M. Molotov, and L. M. Kaganovich, who were also involved in repression and brought to the brink of exclusion from big politics at the end of Stalin's rule, they understood the need to change the political course, to restore legality, and introduce reforms.

In the unfolding struggle, Beria relied on the security agencies, Malenkov's base was the national government, and Khrushchev's was the party apparatus. The political weight of the party apparatus at that time was less than not only the weight of the Council of Ministers, but also that of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The ratio of apparatus forces can be judged at least by these facts: the salaries of state security commissioners at the district level were four times higher than those of the secretaries of the district party committees. State officials had better apartments than Party officials. The best dachas in the elite village of Uspenskoye near Moscow belonged to ministers, not to Central Committee secretaries.

The personal attitude of the leader of the Communist Party to the chief of the Interior Ministry is evidenced by the expressive phrase Khrushchev said to Bulganin immediately after Stalin's death: "If Beria gets the state security, it will be the beginning of our end". The struggle for leadership cost Beria his life (December 1953). It also led to the displacement from the most important positions on the Olympus of power of G. M. Malenkov (in February 1955 he lost his post of Prime Minister), V. M. Molotov (dismissed from the post of Foreign Minister in June 1956), the defeat of the so-called anti-party group of Malenkov, Kaganovich, Molotov and Shepilov (June 1957), the dismissal of G. K. Zhukov from the leadership of the Armed Forces (October 1957). In March 1958 N.A. Bulganin was dismissed from the post of the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. N. S. Khrushchev, having since that time presided over two top positions in the party and state leadership (the First Secretary of the Central

Committee of the Party and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers), became the sole leader of the USSR.

Nikita Khrushchev's supporters, who found their places in the Central Committee's Presidium and in the USSR Council of Ministers, used the methods familiar from Stalin's times in an attempt to bolster the new leader's authority. However, they succeeded in creating a "cult of impersonality". Khrushchev's unrestrained reformism for the most part did not bear fruit and cast doubt on the reformer's wisdom. N. A. Kosygin (from July 1957 Deputy, from May 1960 to October 1964 First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and L. I. Brezhnev, elected in May 1960 Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR instead of K. could not give Khrushchev much support. E. Voroshilov. On the contrary, Brezhnev was one of the organizers of the conspiracy that ruined Khrushchev's political career in October 1964. All his resignations were presented to the people as a consequence of the mistakes in devising and implementing the new course of the state's domestic and foreign policy.

From its first steps, the new leadership made an effort to distance itself from the abuses of Stalinist policies and the "cult of personality". The latter manifested itself already on March 10, 1953. On the instructions of the Central Committee secretaries, the report on Stalin's funeral in Pravda was written in the spirit of the "cult of personality," but by the new head of government. His speech at the funeral rally was typed in a larger font than the other speeches, the newspaper placed a falsified photograph of Malenkov sitting between Stalin and Mao Tse Tung. In this connection, Malenkov stated, "In the past we had major abnormalities, much went along the

lines of the cult of personality. And now it is necessary to correct the trend going in this direction at once. We consider it imperative to stop the policy of the personality cult!"

However, up to February 1956, the official concept of the "cult of personality" and Stalin's name had nothing in common. The newspapers, as before, invariably emphasized his inestimable role in resolving all the issues of the Party and the state. For example, an editorial in Pravda on January 14, 1954, stated that Stalin's role in the Communist Party was invaluable.

"Lenin's program instructions on the national question found their further creative development in the works of Stalin, the great successor to Lenin's immortal cause. His "classic" articles on the national question were republished until 1959.

About Beria's first order after his appointment as head of the NKVD

On November 25, 1938 Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria was appointed People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of the USSR, replacing Nikolai Ivanovich Ezhov.

Before that, during the three months from August 22, 1938, Beria was appointed first deputy People's Commissar of the NKVD and was familiarizing himself with the situation.

Together with Beria, the first deputy commissar of the NKVD was Frinovsky, who was also head of the 1st Directorate of the USSR NKVD - the Main Directorate of

State Security (GUGB NKVD).

On September 8, 1938, Frinovsky was relieved of his duties in the NKVD. He was succeeded by L.P. Beria as head of the Main Directorate of State Security of the NKVD, but remained first deputy commissar of the NKVD. On September 11, 1938 L.P. Beria was awarded the title of Commissar of State Security of the 1st rank. For understanding - this rank corresponded to the rank of army general.

In November 1938, Lavrenty Pavlovich became the head of the NKVD.

It is curious that in spite of the fact that the great bulk of everything negative about what they say about the work of NKVD bodies in the 1930s, came before, at the time of the leadership of Henry Yagoda and Nikolai Yezhov, for some reason the main "bloody executioner" was subsequently appointed as Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria, who just from the first days of his leadership of NKVD, began to sort out the "Augean stables", inherited by him. At that time the cadres of NKVD were cleaned up very seriously - 7372 persons (22,9 %) from the rank and file and 3830 persons (62 %) from the top.

And the first order, issued under the signature of L.P. Beria, was an order about how NKVD bodies had to carry out the Decree of the Council of People's Commissars on investigation, arrests, etc.

Such documents show well both the scale of violations during the Yezhov's time and the systematic effort aimed at returning the NKVD's work to normal.

Beria's defeat in the struggle for political leadership in 1953

Despite the fact that Malenkov was considered the number one figure in the country's leadership immediately after Stalin's death, Beria actually began to play the leading role. He proceeded from the assumption that the main link in the post-Stalin society should remain the security services, and he began to nominate his protégés to head them. On March 19, 1953, Beria proposed to replace the heads of the Interior Ministry in all republics of the Soviet Union, 12 autonomous regions, six territories and 49 regions of Russia. The new executives in their turn replaced the personnel at the middle management level. The security services had a decisive say in any promotion or transfer of party, state or economic cadres. Such activity could not help but arouse the wariness of Beria's colleagues in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Party.

However, at first they supported Beria and his initiatives to address issues in the most diverse areas of state life. They agreed with proposals to reconsider a number of investigative cases, to introduce changes into the law enforcement system, national and foreign policy, etc.

With the first orders for the Interior Ministry, the new Minister set up investigation groups and commissions to review the cases, which were being processed by the departments and divisions of the Ministry. Such groups dealt with the cases of "arrested doctors", "former employees of the Soviet MGB" (the case of Abakumov-Shvartsman), "employees of the Main Artillery Directorate of the USSR Military Ministry", "to review cases of eviction of citizens from Georgia", "on charges

of former leadership of the Air Force and the Ministry of Aviation Industry".

On March 26, Beria sent a note to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee about the amnesty. It was pointed out that there were 2,526,402 prisoners in penitentiaries, prisons and colonies, of whom 221,435, that's only (8.8%) were especially dangerous state criminals (spies, saboteurs, terrorists, Trotskyites, social revolutionaries, nationalists, etc.). It was proposed to release from prison convicts sentenced for up to 5 years for official, economic, and some military crimes, regardless of their length of imprisonment; women with children up to 10 years of age; pregnant women; minors; elderly men and women; patients suffering from a serious incurable disease; and those sentenced to imprisonment for more than 5 years, in half of their sentence. On March 27, 1953 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree "On Amnesty," under which more than a third of the prisoners were released. According to its signature, the amnesty was referred to as the Voroshilov, the amnesty. In reality, more than a million people were released and around 400,000 cases were halted.

<https://zen.yandex.ru/media/id/5e4d49628c0a1879703edafc/esce-raz-pro-politicheskie-repressii-v-sssr-609d890af0f5e96e9bd98d0f>

A further retrospective of “political repression” in the USSR

The expression "victims of political repressions", which has essentially become a common noun and has

become part of a sort of lexicon of political terms, took shape by 1958, the year of the beginning of the large-scale rehabilitation.

The first partial rehabilitation was carried out at the suggestion of Lavrenty Pavlovich Beria in 1938-1940. There was also rehabilitation in 1940-1941, where mostly military personnel of different ranks were rehabilitated.

The rehabilitation of 1958-1960 was already underway in the light of the decisions and assessments made at the XX Congress of the CPSU. This rehabilitation was selective, rehabilitating mostly the so-called "party nomenklatura," while workers and collective farmers were not really mentioned at the time.

In the 1960s, the well-known documents of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs were prepared on the number of persons convicted by the VChK, OGPU, NKVD, and MGB for the period from 1921 to 1953. At the same time, a number of stable, often mythologized notions about the causes and course of the "so-called repressions" also emerged.

First and foremost, (and this was the focus of all efforts of the propaganda apparatus), was the demonization of Stalin. Monster... paranoid... afraid... trusted no one... maniacal suspicion... etc. - what epithets there were (and still are) for Stalin!

Second - Pretty strong overestimation of the number of repressed, almost by ten of times.

Third - It was necessary to sharply begin to glorify the

images of the repressed leaders, representatives of the elite of the so-called "old Leninist Guards". The words "return to the Leninist norms of party life" came into everyday use. All of this later translated into the formula "innocently repressed".

Fourth, the need to explain the heavy military defeats of 1941 precisely by the consequences of the political repressions of 1937-1938. If there had not been 1937 there would not have been 1941! Neither more nor less!

It would seem that in the 65 years that have passed since the 20th Congress of the CPSU we should have sorted out and disclosed the real causes, nature and consequences of the repression. It was proved more than once that "sensationalist" accusatory statements of Khrushchev in his report to the Congress were false. But these lies were repeated...replicated...and continue to be repeated.

New falsehoods were added to these lies. In 1988, at the suggestion of the "gray cardinal" in the Politburo of the CPSU, A.N. Yakovlev, the third wave of rehabilitation began, which in the 1990's practically turned to be continuous. One could say that a rehabilitation conveyor belt was continuously operating. What do you mean by that? Well, simply, they rehabilitated everyone in a row, with lists, and without going into the heart of the matter. The task was to do everything with the noise, with a sweeping criticism of Stalin and his time, and on the sly, with lists, to rehabilitate as much as possible!

Here is how Alexander Kapustin, former head of archives of Sverdlovsk region, recalled it: "...I myself was a member of the rehabilitation commission. They lumped

together in one basket the criminal Article 58 and the administrative Article 58 - dekulakization and repression. They also added the Civil War, losses from collectivization and so on...".

In his book Stalin's Repressions, Dmitry Lyskov wrote that the rehabilitation commission reviewed 1 million 17,000 criminal cases over 15 months. And now a little arithmetic. The rate of review is truly fantastic - almost 67,000 cases per month! If I worked 22 business days a month, as usual, I would get a little over 3,000 cases a day! Then comes the arithmetic: if I worked 8 hours a day, I would get 380 cases per hour, or 6 cases every minute! A veritable conveyor belt!

Such a scale and pace of rehabilitation raises legitimate questions - was there even a trial, a finding of guilt or not? How objective was the consideration of such cases on the merits? Cases were considered by lists, in piles - what objectivity can we talk about then?

The following clichés were firmly rooted in mass consciousness - the reasons of the repressions were Stalin's struggle for power, his maniacal nature and suspiciousness, his unprecedented cruelty.

The mass character of repressions was underlined by the phrase, which had nothing to do with reality, but firmly entered the lexicon - "half the country was jailed, and the other half of the country was guarding them". Or about innocence of absolutely all repressed - "repressions were illegal" ... "during repressions the biggest and the best part of leaders, military and intelligentsia was destroyed". And last - "the repressions greatly weakened the country

and the army and led to the defeat in 1941".

As a result the most important questions of who, how many people were repressed and why were they repressed, turned out to be confused and unresolved.

Where did the discontent in the country come from, which resulted in repression? Why did Stalin, who had practically defeated all his political opponents by 1936, suddenly, out of the blue, decide to carry out mass repressions, why did he need this? And what did the country lose and what did it gain by 1941?

The events of those years are still a mystery to many. Many myths and legends born of the XX Congress of the CPSU are still in circulation.

The same Alexander Kapustin says about the myths and absurdities - "I regularly, almost every month, meet with schoolchildren. In Kamyshlov, there was a meeting at school with 10th and 11th graders. These are history classes. And when they talked about repression, I asked: "And how many repressions did we have in our country?". A girl (grade 11!) answers me - 300 million people!"

As they say - no comment.

And here are the real numbers. In the 1960s they were prepared for Khrushchev.

Between 1931 and 1938, 4,835,937 people were arrested. Of these, 2,944,879 people were convicted. What does this mean? That, almost 1,900,000 people were released!

Of the 2,944,879 people (those who were convicted), 745,220 were sentenced to capital punishment. This includes the most peak years - 1937-1938.

If we take all data up to 1953, we have 4,060,315 people convicted. Of them 799,455 people were sentenced to capital punishment.

Yes, indeed the number of arrests and shootings in 1937-1938 was greater than in all other years - from 1921 to 1936 and from 1939 to 1953.

Nevertheless, the total number of those shot is 19.6 percent of the total number of those convicted, and the number of those convicted in general is 1.7 percent of the country's population! Where then are the "mass repressions"? Where was "the whole country sitting"?

All sorts of claims can be made against NKVD organs. Especially if you look at their work from the point of view of all sorts of myths and other things. But what you could not accuse them of was the fact that they did not keep a careful count in their office. What, - what, but everything was counted there, and these figures can be trusted!

The preconditions which led the country to the arrests of 1936-1938, the reasons for this, must be sought in the 1920s. For example, it is worth carefully considering the development of the economy of the USSR during the NEP, its achievements and negative aspects.

On the one hand there was an increase in production. This is a plus.

On the other hand - was the presence of various kinds of social problems and contradictions, jeopardizing not only the future of the NEP, but also the very existence of the USSR. This, I believe, is the root of the abolition of the NEP! And not the fact that "bloody Stalin" suddenly got fed up with it all, and then the government decided to cover up the NEP, as they still tell in some textbooks.

In fact, there were big changes in the social image, for example, in the village. As a result of changes, the number of those who were negative to the current government increased. The result of World War I, the revolution and the Civil War - the war was very long – there was a sharp decline in productivity in the village and the revival of the rural community as a body of peasant self-government. This reduced the influence of the official authorities on the peasantry.

And in industry, the slow growth rate was accompanied by increasing unemployment, which was numbering in the millions. Already in the second half of the 1920s, the then youth of the country faced the problem of future prospects, social advancement, etc. Social dissatisfaction in society was only growing. The country was still backward in most sectors of the economy.

Already in 1922-1923, the OGPU had data that spoke of dissatisfaction with the ruling power and its overthrow. The Kronstadt uprising, the Tambov uprising, the Ishim uprising, the rebellion on the Don, which took place after the Civil War - this is only a known part of the open and violent protests against Soviet power. And how many local pockets of resistance were there, which no one really studied?

Speculators and corrupt officials flourished in society. Once I wrote that the famous books by Ilf and Petrov "The Twelve Chairs" and "The Golden Calf" are not satire, for the most part! They were a cross-section of real society in the late 1920s! So did Zoshchenko and Mayakovsky - they wrote from nature, from what they saw! And not "out of thin air or from the ceiling", like Solzhenitsyn who sucked out of nowhere his "facts". And that's really how it was in life! The result was the emergence of "red banditry" in the country.

Today not everyone knows what this is. This is when the people who took part in the revolution, who fought in the Civil War, who won, suddenly saw how the NEP was developing, how the "Nep-man bourgeoisie" appeared. And they began to have questions - How so? What were we spilling blood for? Hate came.

As a result, "communist cells" began to form, which carried out trivial lynching. And it was impossible to explain that the country was building a rule-of-law state, that only a court could sentence a person to death!

What the Party was

The Party in the 1920s-1930s was not homogeneous in its composition. Differences in education, culture, and life experience were felt. Party seniority was of great importance, especially since pre-revolutionary times. It so happened that those who had this experience, even despite their abilities, capabilities, education, or rather the lack of it, often occupied leading positions.

In his novel Bloodwashed Russia, Artem Vesely

described the ideology of such "superiors"-"Everything was simple: the Red Army is the defender of the workers! Our enemies - kulaks, landlords, capitalists! Mercilessly! Duty! Red sacred banner! Down with it! Long live the Party! Who has any questions, comrades?" That's the approach then.

Discussion in the Party and the Opposition

This question is very important for understanding the causes and course of the repressions. There was real opposition in those days and the struggle going on within the Party was the most important reason both for the Party purges and for the repressions which followed.

Trotsky, Bukharin, Rykov, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Tomsky, Raskolnikov, Radek, Antonov, Pyatakov, Rakovsky and many others, although they were a minority in the Party, were nevertheless a kind of such "authorities" for most of the oppositional currents.

All these factions, groups, etc., split the party, disorienting not only its members but also the country - everyone was watching the discussions. All this factionalism posed a real danger to the development of the country - the methods of underground work were well known to the "old party people".

And another danger awaited in the light of the degradation of the ruling elite.

And this degradation was clearly visible in the reports of the OGPU. The majority of those who came to power after 1917, after the Civil War, and held leading positions

at different levels, *were firmly convinced of their right to remain forever at the head of the factory, district, city and country as a whole*. Most of them are the so-called "old Leninist Guards". By that time, they had built comfortable nests for themselves, treating plants and factories, districts and cities, and regions as their own fiefdoms. The legal nihilism dominant in society in the 1920s and 1930s helped facilitate permissiveness, bribery and embezzlement.

The Army

What was the army and its commanding officers at that time? Except the Civil War, there was nowhere else to gain military experience. As to education - most of the commanders had primary and secondary education, but few had academic education.

On the question of the ideology and political orientation of the army, you must keep in mind who was considered to be the creator of the Red Army. And he was Leiba Bronstein - Trotsky. Accordingly, most of those who were appointed to their command positions were trained by Trotsky. Naturally, they respected, one might say, revered Trotsky.

In general, the army was not united at all. There were some, figuratively speaking, "interest groups" - Pervokonniks, Chapaevs, Kotovs, etc. Everywhere they supported and dragged their own. At the same time, they competed sharply with others. The command staff was split as a result.

In terms of morale, drunkenness was the scourge of the

army. But it was especially characteristic of the 1920s and early 1930s. Many commanders who were fired from the army and later declared to be "politically repressed" were actually fired for trivial drunkenness and debauchery. As a consequence, the combat readiness of the army was at a very low level.

Major military exercises in 1935-1936 showed both poor training of commanders and soldiers, and the actual unreadiness of the army for war.

Not only Stalin as head of state was responsible for unsatisfactory combat readiness of the army, but first of all those marshals, together with their commander and kommandavys, who were arrested and then, later, were declared "innocent victims".

Opposition to new coups d'état

The revolution, civil war, persecution of the church, collectivization, and dekulakization led to the formation of significant groups of people dissatisfied with the Soviet regime in general and the ruling regime in particular. And given the political, military, and life experiences of many of them, it became clear that these people would not sit idly by. These strata of society were an excellent base for possible undercover work by Western intelligence agencies.

The concessionary policy of the Soviet government in the 1920s, the attraction of foreign specialists to work in industry in the 1930s, (details below), and their free movement around the country allowed the intelligence services of Germany, Poland, Great Britain, the United

States, Japan, and other countries to actively work. They felt at ease, actively working with technical and creative intelligentsia, the bureaucracy and the army command staff. They were recruiting and selecting their assistants with all their might.

The situation in the country was quite complicated and contradictory. On the one hand, the course for accelerated industrialization and collectivization taken by the government with quite specific goals and objectives.

On the other hand, the braking of this process by the entire groups and sections of the population was becoming more and more apparent. And if you consider the fact that from 1927 the threat of a new war against the Soviet Union became very real and this threat was growing, then it was not difficult to foresee the actions of the authorities - it was necessary to fight slackness, with the "laxity", it was necessary to tighten the screws.

It was assumed that it would be impossible to move forward in the state the country was in at the time. If you sort this out, understand, then maybe you will come to understand what happened.

How did the people survive the repressions? What effect did they have on the country's development?

This topic, it seems, remains beyond the interest of researchers. As Aleksandr Kapustin, former head of archives in the Sverdlovsk region, said, *"Until we make a comparative assessment of the state of the country before and after, until we evaluate the nature and results of the new elites and the old ones, before and after, the state and development of production, we cannot give an*

answer and a scientific evaluation of the repressions of 1920-1930".

Back to 1953 Amnesty and Beria's Role in it

The investigations not only led to the release in April 1953 of a large number of those convicted and remanded under investigation. They testified to Beria's intentions to find the perpetrators of their falsifications. M. D. Ryumin was identified as the main person responsible for the "doctors' case"; Stalin and Abakumov for the murder of S. Mihoels; not only for the "doctors' case" but also for the "Leningrad" case and the case of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee - former MGB minister and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee since March 1953 S. D. Ignatiev. Investigating the background to all of these cases would have posed a great danger to Malenkov. The idea of "collective leadership" threatened their collapse with new purges along the lines of the 1930s.

However, Beria's proposals to reconsider the entire system of arrests, trials, and investigations were not supported. His proposals to abandon the course of building socialism in the GDR (to ease international tensions), to weaken state control over collective farms (as a way to resolve the agrarian crisis), and to limit the functions of the Party Central Committee to work with personnel and propaganda were also met with much doubt.

The corrections of the national policy adopted on June 12, 1953, at Beria's initiative: replacement of the

administrative personnel of national republics mainly by the natives of the republics, conduct of business in the local language, recall of the nomenklatura workers not knowing the local language to the Central Committee were fraught, as the practice of their implementation showed, with the worsening of the international tension and Russophobia.

On June 17, 1953, unrest began in East Berlin, and Beria was fully absorbed in restoring order there. This facilitated the organization of a united front against Beria by all (except Mikoyan), members of the Presidium of the Central Committee. At first, it was thought to be limited to transferring him from the Interior Ministry to the Ministry of Oil Industry, but then they agreed with Molotov's opinion that "no drastic measures" were needed: that meant liquidating Beria as a "spy and conspirator". On June 26, he was arrested. N. S. Khrushchev, Deputy Defense Minister Marshal G. K. Zhukov, Commander of the Moscow Military District K. S. Moskalenko and his deputy P. F. Batitsky (Marshals of the Soviet Union since 1955 and 1968) played a major role in the success of this operation. On the same day, by decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Beria was removed from the post of First Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR, deprived of all ranks and awards. The case regarding his "criminal actions" was referred to the Supreme Court of the USSR.

Arrested and put on trial were Beria's nominees: the USSR Minister of State Security, at the time of his arrest, Minister of State Control V. N. Merkulov; the head of one of the departments of the NKVD of the USSR, before the arrest - the Minister of Internal Affairs of Georgia V. G.

Dekanozov; Deputy People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia, then Deputy Minister of State Security of the USSR, Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs of the USSR B. B. Kobulov; Commissar of Internal Affairs of Georgia, before the arrest - the head of one of the departments of the Interior Ministry of the USSR S. Goglidze; head of one of the departments of the NKVD USSR, before the arrest - Minister of Interior of Ukraine, P. Meshik; and head of the investigation section on particularly important cases MVD USSR, LY. Vlodzimirsky.

Being under arrest in the headquarters of the Moscow Air Defense District, L.P. Beria sent several letters to the CPSU Central Committee (three letters, dated June 28, July 1 and 2, are published). In the first ones he admitted some of his mistakes and repented of having belittled the decisions of the Central Committee by simultaneously sending out memos to the Interior Ministry; he behaved unacceptably nervously, rudely and even impudently at the last joint session of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the government with respect to Khrushchev and Bulganin. At the same time, he was "sure" that the matter could have been settled with criticism, from which he was ready to draw "all the conclusions necessary for himself" and continue his work with benefit to the cause. "But the Central Committee decided otherwise, I believe that the Central Committee did the right thing."

Without disputing the decision of the Central Committee, Beria disagreed with it in essence, claiming that "he had always been utterly devoted to the party of Lenin-with-Stalin, to his motherland, was always active in his work." Admitting that his comrades might have had reason to

call him "firmly to order, to point out his place and firmly to pull him back," he begged not to deprive him of his right "to be an active builder," to send him "to any job, the smallest" and make sure that "in two or three years I will be firmly corrected and will still be useful to you." In the last letter Beria asked not to allow the reprisals against him "without trial and investigation, after five days of detention, without a single interrogation"; asked to appoint a commission, which "carefully reviewed his case, brought charges, questioned witnesses" and made sure "that I am absolutely clean, honest, loyal friend and comrade, a loyal member of our party". Addressing the first leaders, Malenkov and Khrushchev, he asked them "not to persist, if the comrade is rehabilitated," to "intervene and not ruin your innocent old friend". The letters had no effect and remained unanswered.

On July 2-7, Beria's "criminal anti-party and anti-state actions" were examined by a plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. Malenkov, who spoke at it, said that the Central Committee Presidium had discovered many blatant facts of Beria's violations of socialist legality, statutory requirements of the party, and abuse of his official position to the detriment of the state and the people. Khrushchev said that Beria not only carried out mass repression of Soviet 'peasants, but also abused his official position on an enormous scale, which in fact bordered on criminal offense, caused enormous harm to the key sectors of the national economy, domestic and foreign policy of the USSR. **N. Shatalin spoke of the documents found in Beria's safes, testifying that he had been spying on other members of the country's leadership, collecting compromising evidence in order to destroy them when the opportunity was ripe.** The moral decay of

Beria was also noted.

On December 23, 1953 he was shot on the verdict of the Special Court of the Supreme Court of the USSR. The version of Beria's murder at the time of his arrest, circulated as early as 1953, has no proper justification. Nevertheless, it lives largely because the materials of Beria's trial, which was supposedly broadcast on the radio to the offices of the country's top leaders, have not yet been published. Together with Beria, his "henchmen" were accused of treason against the motherland and of committing terrorist acts and sentenced to death.

Naturally, all the crimes of Stalin's regime were blamed on this group. It is noteworthy that Beria and his associates were exposed in full accordance with the traditions of the 1930s-40s. An informational statement about Beria's anti-party and anti-state actions reported that he was expelled from the CPSU "as an enemy of the Communist Party and the Soviet people". C. Ignatiev, who was Beria's designated successor, was readmitted to the Central Committee in July 1953 and soon afterwards elected First Secretary of the Bashkir Regional Communist Party Committee.

After Beria was shot, the Interior Ministry, which Beria headed, was reorganized. On the basis of the divisions and institutions separated from the Ministry of Internal Affairs; on March 13, 1954 there was established the Committee for State Security under the Council of Ministers of the USSR. Colonel General I. A. Serov was appointed chairman. He was a man formed in the entourage of Beria and Zhukov, known for his rudeness, tactlessness, lack of culture, who committed a number of illegal actions against the entire people. But he had one

indisputable "virtue" - he was a longtime friend of Khrushchev. On August 8, 1955, he became an army general. During the campaign to expose Beria and purge the Chekist ranks of his supporters, Serov in two years fired 16 thousand of his staff "as not inspiring political trust, malicious violators of socialist legality, careerists, and morally unstable".

The fall of Malenkov

Khrushchev's positions strengthened. On August 8, 1953, G. M. Malenkov made a speech at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, expressing his views "on the urgent tasks in the field of industry and agriculture and measures for further improvement of the material well-being of the people". He proposed a drastic increase in the production of food and consumer goods by increasing capital investment in the light and food industries, as well as by increasing the procurement prices from the farms for meat, milk, chaff, potatoes and vegetables, reducing taxes (by half) and compulsory supplies from the collective farmers' subsistence farms.

The speech had a huge resonance, the name of the chairman of the Council of Ministers became very popular. It seemed that "no one would be able to threaten Malenkov's dominant position in the near future. This was also the forecast of the U.S. intelligence services. However, the stumps were wrong. Conservatives in the Central Committee found Malenkov's promises excessive (simply put, "demagoguery"). They saw no way to fulfill them. Sympathies turned out to be on the side of N.S. Khrushchev - the moderate course he proposed seemed

to be more preferable.

On September 3, 1953, the Plenum of the Central Committee established the post of the First Secretary of the Central Committee, to which Khrushchev was elected. In November, at a meeting on personnel matters, he managed to win the favor of numerous and influential members of the party apparatus. G. M. Malenkov, speaking at this meeting, began to lament the rebirth and impossibility of renewing the country without renewing the Party apparatus. Khrushchev interceded, reminding that *"the apparatus is our backbone."* The response to these encouraging words was a long round of applause.

The Beria trial greatly weakened Malenkov's position. Khrushchev, by giving Ukraine a kind of gift in the form of the Crimea, transferred from the RSFSR in January 1954 on the occasion of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia, significantly weakened the bitterness of the Ukrainian's losses from Stalin's repressions, also with his (K) participation and gained new powerful supporters in the leadership of the Ukrainian party organization and secretaries of regional party committees, who had a significant number of votes in the CPSU Central Committee.

In March 1954, G. M. Malenkov made yet another "gaffe". He said, at the pre-election meeting of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that a new war with modern means of warfare would lead to "the death of world civilization". Thus he incurred the wrath of Molotov and other conservatives. Malenkov was accused of the fact that his statement did not help to mobilize public opinion for an active struggle against the criminal

designs of the imperialists, and might give rise to sentiments of hopelessness and the uselessness of the efforts of the peoples protesting against the imperialist plans. "The blunder" was corrected by Khrushchev's speech. "If the imperialists try to start a new world war, it will end in the collapse of the whole capitalist system," he corrected Malenkov, repeating almost word for word his "politically correct" speech of November 6, 1949. At that time, they were told that "not we but the imperialists should fear war"; if they start World War III, it "will be a grave not for individual capitalist states but for all world capitalism."

Malenkov was "finished off" by the December 1954 trial of the top leaders of the MGB accused of fabricating the "Leningrad case". He was heavily compromised as one of the organizers of the reprisals against the "Leningradites".

On January 24, 1955, Pravda published a large article by D.T. Shepilov, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, "The General Line of the Party and the Vulgarizers of Marxism." It criticized without mentioning Malenkov's name his "deeply erroneous and politically harmful views" on the socialist economy, stipulating the need at certain stages for the predominant development of industries in Group B, i.e., the production of consumer goods.

On January 31, the plenum of the Central Committee decided to relieve Malenkov of his duties as chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. At the same plenum, he was for the first time publicly accused of cooperating with Beria and blamed for the "Leningrad affair". The chairman of the government, who did not possess the

necessary leadership qualities, accepted his resignation, declaring: "I accept the decision of the Central Committee as correct, principled and fair". Repenting and promising to correct his mistakes, he was retained as a member of the Central Committee's Presidium and recommended as Minister of Power Plants. On February 8, 1955 the USSR Supreme Soviet appointed N. A. Bulganin, a long-time supporter of Khrushchev, as the new head of the USSR government. G. K. Zhukov was appointed to the post of Soviet Defense Minister vacated by Bulganin.

In May 1955 under initiative of Khrushchev he signed a peace treaty with Austria, according to which the Soviet troops were to leave that country in exchange for its declaration of permanent neutrality. Immediately thereafter, relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia were normalized. Khrushchev had to admit his guilt and apologize for breaking off relations in 1948, and held Beria responsible. Reporting on the results of the negotiations at the Central Committee Plenum in July 1955 Khrushchev noted Molotov's opposition to the May agreements. He tried to defend his position by proving the fallacy of concessions to the leaders of Yugoslavia, whom he continued to regard as "traitors, anti-Marxists, and perverted men," and by sending a delegation to them "to belittle the prestige of our great country." The members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who spoke in the debate regarded Molotov's position as erroneous and condemned his disloyalty to Khrushchev.

Immediately after the July (1955) plenum of the Central Committee, the preparations for the next Party Congress began. It was conducted in the context of intensified release of political prisoners. By January 1, 1954 the

number of prisoners was 475 thousand, by the beginning of 1956 it decreased to 114 thousand. In 1954, rehabilitated were the victims of the "Leningrad case," in November 1955 - the members of the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee. The military leaders arrested after the war were rehabilitated, and a reexamination of the political accusations of the 30s was begun. Up to the beginning of 1956, the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR alone rehabilitated 7,679 persons, totally rehabilitated there were about 16,000.

During preparations for the Congress, a commission headed by P. N. Pospelov, Secretary of the Central Committee, was created to examine how mass repressions against the majority of the Central Committee members had been possible. Elected at the 17th Party Congress, he investigated and reported to the Presidium of the Central Committee. Khrushchev pressed harder and harder to condemn Stalin's "mistakes and perversions," declaring: "Stalin was devoted to socialism, but he did everything in barbaric ways. He destroyed the Party."

Molotov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and Malenkov opposed, believing that condemnation of Stalin would cause bewilderment in the party ranks, create difficulties for the CPSU, and badly affect not only the prestige of the country, but also the authority of everyone who was an associate of Stalin. Khrushchev stated that he was ready to bear his share of responsibility, apparently hoping not only not to suffer more than others, but also to win. His desire to blame Stalin and Beria for everything bad in the past, thereby rehabilitating the Party and the idea of communism, was outwardly logical and beneficial to all of Stalin's heirs. The reminder that

each member of the Presidium had the opportunity to express his or her own point of view on the questions of repression and rehabilitation at the Congress did not add to the determination of the opponents.

In the end, a compromise was reached in the Presidium of the Central Committee: it was decided to make the report at a closed session of the congress and not to publish it in the press. It was not supposed to be talked anything about the rehabilitation of the defendants in the open trials of 1936-1938.

Khrushchev also promised not to "savor" the past, although, contrary to party tradition, he did not submit the text of the report on this cardinal question for the country's fate for the Presidium's approval. The report was being prepared on the eve of its reading. The materials of the P. N. Pospelov commission and preliminary "dictations" of Khrushchev himself were combined in it. Within two days, he was finalizing the text of the last version of the report together with D.T. Shepilov.

XX Congress of the Party, Overcoming resistance to the course of the Congress.

The Congress, which opened on February 14, 1956, summed up the results of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, adopted directives for the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) and set the task to catch up and surpass the developed capitalist countries "within a short historical time". However, the Congress went down in history primarily because of the report "On the Personality Cult and its Consequences" at the last, closed session on

February 25, when the agenda, known to the delegates, was exhausted and elections of the new composition of the CPSU Central Committee took place.

The report was unexpected by the vast majority of the delegates and was listened to in silence; there was no applause at the end either. For the first time, it was officially stated that the majority of the repressed "enemies of the people" were honest citizens of their country. The report was replete with shocking information about mass shootings of innocent people and deportations of peoples in the 30s-40s. The main position of the report was that the repressions and the "cult of personality" of Stalin were primarily the result of the negative traits of his character, deviations from the Marxist-Leninist understanding of the role of the individual in history. The report did not call into question Stalin's political regime; it was intended to give the impression that all that was needed was to condemn and eradicate the "perversions" of socialism, and the road to communism would be open. No debate was opened on the report.

Was there or was there not a conspiracy to overthrow Stalin?

Having written such a headline, you can be sure that you will immediately get comments rejecting any attempt to even just lay out the versions and facts indicating attempts to remove Stalin from the political arena.

The argument against any version about conspiracies against Stalin is usually this: This could not be by definition... It is all invented, and Stalin is a maniac... All

the "testimony" about the conspiracies was beaten out by NKVD investigators under torture... All the trials with alleged confessions are a hoax... It is all Stalin's paranoia and the so-called "conspirators" are honest and faithful party members... etc., etc.

After all, if you admit the existence of conspiracies in the 1930s to remove Stalin from power, then you have to admit the validity of repressions against a number of political figures of that time. And those who try to somehow prove the existence of anti-Stalinist conspiracies, thus indirectly justifying the arrests and political repression of that time. That is the simple logic.

How to get to the bottom of this.

Stalin's alleged fears of assassination attempts were explained by the fact that he allegedly suffered from paranoia. This version flourished particularly lavishly in the years of perestroika, when all kinds of "revelations" about Stalin's time and himself were regularly printed in popular newspapers and thick magazines. Somehow the material appeared with a reference to the alleged words of Academician V.M.Bekhterev, who allegedly examined Stalin and gave him such a diagnosis.

And Bekhterev allegedly, after examining Stalin, came out and publicly announced his diagnosis! That in itself is simply nonsense - even if something happens, the doctor will never publicly announce the diagnosis. Especially not to outsiders. Well, and Bekhterev himself, who allegedly publicly announced this diagnosis, was immediately, of course, liquidated by Stalin's order. That's about the total picture painted by the perestroika press.

Stalin was normal and understood what he was doing. And he had more than enough opponents. The most powerful of them, perhaps, was Leon Trotsky. Even when he was removed from power, he did not accept it and continued to fight. And Lev Davidovich had plenty of comrades and like-minded people in the ranks of the CPSU(b) at the time.

Leon Trotsky (Leiba Bronstein, 1879-1940).

Here is a recent revelation - "As it turned out in recent years, the underground activities of the Trotskyists in the Soviet Union was not of a mythical nature. This became especially evident after the documents from a closed fund of Lev Trotsky, kept in the U.S., became known. This was written in the book "Secret Agent of Dzerzhinsky" by Elizabeth Porecki (1898-1978), the widow of the famous Soviet intelligence agent, Ignatius Reis (real name Natan Poretsky, 1899-1937).

In all probability, Stalin was especially worried because many of his army posts were held by people who had been promoted by the head of the military department, Leon Trotsky. And so it turned out that Trotsky, who was removed from power, still had possibilities for confrontation with the general secretary. And he repeatedly emphasized it.

So in 1927 at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), Lev Davidovich, in response to a proposal to expel him from the party, took the floor and said literally the following - "You - a group of talentless bureaucrats. If there is a war, you will be completely

powerless to organize the defense of the country and to achieve victory. But when the enemy is within 100 kilometers from Moscow, we will overthrow the talentless government. Not only that, we will shoot that stupid gang of worthless bureaucrats who have betrayed the revolution ..." (From the book A. Lapshin. Under the banner of the scorpion. M. 1996, p.239).

It was Trotsky's "Thesis of Clemenceau" - in the event of war, even if the enemy is a few tens of kilometers from the capital, a military coup must be performed and the government must be removed from power. Georges Clemenceau (1841-1929), Prime Minister of France, once articulated this thesis.

Stalin, understandably, could not let such a statement pass his ears. Especially knowing that Trotsky is a man who does not throw words to the wind in vain. And the fact that Trotsky would try to use his abilities in the Armed Forces. Researcher Vladimir Bobrenev, in his monograph "For lack of corpus delicti" (from the series "Russian Secrets") gives interesting information about assumptions of this kind.

Trotsky at one time maintained contact with his supporters through a certain Suvarin, who at one time was a member of the Executive Committee of the Komintern. Boris Suvarin (real name Boris Livshits) - French politician and writer, anti-Stalinist.

At the very end of the 1920s, Suvarin met several times with the Soviet Consul in Paris, Nikolai Kuzmin (1883-1938). Through Suvarin, it is assumed, Trotsky induced Kuzmin to his side and urged him to convince Tukhachevsky of the need to move to an active struggle

against Stalin. True, this is unlikely to be concrete - relations between Kuzmin and Tukhachevsky were tense: Tukhachevsky at one time stole Kuzmin's wife. However, the very fact of Trotsky's search for opportunities to influence the military seems very real.

This is evidenced by the following - in 1932 Suvarin allegedly in a conversation asked the writer, journalist and war correspondent Isaac Babel - "Is there any possibility for change in the Soviet Union?" Babel answered with only one word - "War". Suvarin continued - "And who would lead the army in such a case?" And Babel answered without hesitation - "Putna."

Vitovt Kazimirovich Putna, a participant in the war with Poland, a participant in the suppression of the Kronstadt uprising (1921) and the suppression of a number of peasant uprisings.

In 1923, he joined the Trotskyist opposition.

In 1927-1930 he was military attaché in Japan, Finland and Germany.

In 1934 he was military attaché in Great Britain.

In 1936 he was recalled to the Soviet Union and was arrested on August 20, 1936.

A curious character...

What Babel talked about with Suvarin, coincides with a speech by Trotsky at the plenum of the Central Committee, mentioned above.

Churchill and Hitler and Goebbels knew about the conspiracy in the Red Army. In his memoirs Churchill said that there was a conspiracy and that "it was followed by ruthless and unhelpful purge among the

military and politicians in Soviet Russia ...". And the notorious Goebbels wrote in his diary shortly before his suicide, referring to the issue of repression in the Red Army - "Stalin carried out this reform in time, and therefore now enjoys its benefits ...".

MORE ATTEMPTS.

In June 1937, again followed an attempt to oust Stalin. The initiator was Osip Aronovich Pyatnitsky, one of the leaders of the Komintern, an associate of Lenin and Krupskaya. His son Vladimir Pyatnitsky's study, *The Plot Against Stalin* (M. 1998), speaks of the Komintern and of Osip Pyatnitsky himself. Vladimir Pyatnitsky studied documents about the activities of this organization and his father, who stood at its origins.

In the end Vladimir Pyatnitsky came to the conclusion - his father was involved in a conspiracy against Stalin. The conspirators gathered illegally, "over a cup of tea.

It is worth referring to the words of the author. Vladimir Pyatnitsky notes that even then no one believed in the spontaneity of what happened at the Central Committee Plenum. "There was talk of a 'cup of tea' - a meeting to which, before the Plenum, Pyatnitsky had summoned many secretaries of regional committees, old Bolsheviks and his Comintern comrades-in-arms. It was assumed that it was then that a preliminary agreement on a unified position was reached. I think there were not fifteen of them, but many more. According to A. Temkin, and he told about it in a cell of the NKVD internal prison at Lubyanka by Pyatnitsky himself, one of the participants of the meeting was the secretary of the Moscow Council Filatov, who immediately told Stalin about everything that

happened there. The results of this immediately affected Stalin, and of course, he took action. Grigory Kaminsky was arrested immediately after the end of the day's plenum by Frinovsky, Yezhov's first deputy. At his personal direction, after the evening session, almost all the Plenum members who opposed Stalin were arrested. Khatayevich, secretary of one of the regional party committees, was arrested on his way home. At the same plenum, death sentences were virtually approved for Bukharin, Rykov and their peers, and emergency powers were extended to Yezhov "to continue the fight against the counterrevolution," writes Vladimir Pyatnitsky.

You can take it as you like, what and how they discussed "over a cup of tea", maybe there was nothing of the kind, in today's view. But! It is necessary to take into account the time when the events took place. And here, for example, what Alexandra Nikolaevna Safonova, wife of Ivan Nikitovich Smirnov (1881-1936), supporter of Trotsky, Soviet political figure, one of the leaders of the Left Opposition, told in her memoirs.

Safonova recalled the words of Sergei Mrachkovsky (1888-1936), a Soviet military and economic figure, also a member of the Left Opposition. ".. Mrachkovsky had a face-to-face conversation with Stalin about BAM. When he returned, he told us - "Amazingly, he knows how to cover the heart of the matter... By the way, how easy it is to liquidate it." Ivan Nikitovich replied - "We can't do that". To which I said - "Then why all this irresponsible talk"?

As for the oppositionists themselves, one cannot ignore the fact that they themselves created Soviet society at the time, themselves stood at its origins, and when they

themselves were in power, they did to their opponents, exactly as their opponents did to them.

AT WAR.

During the Great Patriotic War, attempts to plot against Stalin did not cease. Here is just one example.

Mikhail Korshunov and Victoria Terekhova conducted research and wrote the book "The Secret of Moscow Secrets", which traced the fate of repressed dignitaries and their families who lived in the government house - the House on the Waterfront. In the book they told that in 1937 the state and public figure, diplomat Jalaeddin Korkmasov was repressed. He was from Dagestan. His son Erik was left alone. At the beginning of the war he was drafted into the army, wounded in combat and eventually medically discharged.

Arriving in Moscow, Erik Korkmasov creates a youth organization called Revenge for the Fathers from his friends in the famous house. The purpose of the organization is to assassinate Stalin. It included, in addition to Eric, Tanya Poluyan, a certain Svetlana, Volodya Rukhimovich - son of Moisey Rukhimovich (1889-1938), former USSR Commissar of Railways (1930-1931), former USSR Commissar of Defense Industry (1936-1937), Lena Bubnov - daughter of former USSR Commissar of Education Alexander Bubnov (1884-1938).

Soon the group came to the attention of the NKGB, it introduced the agents of this organization - Alexei Smirnov and Anatoly Granovsky. As a result, all activities of the conspirators were controlled by the

authorities.

The assassination attempt was scheduled for May 1, 1944. After the demonstration, Smirnov and Rukhimovich set off for Vorobyovy Gory, where Smirnov claimed that Stalin would surely come. Both of them were armed. But Smirnov was able to replace the cartridges and laid down blanks. The other members of the group had to hide the pistols after the assassination attempt.

The leader's car showed up. In front and behind were cars with guards. But instead of Stalin, operatives who arrested the conspirators suddenly jumped out of the cars.

At the same time the apartments of the group members were already being searched. As a result, Rukhimovich and Bubnova were sentenced to execution. Korkmasov and two others were sentenced to 15 years.

Not only the authors of the book wrote about this conspiracy, but also Anatoly Granovsky himself, who was infiltrated into this organization. He eventually became a non-returnee and wrote a book - "I Was a NKVD Agent". First-hand testimony.

All these cases cited from various sources, I believe, are just a drop in the ocean. There is so much about that time yet to be learned. And it's good that more and more documents are becoming the subject of research.

Again at the end of the XX Congress, 1956

At a meeting of the congress it was decided to acquaint the party organizations with the contents of the report. On March 5, the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted a resolution to acquaint "all communists and Komsomol members, as well as non-party workers, clerks and collective farmers" with it, and to send a pamphlet with the edited text of the report to party organizations marked as "Not for Press". For the masses at large, the "cult of personality" was first conflated with Stalin's name on March 28, 1956, in an article in Pravda entitled "Why the cult of personality is alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism.

Reading the pamphlet N.S. Khrushchev at meetings, its content aroused indignation among the listeners and a desire to understand the reasons for the connivance of lawlessness on the part of the party organs, and the public exposure of the crimes of the Stalinist regime generated profound changes in the public consciousness and destroyed the system of fear, Therefore the party leadership sought in every way to limit the growing criticism of the "cult" to a certain framework. Wishing to prevent the term "Stalinist" from being used in a negative light, A. N. Shelepin declared at the plenum of the Central Committee of the Komsomol in April 1956. That this word was invented by the bourgeois propaganda, which is trying to make it a swear word for its own black purposes. In our understanding, he argued, "the Stalinist", "like Comrade Stalin himself, is inseparable from the great title of Communist.

The framework of the criticism of the "cult" was delineated by the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences" published in June 1956. It offered an

explanation of the objective and subjective reasons for the emergence of this phenomenon. The resolution declared the "cult" a consequence of the struggle between the "obsolete classes" and the policies of Soviet power, the existence of an acute factional struggle within the party itself, and the complexity of the international situation. All of this led to a restriction of democracy, excessive vigilance, and centralization. Particular emphasis was placed on the assertion that, despite all the evils brought about, the "cult" had "not changed the nature of socialism": All negative phenomena had been overcome thanks to the determination of the "Leninist core" of party leaders. The shifting of blame exclusively to Stalin, Beria, and Yezhov was undertaken in order to remove political responsibility from Stalin's entourage, the local executors, and the organizers of political processes.

Much dissatisfaction was caused by the fact that the authorities did not dare to publish Khrushchev's report, but only acquainted their subjects with its contents. This was perceived as the party's unwillingness to tell the truth to the people. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that the content of the report was retold by the leading Western mass-media beginning on March 16, 1956. On June 4, the report was published in the New York Times, while in the Soviet Union it first appeared in the open press only at the end of perestroika (Izvestiya Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, 1989, #3).

Criticism of the "cult of personality" could not help but destroy the one-dimensionalism and perception of the past and the canons of the "Short course of the History of the VKP(b)" and generate new critical assessments.

Khrushchev's report at the 20th Congress began to cleanse the party and society of the ideology and practice of state terror. At the same time, the report marked the beginning of a major split in the international communist movement.

This speech about Stalin became the detonator for anti-communist actions in Poland. A crisis situation developed in Hungary, where, under the influence of the decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, there was active criticism of the strict leadership of the Hungarian Workers' Party and the country's pro-Soviet orientation.

The Soviet leadership saw the cause of the crisis in the machinations of the secret services and counter-revolutionaries in Hungary itself. The crisis was resolved by the restoration of Soviet influence in Hungary by introducing troops and suppressing all pockets of resistance to the new Provisional Revolutionary Government headed by J. Kádár. Several parties condemned Khrushchev's report to the 20th Congress as a reactionary one. Criticism of Stalinism was painfully met in China, which in this connection demonstrated claims to leadership in the world communist movement; in Albania, the DPRK, and Romania, where at that time their own "personality cults" were being established.

The political results of 1956 had to be sewn up badly by the Presidium of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This was proved by the letter of the CPSU Central Committee to the party organizations of December 19. It had a characteristic title "On intensifying the political work of the party organizations in the masses and suppressing the sneaks of anti-Soviet, hostile elements". It informed about

numerous facts of propagation of "broad" criticism of the "personality cult", about anti-Soviet riots among young people in Moscow, Sverdlovsk, Kaunas, Tallinn and Yerevan; about the influence of the malignant pro-war views on the public conscience.

XX Congress and Khrushchev's Lies: Why Stalinists Kept Silent

The 20th Congress of the CPSU was a turning point in the history of the Soviet Union. There Nikita Khrushchev denounced the "cult of personality" and accused Stalin of various crimes of repression. A lot of lies were voiced from the high rostrum by Nikita Sergeevich, but no one, no one present spoke out against them. Why were Molotov, Kaganovich and other authoritative comrades silent? After all, with their silence they seemed to have legitimized Khrushchev's false accusations!

In this article let's turn to the books of F.Chuev and try to give an answer to this question. Here is how Molotov and Kaganovich themselves, who disagreed with Khrushchev's report, explained the reasons for their silence.

1. First, Nikita Khrushchev had done a great deal of preparatory work, securing for himself the support of the majority of the Congress delegates. Molotov considered speaking under such conditions to be futile:

Khrushchev picked a lineup at the 20th Congress that shouted "hurrah for him!" Then I thought it over for a long

time, from different angles. The party was not ready for that [to oppose Khrushchev]. We would have simply been kicked out. I hoped that by staying in the Party we would straighten things out little by little. And then it would have been unexpected, if we had stood up, nobody would have supported us. No, nobody. We should have prepared a little before. Vyacheslav Molotov.

2. Second, they didn't stand up against Khrushchev because they were afraid that their performance would lead to a split in the party.

Molotov:

I believe that in the position we were in then, if we, even if I, had come forward with such views, we would have been very easily excluded. It would have caused, at least in some sections of the party, a split. And the split could have been very deep. Here was Tevosyan, the then Minister of Iron and Steel, he used to shout to me: "How is that so? How is that so?" He's a Stalinist, yes. Same thing Yudin, the ambassador to China. These two of them came to me at the congress. The danger was that even in our group, which was rather motley in its attitudes, actually motley, there could have been a split, which did not promise anything good, because the case for the Party as a whole was unprepared.

Kaganovich:

Maybe that was our mistake. We did not want to split the Congress. We didn't want to split the Congress because of our desire for unity. Lazar Kaganovich.

3. Third, Molotov's own career was far from its zenith by March 1953. To the press he remained the second man in the state, but in fact he had already been in the disgrace of Stalin for several years.

From the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs he was removed in 1949, then was arrested his wife P. Pearl; and in October 1952, at the plenum after the XIX Congress of the CPSU (b), Stalin made a sharp criticism of Molotov.

At the plenum, he basically propelled Khrushchev forward. Well, I, as a right-winger, was not elected to the Bureau either. In 1953 I was no longer invited by Stalin, not only to the small meetings, but also to social gatherings - to go out for an evening somewhere, to the movies - they stopped inviting me. Keep in mind that in recent years Stalin treated me negatively. I think that was wrong. Let them get a good look into it. I didn't change my opinion of Stalin, but there must have been some influence on him.

When Khrushchev read his report to the 20th Congress, I was already on the sidelines. Not only in the ministry... They tried to stay away from me. Only at the meeting would they report.

Kaganovich:

Stalin in recent years, made mistakes in the evaluation of people. He brought Khrushchev, Malenkov and Beria closer to him, while Molotov, Kaganovich and Voroshilov moved away. Stalin pushed us aside and underestimated us, but it was we, as it may even seem strange, both Molotov and I, who proved to be the

strongest. It was he, of course, who made the mistake. Pity.

Molotov, Stalin, Kaganovich.

4. Fourth, Khrushchev, during the 20th Congress of the CPSU, organized his speech quite cleverly. Molotov and some comrades knew that Khrushchev might criticize Stalin, but they did not know the content of the report itself. Besides, after the Congress it was planned to assemble a plenum of the Central Committee, where it was planned to hear the report of a special commission concerning the repressions and to work out some decision. During the congress such events were not planned.

The congress lasted from February 14 to 25 1956. At first, everything was relatively quiet, and the questions of the 6th Five-Year Plan, international relations and others were discussed. It seemed that the congress would end like this. But on the very last day, Khrushchev made an unexpected "horse move". **Kaganovich relates:**

In the Cultural Room of the Congress, where we usually went out, the Presidium of the Central Committee was suddenly assembled - some standing, some sitting - the room was small. They handed out our red books.

Khrushchev said:

- We have to speak at the congress. We said that we had agreed on a resolution at the Central Committee plenum - after the congress, in a quiet atmosphere. The Congress was already over. We were making speeches in unison, peacefully, without a split. - We must do it

now," says Khrushchev. We thumbed through it, looked at it, didn't even get a chance to read it. And the congress is waiting. We took a break. For fifteen minutes. We are going to have a session of the Pospelov commission.

Khrushchev then wrote: It was suggested that I make a report. He was lying. He himself said: -I will make a report. There were objections. I objected, Molotov, Voroshilov. I can't say that we actively opposed it. It was impossible. The facts were there, the facts are there, and the Congress is waiting. It is not true what he writes, that Molotov and Voroshilov did not object, but Kaganovich did. But they didn't actively dare, it was impossible. Maybe it was our mistake.

As we can see, Khrushchev's report was crucial, but he kept it up his sleeve until the last day. And on the last day, in fact, he confronted everybody with the fact. If he had made the report earlier, the same Molotov, Kaganovich, and Voroshilov could have gathered in the evening, read the report, think things over, and work out their line of behavior. But Khrushchev did not leave them any time for that.

Nikita Khrushchev at the XX Congress of the CPSU.

5. Well and fifthly, to Molotov's credit, although he did not oppose the report, he decided to fight by other methods - to gather a group of comrades around him to prepare Khrushchev's resignation. It seems that Kaganovich, Voroshilov, and other opponents of Khrushchev thought this was the best way to proceed. If the plan had succeeded, Molotov and company would

have returned the country's policies to their previous course, rehabilitating Stalin's name without any upheaval, by decisions from above.

Alas, the attempt to remove Khrushchev in June 1957 was close to success, but in the end it failed. All comrades who spoke against Khrushchev were declared "anti-party group..." and sent into premature resignation.

What more needs to be added. Reading Felix Chuev's books, I have the impression that Molotov and Kaganovich underestimated the possible consequences of Khrushchev's report. Although they did not agree with the criticism of Stalin, they did not consider it too dangerous. Yes, unfair to Stalin, but Stalin did not live for himself, and for the cause, but the cause is alive! The Soviet Union is still the USSR, faithful to the ideas of Marx-Engels-Lenin, and it is as if nothing terrible has happened. They evaluated Khrushchev's activities extremely negatively, but at the same time they saw no threat to the existence of the USSR, and they still believed in the imminent collapse of capitalism on earth.

It seems that at that time they did not understand that there was much more than criticism of Stalin as a single individual. It was a rejection of the entire Stalinist legacy, it was the beginning of a 180-degree turn of the entire state policy. The Stalin legacy is the foundation of the Soviet Union. It is impossible to build a building upward, but at the same time to destroy the foundation - sooner or later everything will collapse. Neither Molotov nor Kaganovich evaluated the situation this way. However, it is easy for us to judge now, we see the result - the collapse of the USSR, while it was much more difficult for them.

And as for the split in the Party. Probably here played a role the so-called testament of Lenin in 1924, in which he urged to prevent a split - Molotov and Kaganovich remembered it. But it seems to me that in the case of the XX Congress of the CPSU, the split would be in the hands of Stalin's supporters. What was the point of party unity if the party was headed for the abyss? If Molotov had understood this, and if Molotov had spoken at the congress, yes, he would have been joined by a smaller proportion of the delegates, but he would have been joined by the majority of the party grassroots and the masses of ordinary people. And Stalin's authority was enormous! And so was Molotov.

Remember, none of the politicians stood up for Stalin, but still riots broke out in some cities, and in Tbilisi they even had to be suppressed by tanks! And what would have happened if Molotov had deliberately gone to split the party and from high rostrums urged all honest people to stand up for the good name of Stalin? It seems to me that Khrushchev would have been simply ridiculed.

Comrade Stalin and Comrade Molotov.

However, this is all an "if only". And in fact there were many factors coming together. And Stalin's mistakes in people in the last years of his life, and the tactics chosen by the Stalinists to fight, which ended in failure for them, and unconditional cunning and sagacity of Khrushchev. They were all outplayed by the simple-minded and seemingly short-sighted Nikita, who was eager to get into the clan at any cost, and when he got his hands on it, launched processes that led to the destruction of the

USSR and the collapse of the entire communist movement.

"How is that so? How is it so?" - shouted to Molotov after the 20th Congress, indignant Tevosyan and Yudin. And indeed, how is it so?

Amnestied and Rehabilitated People against the Soviet Power.

In early 1957, Khrushchev gave new reasons for controversy in the Presidium of the Central Committee. He proposed reorganizing the management of industry and construction by creating councils of national economy (sovnarkhozes) on the ground instead of industry ministries in the center. Members of the Presidium began to discuss the idea, the results of which did not seem unambiguous to them. On February 13, without waiting for the approval of his proposals, Khrushchev submitted them to the Central Committee Plenum. Then, ignoring Molotov's opinion that the plan was "obviously incomplete" and "might seriously hamper the administrative apparatus", and violating the established order of further approvals, he obtained the approval of his proposals at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. On May 10, 1957 the reform became the law. It abolished 10 all-union and 15 union-republican ministries. The enterprises subordinate to them were placed under the jurisdiction of state economic enterprises. Similarly Khrushchev obtained a decision to cancel the internal state loans and payments on them.

On May 22, 1957, without consulting the Presidium of

the Central Committee, Khrushchev, on behalf of the Central Committee and the Soviet government, set a goal for the country to catch up and surpass America in meat production per capita in 1960- 1961, in milk - by 1958, promising collective farmers soon to cancel the mandatory supplies from subsidiary farms. Specialists understood the unreality of the task, because in 1956 the U.S. produced 16 million tons of meat, and the USSR - 7.5 million, and to reduce such a gap clearly did not have the required conditions.

As early as May 1957, Khrushchev's opponents in the Presidium began to speculate that it was time to get rid of him: to liquidate the post of the First Secretary of the Central Committee; to carry out the necessary reshuffle of personnel. Khrushchev was suggested as Minister of Agriculture, his supporter Suslov was appointed Minister of Culture, Serov was replaced as Chairman of the KGB by Bulganin or Pato-Lichev, Zhukov, on the contrary, was promoted and transferred from candidate to member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. On June 18, 1957 using the convocation of the Presidium of the Central Committee to coordinate the speeches of its members at the upcoming celebration of the 250th anniversary of Leningrad, Malenkov sharply criticized Khrushchev's activities and proposed that he be removed from office. The majority belonged to Khrushchev's opponents, and their votes were enough to pass a decision. However, Bulganin, who chaired the meeting, was indecisive and agreed to postpone it to the next day so that the three absent members of the Presidium could join the meeting.

The resumed discussion dragged on for several days. Khrushchev's supporters took advantage of this time.

Leonid Brezhnev, F. R. Kozlov, K. A. Furtseva began calling secretaries of republican, territorial, and regional party committees, summoning them to Moscow in order to insist with their help that the discussion of Khrushchev be moved to the Central Committee plenum. It was counted that the majority of the 133 members of the Central Committee, who considerably strengthened their position in the field through the transition to sovnarchy, would not want to support the coup d'etat, which threatened them with the elimination of the post of first secretaries. The calculation proved to be correct. The plenum of the Central Committee, which opened on June 22, strongly supported Khrushchev. Then Bulganin, Voroshilov, Pervukhin and Saburov began to repent, claiming that they had been ignorant of the true intentions of the "troika" (Malenkov, Kaganovich and Molotov).

On June 29, the plenum rendered its final verdict. The activity of the "troika" and Shepilov, who "joined it," was recognized as factional. D.T. Shepilov turned out to be a principled opponent of Khrushchev, not as a Stalinist, but as an opponent of the "cult of personality," including its new form, so he was called an "adherent".

Khrushchev's opponents were stripped of all leadership positions and expelled from the Central Committee. The repentant Saburov was removed from the Presidium, Pervukhin was transferred from member to candidates, and Bulganin was given a stern reprimand with a warning. The composition of the Central Committee Presidium was expanded to 15 members. Khrushchev's supporters were included. New members of the Presidium were Brezhnev, Zhukov, Kozlov, Furtseva, Shvernik, transferred from candidates, and newly elected Aristov, Belyaev, Ignatov and Kuusinen.

Encouraged by the victory, Khrushchev decided to consolidate definitively with the resignation of G. K. Zhukov. Minister of Defense seemed dangerous to Khrushchev (as he had been to Stalin in his time) by his authority, independence of judgment and decisions, and his ability to become a real alternative to the first person in the state. Many in Khrushchev's inner circle felt that Marshal had no rest for the "crown of Eisenhower," the nagging commander-in-chief of the Allied expeditionary forces in Western Europe who had become president of the United States. Marshal Malinovsky in 1955 warned Khrushchev: "Take care of Zhukov, he is a growing Bonaparte, he is a dangerous man, he will stop at nothing". Equally categorical was Marshal I.H. Bagralin, who believed that Zhukov "always sought personal power and Slip. He is just a sick man. Power hunger is in his blood."

Khrushchev knew about Zhukov's hesitation, who once considered it expedient to abolish the post of the First Secretary of the Central Committee and promised to demolish the KGB and Lubyanka itself "in no time at all". It was also known about his disdain for the army political workers, concerning many of whom he said at a large meeting: "For forty years they have got used to cowering, they have lost all sense of smell, like old cats. Just stick red beards on them and give them daggers - they would slit the commanders' throats."

On October 19, 1957, at the meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee in the absence of G. K. Zhukov, (he was sent on a state visit to Albania and Yugoslavia), it was decided to remove him from the Presidium of the Central Committee and members of the Central

Committee for shortcomings of Party and political work in the army, exaggerating his role in the history of the Patriotic War and Bonapartism. The Army with the new Minister of Defense, Marshal R. Malinovsky (appointed to the post on October 26, 1957) was again completely under the control of the party apparatus. In contrast to the practice of previous years, the disgraced Zhukov was preserved with a comfortable life and honor.

In the late 50's other active participants in the 1957 démarche against Khrushchev were also removed from power. On March 27, 1958 Bulganin was dismissed from the post of chairman of the USSR government, appointed head of the State Bank of the USSR and a few months later sent as chairman of the Soviet National Economy in Stavropol, and on September 5, 1958 was relieved of his duties as a member of the Presidium of the Central Committee. On May 7, 1960, K. E. Voroshilov left his post of Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and on July 16, "at his personal request", he was removed from the Presidium of the Central Committee. The new chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet almost to the end of the Khrushchev rule was Leonid Brezhnev.

Having defeated the resistance leaders to the course of the 20th Party Congress, Khrushchev forced the exposure of the "cult of personality". In October 1961, at the XXII Congress of the CPSU, Stalin and his defenders were once again sharply condemned for their crimes. By decision of the Congress, Stalin's body was removed from the Mausoleum and buried near the Kremlin wall. Kaganovich, Malenkov and Molotov were expelled from the Party (December 1961 - May 1962).

Shepilov, initially sent to Kyrgyzstan to head the Institute of Economics of the local Academy of Sciences, was deprived of the title of corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences in 1960 and transferred to work as an archaeographer in the Main Archives Department of the USSR Council of Ministers. In February 1962 he was also expelled from the party, but unlike his "accomplices", he was restored in the CPSU even before his retirement (1982).

In the period between the XXth and XXII Congresses of the Party and later, the revision of the cases of the previously repressed "enemies of the people" continued. By 1990, 369,570 people had been rehabilitated after revision of the cases considered by the abolished extrajudicial agencies ("troikas"), but only in 1989, 912 people were denied, including not only renegades and punishers but also former employees of state security agencies who were guilty of falsifying criminal cases of the time.

Management reorganization in connection with the "construction of communism." As the deadline approached for the USSR to catch up with and surpass the U.S. on major economic indicators, the idea matured to organize this competition by all the rules. In January 1959, an extraordinary XXI Congress of the Party was convened.

The Soviet Union was the first country to achieve complete and final victory of socialism and to begin the unfolding construction of communism. He discussed the prospects of development of the national economy for 1959-1965. The annual acceleration of the growth rate in all sectors of the economy, as laid down in the plan,

created the illusion of achieving victory in the economic competition with capitalist countries and making the USSR the first in the world by the absolute volume of production by 1965.

At the same time it was decided to accelerate the preparation of a new 3rd Program of the Party which was prepared by special committees established at the 18th, 19th and 20th Congresses of the Party. Its draft was published in the press in the summer of 1961. The XXIIInd Congress of the CPSU was convened for discussion and adoption. The CPSU Program was approved at the forum called the Congress of Builders of Communism held in October. It defined the prospects for further movement of the Soviet people, and at the same time the entire human society, toward communism.

In connection with the development of the new program, the planning bodies prepared calculations of the possible levels and rates of development of national economy of the USSR for the years 1961-1980. The general outlook "showed" that in the next decade the Soviet Union would surpass the United States in production per capita, and in the second decade it would "come close to implementing the principle of distribution according to needs". In his speech on the occasion of the flight of the first cosmonaut Yu. Gagarin in April 1961, Khrushchev said that the implementation of the seven-year plan "will bring us closer to the fact that we will cross the threshold of the achievements of the capitalist world and break out, as we have now broken out into space, forward in the development of our economy and meeting the needs of the people.

However, unforeseen complications began to arise in the

early stages of the "takeoff" toward communist abundance. On June 1, 1962, in an address to the people, I had to speak frankly about the difficulties that were arising in providing the population of the cities with meat products, and I set forth measures to overcome them in the near future. It turned out, that with the existing level of mechanization of cattle breeding and productivity of work on collective and state farms, the costs of meat and milk production were much higher than the prices, at which the state procures those products. In many collective farms cattle breeding is not profitable, and fosters losses. Taking this into account, the country's leadership decided to increase purchasing prices for the meat of cattle, tills, sheep, goats and poultry by an average of 35%. At the same time it was decided to raise retail prices for meat and meat products by an average of 30% and for animal oil by 25%.

To eliminate the disruptions in food supply to the population, it was necessary to resort to imports of grain and introduce rationing of some products in the form of "orders" to enterprises and organizations. The situation worsened in 1963, the driest year since 1946. Grain yields and gross harvests in that year decreased by almost 30% compared to the previous year. Grain imports in 1963 were 3 million tons, with exports of 6.2 million; in 1964 - 7.2 million tons, with exports of 3.5 million. In 1985 the USSR imported 45.6 million tons of grain.

A significant increase in retail prices of meat and butter caused unrest in a number of cities (Omsk, Kemerovo, Donetsk, Artemyevsk, Kramatorsk). The riots in Novocherkassk on June 1-2, 1962 had to be suppressed by force. As a result, 24 demonstrators were killed, 70

were wounded, 105 were convicted, seven of them were sentenced to capital punishment.

The arising economic and social problems forced Khrushchev to search for new ways to improve the economic management. In particular, he began to fight the "shadow-makers" who were engaged in clandestine economic activities instead of building communism.

In November 1962, the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, at Khrushchev's insistence, set about restructuring the entire governing bodies from top to bottom according to the principle of production. Party organizations, from oblast and below, were divided into industrial and rural ones. According to this model, instead of unified rural and industrial councils and executive committees had to be created, and, accordingly, the organizations of trade unions and Komsomol were divided. Feverish measures led only to an increase in the number and a significant increase in the cost of maintaining the administrative apparatus (for example, in the Samarkand region - 1.7 times), but were ineffective. Regional organizations and departments of communication, trade, public education, health care, administrative bodies, subordinated to both industrial and rural party and Soviet bodies, began to receive daily duplicating resolutions and orders on the same issues. Instead of their direct work, their leaders and specialists were forced to spend many hours at various meetings and assemblies, the number of which at least doubled, and they were often scheduled for the same time.

The plans to speed up economic development through partial restoration of branch management of the economy by means of formation of the system of branch

committees, enlargement of state farms (the number of state farms was reduced by the decision of the November 1962 Central Committee Plenum) and establishment of republican, union-wide SNKh and then formation (March 1963) of the Higher Council of National Economy, which actually restored the centralized structure of economic management. By the end of 1964, the country had 47 sovnarkhoses (instead of 100 before November of 1962) and 19 large economic regions which included all union republics (except Moldova).

At the end of the 50's in connection with the course on building communism the state-church relations became tense again, in fact the persecution of the Russian Orthodox Church was renewed. Secretary of the Central Committee L. F. Ilyichev in his speech at a meeting on ideology (December 1961) said: "Religion, which has always been in modern conditions an anachronism, now becomes an intolerable hindrance on our way to communism. Atheistic work was recognized as the main lever for the formation of a scientific and materialistic worldview. Achieving a "society without religion," and in the very near future, was declared a program goal. This goal was most clearly articulated in Ilyichev's report on "Prior Tasks of the Ideological Work of the Party" at the June Plenum of the Central Committee of the Party (1963). The new attack on the Church was expressed not only in increased atheistic propaganda, but also in the administrative reduction of the number of active religious associations. In 1958 there were 18,600 of them. The contradiction between the freedom of conscience proclaimed in the Constitution of the USSR and the practice of its realization could not be resolved in the following years. From the mid-1970s, however, the attitude toward religion on the part of the state became

more tolerant. The existence and activities of religious associations were seen as a necessary condition for ensuring freedom of conscience and human rights.

Liquidation of private homesteads and Artels under Khrushchev. "Economy of the USSR 1929-1955".

When Khrushchev came to power, he first got rid of those who could oppose him - Leonid Beria was killed, Malenkov (was appointed Minister of Power Plants in 1955), was removed from the leadership of the country and sent to different places for minor posts, Molotov was transferred from the post of Foreign Minister to the State Control Committee, and then sent as Ambassador to Mongolia. Presumably, there were other figures of a lesser rank. Khrushchev brought his own people to the leadership of the country, those who were loyal to him, whom he counted on. And so it went.

On March 6, 1956 the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers "On the Charter of the Agricultural Artel and Further Development of Collective Farmers' Initiative in the Organization of Collective Farm Production and Management of Artel Affairs" was issued.

It recommended that collective farms, proceeding from the interests of the state, public interests of collective farms, and personal interests of collective farmers, should supplement and modify certain provisions of the adopted Charter themselves, taking into account local specific conditions, in particular the size of homestead plots, number of cattle in personal possession, minimum labor days and other.

The Statute of February 17, 1935 - "...the size of the homestead lands which is in personal use of the collective farm yard (excluding the land under dwelling buildings) can vary from 1/4 to 1/2 of a hectare and in separate regions - up to 1 hectare depending on regional and district conditions determined by the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the Union republics on the basis of the guidelines of the People's Commissariat for Agriculture of the Soviet Union..."

Translated into more familiar language - the peasants could have from 25 to 50 hundred hectares of land for personal use.

It was said that "... the charter of the agricultural Artel no longer covers all aspects of the varied life and activities of the collective farms, in some cases restricting their initiative in establishing the order of public farming most appropriate to the specific conditions of the collective farm..."

The numerous letters received by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers from the collective farms and collective farmers propose changes to certain provisions of the Model Statute of the Agricultural Artel and, in particular, raise questions about the procedure for allotment and size of homestead plots, the number of cattle owned by a collective farm yard, the procedure for using collective farm grazing, determining the minimum labor days, exclusion of collective farmers from collective farms, income distribution, expansion of collective farm management rights and others. Collective farmers rightly pointed out that the allotment of homestead lands to collective farms, stipulated by the Model Statute of the agricultural Artel, regardless of the degree of labor participation in the collective farm of able-bodied members of the collective farm, contradicts the objectives of organizational and economic

strengthening of collective farms...".

As a result, the areas of plots allocated for personal subsidiary plots are affected.

On the work on the personal plot and on the collective farm. In 1939 the resolution of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks and the Council of People's Commissars determined that the obligatory annual minimum labor days for women of 16 to 55 and men of 16 to 60 years in collective farms was 60 to 100 days per year.

After the war this minimum was increased, in the 1950s it was already averaging up to 150 labor days per year for women and up to 200 for men.

On August 27, 1956, the Decree "On monetary tax from the citizens having cattle in the cities" was issued. This decree introduces a special tax for city dwellers who own livestock. On August 20, 1958, the decree "On Prohibition of the Keeping of Livestock in the Personal Ownership of the Citizens Residing in Cities and Workers Settlements" was issued.

As a result, 12 million urban families with their own vegetable gardens were affected. As a result - mass slaughter of livestock. People who had previously fed themselves, sold their surplus produce at markets and surrendered their produce to the state, now found themselves as consumers of produce from stores.

According to the Statute of 1935 - "...each collective farm yard...may have for personal use a cow, up to 2 young cattle, 1 sow with litter or, if the collective farm board finds it necessary, 2 sows with litter, up to 10 sheep and goats together, unlimited number of birds and rabbits and up to 20 beehives. Each collective farm yard

in agricultural areas with developed cattle breeding may have 2-3 cows and, in addition, young cattle, 2 to 3 sows with litter, 20 to 25 sheep and goats together...".

December 1959, a decision is made regarding the villagers. At the regular Plenum of the Central Committee it is said that "...private subsidiary farms are gradually losing their importance...".

As the main argument - it turns out, it will be much more profitable for the villagers to get products from the collective farm, rather than grow themselves! That's it, - - - not much less.

And, as a result, additional taxes are imposed on each head of cattle in private households, each planted fruit tree.

It becomes unprofitable to keep cattle, and mass slaughter begins, because even though the state is willing to buy, but the prices offered is very low, it is easier to slaughter them. And where it is sold - the collective farms cannot feed such a number of cattle, also begins slaughtering already "extra".

In the early 1960s, the picture was like this - private farms were heavily taxed, their land was cut down, they were severely restricted in fodder... As a result, private farms come to naught and cease to exist.

And, in fact, collective farmers' private farms were an effective supplier of products in the USSR!

For example, in 1940 they supplied by obligatory state supply up to 30% of all potatoes in the country, cattle and poultry - 25%, eggs - 90%, milk - 26%, wool - 22% etc.

With their elimination begins a systemic shortage and

shortage of production, the income of farmers falls.

On April 6, 1962 N.Ya. Itskov, agricultural scientist, deputy head of the Agricultural Department of the CPSU Central Committee, sent a report to Khrushchev in which he noted that "...it will take many years to decisively displace (overlap) the share of production by their private subsidiary farms. For example, in the production of eggs, it will take several dozen years, very many years for the production of potatoes, vegetables, meat and bacon. I have calculated such data, they are very alarming ...".

Itskov poses a question - "...Is the question of the reduction and even elimination of private subsidiary farms being raised in too much hurry?". N. Itskov never received an answer to his appeal.

The country was beginning to experience food supply shortages. At the beginning of 1962 there was a shortage of bread (wheat), cereals, vegetable oil, meat, milk and other basic foodstuffs. Cards for most foodstuffs were introduced in some regions of the country.

On May 31, 1962 the central newspapers published the resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and USSR Council of Ministers "On raising the purchase (delivery) prices of cattle, pigs, sheep, poultry, butter and cream and retail prices of meat, which stipulated rise in prices for meat and meat products by 30% on average (beef - 31% on average, mutton - 34%, pork - 19%), sausages - 31%, butter - 25%.

1963 - there is a bad harvest, so the USSR begins to

import food and spend its gold reserve for that. From that time on the food shortage becomes chronic, the growth of imported food purchases – become permanent. As for the Artels, everything was done approximately according to the same scheme.

On April 14, 1956 there was issued the Decree "On Reorganization of the Artisanal Cooperative" which stated that "...many of the artisanal cooperative enterprises ceased to be in artisanal cooperative production, and in essence were no different from the state industrial enterprises".

Decision - "...to deem it necessary to reorganize the trade cooperation by transferring its largest specialized enterprises to the republican ministries of the corresponding branches of industry and regional and city councils of deputies of workers, and trade enterprises and public catering enterprises to the local trade organizations of the system of ministries of trade and consumer co-operation of the union republics. Establish that the transfer to state bodies of industrial cooperation enterprises shall be made free of charge with all assets and liabilities according to the balance sheet as of the 1st day of the month...".

In 1960 at the level of each republic typical decisions on the liquidation of Artels were made. On September 24, 1960 the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR adopted the Decree "On Abolition of industrial cooperation", which completed the process of Artels liquidation.

By the early 1960s, Artels were transformed into state enterprises, joining the not-so-flexible planned economy, especially for mass-market goods. For example, the Artel Metallist became a state plant, the Artel Krasny Partizan became a Rosin plant, etc. Citizens with an enterprising spirit are deprived of the opportunity for self-

realization, Artel property is alienated without compensation.

The mechanism of forming a variety of goods and an immediate response to changes in demand is eliminated. An era of shortages of a significant part of the range of consumer goods begins, which only increases.

The initiative is pushed into the illegal sphere (the shadow sphere), "shopkeepers" appear. Gregory Grossman, a professor at the University of California, estimated that the shadow economy in the USSR by the end of the 1980s amounted to 7-8%. Incidentally, this was roughly the rate at which the artisanal trades yielded under Stalin.

Yevgeny Yasin, one of the "gurus of liberal economics," estimated that at least 10-15% of GDP in the USSR was given to the shadow economy. Liquidation of pro-martels, bans, shady dealers - all this becomes a breeding ground for the growth of crime, corruption. That's how everything that had been created for years was destroyed in a few years, from 1956 to the beginning of the 1960s. And in the end, instead of moving forward, the country stalled and went into a dead-end.

If we are to believe the individual commentators (it's a good thing there are far fewer of them than adequate people), *it was worse under Stalin*.

As they say - *no comment*. It is not even worth paying attention to.

Elimination of planning under Khrushchev, 1955-1964.

In 1955, the preparation of a new 5-year plan began. And this is where a crisis of goals arises, which was not previously the case. On August 5, 1955, a Decree of the Government of the USSR was adopted, which established the following provision: to ask the directors of enterprises, the chairmen of trade union committees, and local managers for their thoughts and suggestions on the preparation of a new plan. Enterprise managers now report on the production plans of the enterprises they manage, etc.

It is formulated literally like this: "Previously, the plan was drawn up from above, by the State Planning Committee and ministries, now attention is paid to the preparation of the plan at the enterprise."

This is a blow to the planning hierarchy - plans are not brought down from above, but they begin to be drawn up on the spot.

In 1956, the first results of changes in violations of the strategic approach in planning appear - the plan for coal mining, cement production, and metal production is not being implemented. Failure to meet the plan for these positions leads to a disruption of the construction and capital investment plan, and this already means a drop in the economic growth rate.

February 14, 1957, speaking at the Plenum of the Central Committee, Khrushchev declares: *"The development of plans should begin at enterprises, then at the corresponding economic association, in the Council of National Economy, in the State Plan of the republic and end in the State Plan of the*

country...Gosplan should develop consolidated national economic plans based on the plans provided by the National Economy Councils and State Plans of the Republics..."

This decision was based on the fact that mature and well-trained personnel work on the ground, and they should be trusted.

What is this but a nod to the local authorities-we trust you, we give you the opportunity to make your own decisions, and you, in return, support the central leadership. This approach was legalized by the Government Decree of May 4, 1958 - *"The entire planning system should be based on plans drawn up by the enterprises themselves"*

Strategically, the following happened: Earlier, it was the State Planning Committee of the USSR that STARTED planning based on the results already available, on the capabilities of certain enterprises, on the basis of existing demand, etc. All this was prepared, of course, the necessary information from the field was taken into account, everything was processed, calculated, plans were approved and sent down to the places. A plan is already a law.

Now the State Planning Committee of the USSR, on the contrary, was FINISHING the planning process. As a result, the State Planning Committee ended the function of state strategic goal-setting, which determines to a decisive extent the organization, coherence and integrity of the economic system.

Now Gosplan has turned from a *"strategist"* to an *"accountant"* - the plan, instead of a mechanism for strategic management of the country's economy, has actually turned into a registration tool, a statement, in a

word, into ordinary accounting. Now Gosplan simply kept records.

This led to the abandonment of big goals. The economic system is beginning to lose its capacity for high growth rates, as noted earlier. Local proposals *are* beginning to be dominated by plans based on the level achieved in the previous period, and the demand positions of local managers are growing.

As noted - *"As practice shows, designing the development of individual industries in total requires 1.5-2 times more capital investment than can be allocated based on the state of resources."*

How does all this work in practice? Planning moves *"from necessary" mode to the "from achieved" mode.*

A system of bargaining for obtaining resources between different groups of influence is emerging and gaining strength and becoming a practice. In this practice, the implementation of large-scale projects becomes a rather rare exception.

As a well-known economist said about it, Evgeny Yasin - *"...The rule was to plan from the achieved level. This meant that all the existing proportions were transferred to the future with small adjustments. Only more or less extravagant ideas of managers such as the introduction of corn, the construction of AvtoVAZ prompted Gosplan to lay down significant structural changes in the plan..."*

As a result of such *"planning"*, the growth rate of the economy begins to seriously slow down, in fact - to fall. And, as a result, the country begins to lag behind in its economic development more and more.

The fall in economic growth rates is presented in such a way that everything is good - *"...the country had an*

insufficiently high level of economic development, and the plans were focused on achieving maximum and very intense rates. Currently, the planned rates remain high, but they do not allow for excessive strain..."

On May 10, 1957, the Law "On further improvement of the organization of industrial and construction management" was adopted. This Law radically changes the management system! A transition was made from the sectoral to the territorial principle of economic management - through the Council of People's Commissars.

The economic system is fragmented into 105 Sovnarkhozes. On its territory, the Council of People's Commissars is given key administrative powers from planning to controlling the activities of enterprises that are part of the IMH.

On May 22, 1957, a Government decree was issued, according to which it was decided - *"...grant the chairmen of the National Economy Councils of economic administrative districts the rights established for ministers..."*.

And the State Planning Committee of the USSR itself from 1953 to 1962 changed 8 managers and underwent 4 reorganizations. This indicated that the continuity of work on the organization of the economy was disrupted, the integrity of management was destroyed, the system was being fragmented, and this already leads to disorganization.

The personnel potential of those who created and built the country's economy is being reduced, and professionals are being removed.

The decree of October 14, 1954" On significant shortcomings in the structure of ministries and departments and measures to improve the work of the state apparatus " says so directly - *"...reduce the number of administrative and managerial personnel by at least 450 thousand people...In 46 ministries and departments, 200 main directorates, directorates and independent departments, 147 trusts, 93 local directorates, and 898 supply organizations should be abolished..."*.

The organization of the Council of People's Commissars leads to the fact that the interests of *"localism" begin to prevail there*. In the republics, however, this takes the form of *"nationalist localism"*.

By the way - the first five-year plan leads to a lot of adjustments and eventually becomes a seven-year plan!

As a result, strategic planning and the integrity of the unified economic system were destroyed in favor of territorial economic fragmentation. A vicious low-level managerial culture begins to take root in the activities of the state, in which they do not deal with the management of the economic system as a whole, but deal in isolation with various particulars. The feedback channel is destroyed, and with the termination of *top-down planning*, the organizing role of State planning officials is lost.

The number and quality of plan indicators is drastically reduced. In 1954, the number of planned indicators was reduced by 33.5% - from 9,940 to 6,308. In 1955 - to 3,081 indicators. 1958 - up to 1,780 positions.

According to this characteristic, only 18.7% of the State Planning system that existed in 1953 remains by 1958!

In addition, the quality of indicators is fundamentally changing. Natural indicators are increasingly being replaced by monetary ones.

Already in 1954, a number of types of machine-building products were excluded from the nomenclature of industrial products included in the state plan, which were previously planned in terms of standard sizes, brands, capacity and assortment. The output of products of the lightest nomenclature increases for the purpose of general, formal, implementation of the plan.

As a result, the allocated resources, in order to fulfill the overall plan, are spent on products that are easier and easier to produce, but they begin to be unclaimed and stored in warehouses, lying there as *"dead weight"*.

The country's economy is being reoriented from the production of pieces, units of equipment, tons of raw materials, kilowatts of electricity, etc. to rubles.

The slowdown in economic development is beginning to affect the socio-economic situation in the country - the standard of living of the population is falling, the commodity deficit is increasing, and inflation is increasing. The quality of our products is falling.

In March 1963, the Supreme Economic Council of National Economy of the USSR, in fact, the Unified Council of People's Commissars of the USSR, was created.

The functions of the Supreme Economic Council are so great that it is simply not clear - and then what should the Council of Ministers of the USSR do?

But the Supreme Economic Council was already in the USSR - from 1923 to 1932. Then it was transformed into the People's Commissariat of Heavy Industry. That is, it

was already a passed stage in the development of the country.

And, as it turned out 2 years later, the Supreme Economic Council was unable to solve the problems of the country's economic development. It was abolished in October 1965. What was it created for then?..

September 9, 1962 in the newspaper "*Pravda* " is an article by an economist Yevsey Lieberman 's "*Plan. Profit. Award*" in which he suggests abandoning the holistic development of a single economic system in favor of the autonomy of individual enterprises, the actual priority of enterprises over the interests of the country's economy as a whole.

In 1965, these ideas became the basis of a reform called the Lieberman-Kosygin reform. Under this reform, the priority of monetary indicators of the plan over natural indicators is finally fixed. But this is a different story, a different time, after Khrushchev. This will be discussed later.

Khrushchev's resignation

Much of the dissatisfaction with Khrushchev stemmed from his ill-considered actions in October 1962. That led to the acute "missile crisis" in relations with the United States, which brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. Khrushchev, who had barely saved face in this case, had to retreat and accept the political costs. His popularity plummeted as food prices rose. Grain imports in 1963-1964 meant the collapse of the very policy in which Khrushchev considered himself the greatest expert. The dissatisfaction of the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee with such leadership

results began to form into a conspiracy against Khrushchev by early 1964.

Events were precipitated by Khrushchev's plots for new reorganizations. In July 1964 he proposed the idea of reorganizing the management of agriculture by creating about a dozen specialized departments (in charge of the production of grain, sugar beet, cotton, etc.) and transferring the agricultural research institutions from Moscow and Leningrad to the provinces. Khrushchev proposed to raise agriculture and accelerate the growth of consumer goods production also at the expense of the reduction of the "armaments prodigy" and of the army. Completely unexpected for most members of the Party leadership was his speech to the Secretaries of Party regional committees about the advisability of introducing eight-year national economic plans.

During Khrushchev's vacation and rest in the south in October 1964, the Central Committee Presidium colleagues completed preparations for his resignation from leading positions in the Party and the government. The main roles in preparing the conspiracy were played by A. N. Shelepin, Chairman of the Committee of Party and State Control of the Central Committee; D. S. Polyansky, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR in 1958-1962, then Deputy Chairman of the Government of the USSR; and D. S. K. Kuznetsov, Chairman of the Party and State Committee, and V. E. Semichastny, Chairman of the KGB. At the center of the anti-Khrushchev plot was Leonid Brezhnev, the former chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and from June 1963 the Secretary of the Central Committee, in charge of human resources.

One of the drafts of the report, prepared by Polyansky on behalf of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee at the upcoming plenum of the Central Committee, seriously accused Khrushchev of failing all of the country's economic development plans and more than halving the rate of economic growth. It was claimed that he was to blame for the adventurism of the CPSU program itself, and his arrogance, rudeness, and incompetence were condemned. It was proposed that Khrushchev be relieved of all posts; that the combination of the positions of First Secretary of the Central Committee and Presidents of the Central Committee be strictly forbidden from now on; and that the division of the party according to the production principle be eliminated.

On October 12, the members of the Presidium of the Central Committee who remained in Moscow decided to summon members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee and members of the CPSU Central Audit Commission to report to the Central Committee Plenum on the urgent issues of developing a new five-year plan. The time of its conduct was to be determined in the presence of Khrushchev, who had been summoned from Pitsunda.

On October 13, he arrived in Moscow, and a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee began, at which the question of the Eight-Year Plan and the Five-Year Plan immediately turned into a question about the situation in the Central Committee Presidium because of Khrushchev's "non-party treatment" of its members and other transgressions. Only A. I. Mikoyan, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, who had held that post since July 1964, made an attempt to

soften Khrushchev's criticism, but this was of little help to Khrushchev. The next day he signed his own resignation letter. The same day the plenum of the Central Committee heard a report by M. A. Suslov and, without opening a debate, relieved Khrushchev of his post "due to advanced age and deteriorating health". Leonid Brezhnev was elected first secretary of the Central Committee, and Andrei Kosygin was recommended as Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. A year later, Mikoyan was retired. December 9, 1965 N. V. Podgorny became the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The Economy of the USSR 1929-1955.

Reasons for phenomenal growth

The subject of the economy of the USSR under Stalin is an interesting topic and worthy of very painstaking study. From this experience it is even possible to take something today, and use the same managerial decisions.

From 1929 to 1955, the economy of the USSR grew by an average of 13.8%/yr. Of course, with the exception of the war years, 1941-1945. How could there be 20 years of double-digit growth, and as the result of what decisions?

Since 1885 there is comparable statistical data on the development of the economy, set out in a number of works of the American economist Paul Gregory - "Distribution under the dictatorship: and a study on the

basis of archival material of the Stalin era"; "The political economy of Stalinism", etc. It is possible to compare the data of the XIX, XX, XXI centuries, and it will be seen that on average the economy grew until 1913 at a rate of 3.4%.

This growth was somewhat less when economic policy was determined by S.Y. Witte, Chairman of the Council of Ministers, 1905-1906, more when it was determined by Stolypin. Then came World War I, then the Civil War, and "war communism". The country only went downhill. And it was rapidly degrading.

Then there was a period of economic recovery from 1921 to 1928, the NEP, (New Economic Policy), as part of this recovery model. The economy was growing, but it was clear already in 1925-1927, that this model was fading, it was running out of steam. It was then, from another level, the economy began to grow at 13.8% for 20 years!

By the way, at this moment, the U.S. was entering the "Great Depression" - the economic crisis of 1929, and in the USSR was just beginning a frantic economic growth.

When they start talking about the economy of the Soviet Union of that period, they immediately think of the Gulag. They say, the growth is understandable - the prisoners, free labor force, so they did everything. From under the whip?

There are several fairly good works on this subject - "The Economics of Forced Labor". L.Borodkin, Paul Gregory, O.Khlevnyuk, Moscow, 2008. There is a work by G.M. Ivanov, 1997, "The Gulag in the System of the

Totalitarian State. Quotes. "...Forced labor was considerably less efficient compared to that of freelance workers...". In construction and installation work it was almost twice as much, in railroads by 64%, in industrial construction by 55%, in hydro construction by 39%.

"The prime cost of Gulag products, despite the free labor of prisoners, significantly exceeded the prime cost of similar products manufactured by the local industry". From the work of Borodkin - "...the contribution (of the Gulag economy), even taking it to the maximum, is no more than 2-3% in the total figure of the country's economy...".

Before the war, 9,000 factories were built in the country. With the help of the Gulag - 300. 3% of the total. That is the whole figure. Since the 1930s it was already clear that the Gulag system was unprofitable, the cost of maintaining it exceeded the result.

What was the growth of the economy based on?

They began to attract "brains" - smart, savvy, competent specialists from abroad, the best carriers of technological organizational competence. A striking example is Albert Kahn, the "architect of industrial Detroit". He designed and organized the construction of General Motors, Chevrolet, Cadillac, Chrysler and others.

Kahn had a contract with the USSR government and designed and organized the construction of 521 industrial facilities in the USSR - tractor plants, automobile plants, forge shops, machine-tool plants,

rolling mills, foundries, machine shops, steel mills, aluminum plant and many others.

But not one Kahn was such a figure. The best architect, builder from Germany was Ernst May. He worked from 1930 to 1933. 20 cities built or rebuilt in the USSR in the 1930s, designed and organized by the construction of Ernst May. These grew into modern industrial Magnitogorsk, Nizhny Tagil, Novokuznetsk and others.

In the USSR, by the way, they gave awards to foreigners for building plants. For Dnieprostroy - Frank Fifer, Charles Thompson, Hugh Cooper. The plant "Hammer and Sickle" - awarded Thomas Morgen. Stalingrad Tractor Plant - Frank Honi. Kharkov tractor plant - Leo Savezhean. The coal industry of Donbass - Liphart. And others.

On the whole 170 contracts have been concluded in the heavy industry, 42 of them - in machine building, 12 - in war industry, 17 - in ferrous metallurgy, 10 - in nonferrous metallurgy. Import of the best brains to the USSR was systematic, well-organized and planned.

What was the contract of that same Albert Kahn? The main positions - designing and organization of the plant construction, selection and purchase of equipment, development of the whole process chain, the whole process map of the work and staff training. He had been working in Moscow for 4 years, 4000 of our specialists passed through Kahn's bureau and gained priceless experience.

We can give an example: the USSR had no diplomatic relations with the U.S., but it created a company called

Amtorg, which worked in the U.S. and specifically attracted people. As a result, almost 30,000 foreign highly qualified specialists came to the USSR.

What is the conclusion? It is more profitable to bring brains into the country and import technology and human capital than to import financial capital and even more so to import raw materials.

As the result, "import substitution", using the modern language, took place in the USSR, when somebody else's brains were replaced by their own ones and they continued working, creating world-class engineering samples.

The USSR was able to plan and build 9000 factories with all the accompanying infrastructure, with all the social infrastructure in 10 years. And not just factories, but factories - linked in a single chain, in a single technological cycle. In this case, not having computers, all the calculations carried out on arithmometers, but it was done. And for the method that was the basis, the input-output method, the outstanding American economist of Russian origin, Wassily Leontief, was given the Nobel Prize in economics.

For comparison, in the early 1990s, Leontief was invited to Russia with a proposal to help reform the Russian economy. Leontief came to Russia under Yeltsin, talked to "the guru of liberal economics in Russia," Gaidar, and came back to America and said, "I'm not going there anymore. They don't listen to anything."

Another cornerstone of the rapid growth of the Soviet economy was private business, which existed at the time

in the form of Artels. To talk about it substantively, let's imagine that here, we built the economy as a whole, that we planned everything very well... But what about clothes, shoes? Furniture, food-who will do it?

Government Decree of 23.07.1932 "On reorganization of work and organization of forms of industrial cooperation" - "...In order to further develop the industrial initiative of artels, as well as to maximize the industrial cooperation in the production of consumer goods, this decree is adopted... First - Artels have the right to freely buy various raw materials for their production needs, second - Artels have the right to directly sell the products they manufacture and raw materials they procure Third - it does so at warehouse prices...".

The bank loans were given at 3% .

Finance.

A system was created where non-cash and cash were separated. Non-cash money, which was isolated from cash, served as a measure of value and means of payment, provided from the monetary side the process of building new enterprises and the rate of investment, which, were simply phenomenal. It was an investment ruble, which allowed in the presence of material resources not to have such a problem as lack of money at all.

Going back to the industrial cooperation, to the Artels. There were 114 thousand Artels by the mid-1950s, 2 million people were involved in this movement, working in Artels. The production volume of Artels was 6% of the economy, 9% of industrial production. They were

registered in one day, they were exempted from taxes for 2 years, they gave loans to them at 3%, there were special scientific and rural institutes, special design offices and laboratories, in order to develop technology.

What did the Artels give? They gave diversity of goods - 80-90% of the diversity of the assortment in the economy, just, given by this layer.

Personal subsistence farms. 85% of eggs, 71% of potatoes, 67% of milk, 52% of meat, almost 50% of vegetables were produced by personal subsidiary farms. They, in fact, fed the country.

People were given up to a hectare of land, 2-3 cows, 2-3 sows, up to 25 sheep, unlimited birds and rabbits. Part of the villagers' income (up to 80%) was formed not by collective farms, but by private subsidiary farms.

There was no inflation as such. Prices went down because the anti-cost mechanism worked.

Especially after the war it was working at full capacity. Every year the prices were going down, there was an annual target for all enterprises without exception to reduce costs. The target was 3-5%, the reduction was 5-8%. In this case, half of the cost reduction went to the enterprise itself. Seventy-seven percent of the workers were paid by piece. There were very powerful material incentives in that economy!

And since the late 1950s and early 1960s, there was just a stupid liquidation of Artels and private subsidiary farms. The liquidation of Artels began in April 1956, when the government issued a decree #474. It was

called "Reorganization of industrial cooperation". On October 4, 1965 (a year after Khrushchev's dismissal) a government decree was issued, which excluded the prime cost reduction indicator from the plan. In these two steps, in these two decisions, the economy was programmed from anti-cost to cost.

Since 1956 the created economic system in the USSR was dismantled, no positive innovation occurred. Some successful projects were implemented, but the system itself only worsened. In the 1970s and 1980s, everything faded, but, nevertheless, the average annual growth was 5%, that is, the margin of safety and inertia of the previously created economic system was so powerful that it gave out 5%.

So what did the USSR's economy give the country between 1929 and 1955?

- 1- The USSR economy grew from 1929 to 1955 by 13.8% every year except during the war years.
2. The population increased by 46 million from 1929 to 1955. While within this period there was a bloody war which took 28 million lives of our people. And at the end of it all, the population increased by 46 million.
3. Life expectancy increased to 66 years. Nowadays we often say that life expectancy is in general measured by the totality of state efforts, efficiency of economy and integral indices.
4. the Gulag economy was unprofitable, the unit cost of production produced within the Gulag was higher than the unit cost of free labor and the costs of maintaining

the Gulag exceeded the return, the income in this segment of the economy.

The 5 most important facts due to which such phenomenal rates of economic growth were achieved in the USSR from 1929 to 1955 are

1. The basis of everything was quality planning based on the most modern methods of state planning, when the production and technological chains, starting with the extraction of raw materials and ending with the final product, were completely calculated. In essence, the basis was a project for the development of the country, which was then implemented. And the economy of the country was built as a whole. Expressed in modern analogies, modern language, as a single state corporation.

2. a unique financial model was created in which cash was separated from non-cash. The so-called two-loop monetary model, which made it possible to make capital investments in enormous volumes at the expense of non-cash money, without, in fact, even having such a problem as lack of money, in case the plan showed that material resources, human resources, infrastructure were sufficient to create and build new enterprises. And the intersection of non-cash and cash was only in one place, the payroll. This is a two-loop financial model.

3. The best brains of the world were attracted in an organized way to create a new economy in Russia. In fact, the government has organized the inflow of brains. Not an outflow (there is such a concept as "brain drain"), but an inflow. Immediate carriers of technology and the best managerial experience from the U.S., from

Germany, from Great Britain, from Italy have been attracted to Russia, worked here and practically carried out the design and organization of all stages of construction of new plants. And our native specialists learned from them, and after some time, independently were able to reach an even higher level.

4. There was a total anti-cost mechanism within this single state corporation. Vysotsky used to sing, "There was a time when they lowered prices". This was at the expense of the fact that along the entire process chain, starting with the extraction of raw materials, subsequent redistribution, and the final product, all reduced costs. And the end result of lower costs in the economy was returned to society in the form of lower prices.

It is important to note, speaking of this anti-cost mechanism, that the role of material incentives was very large, half of the cost reduction was given to the enterprise itself, in the so-called director's fund, and almost 80% of those who worked in the economy, were on piecework wages. It is clear why with the planned target of reducing costs by 3-5% on average per year, the actual reduction was usually 5-8%, that is, with over-fulfillment of the target through better technology, through better organization of production.

5. The fifth element is the entrepreneurial initiative, or as it was called in the documents of that era - the production initiative. Not within the framework of state enterprises, but the production initiative of citizens in the form of Artels, and in rural areas in the form of private subsidiary farms. This layer of the economy focused primarily on consumer goods, on what people needed, which was not planned, but just determined by demand.

Here, quite briefly, is the story of the economy of the USSR of 1929-1955, what the country achieved and what it really stupidly, thanklessly abandoned.

§ 2. Social and Economic Development

Industry. In 1953-1964 the economic development of the country was carried out according to the plans of the fifth and sixth Five-Year Plan, as well as the Seven-Year Plan, which was the only one in the Soviet history. More precisely, the last three years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan, three years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan and six years of the Seven-Year Plan fell on this period. The idea of the latter emerged during the clarification and development of the tasks of the sixth five-year plan, the last two years of which and the next (seventh) five-year plan were combined into one plan. The main reason for the emergence of the seven-year plan was the transition to a territorial structure of national economy management, which required corresponding changes in planning. The period as a whole was characterized by a relatively high (in comparison with subsequent ones) rate of economic development. Industry was developing at a faster pace.

During the years of the Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955) the industrial production in the USSR was increased by 85%, in three years of the Sixth Five-Year Plan (1955-1958) - by 64%, in the Seven-Year Plan (1959-1965) - by 84%. In terms of the five-year period, industrial production for 1956-1960. ("the sixth five-year plan") increased by 64.3%; for 1961-1965 ("the seventh five-year plan") - by 51%.

The fifth five-year plan was fulfilled ahead of schedule.

By the beginning of 1956, industrial output exceeded the planned targets by 15 percentage points. In total, during the years of the five-year plan were built and put into operation 3.2 thousand new industrial enterprises, including blast furnaces in Cherepovets, at Orsk-Khalilovsky plant; pipe rolling and metallurgical plants in Transcaucasia; mines in Donbass, Kuzbass, Karaganda, in Pechora basin; Bereznikovsky potash and Novokuybyshevsky oil refining plants. Large state district power plants (Prydniprovskaya in Dnepropetrovsk region. The first power plants were commissioned in Dnepropetrovsk region, Cherepetskaya in Tula region, Yuzhno-Kuzbasskaya in Kemerovo region, Yuzhno-Uralskaya in Chelyabinsk region), powerful hydropower plants in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk region, and a number of other power plants); powerful hydropower plants (Mingechaur in Azerbaijan SSR, UstKamenogorsk in Kazakh SSR; the first stage of Kuibyshev hydropower plant). The volume of capital investments in industry was almost twice as much as in the fourth five-year plan.

In the 1950s the USSR accomplished an important stage of scientific and technological revolution, expressed in the beginning of automation of some productions and development of such fundamentally new scientific and technological areas as electronics, nuclear power, cosmonautics. And in 1951 the country created electronic computing machines designed for solving statistical problems.

On June 27, 1954, the world's first nuclear power plant in Obninsk started generating electricity. The July Plenum of the Soviet Communist Party considered the question

"On the Tasks of Further Industry Boost, Technical Progress and Improvement of Production Organization". It was at that meeting that it was first noted that the country was on the threshold of a new scientific, technological and industrial revolution. Industrial workers and scientists were urged to comprehensively study and implement into production the achievements of domestic and foreign science and technology,

In the second half of the 50s the emphasis was still placed on the development of industry, especially the production of means of production (group "A"), which by the beginning of the 60s accounted for almost three-quarters of the total industrial output. Mechanical engineering, metalworking, chemistry, petrochemicals, and electric power were developing at a faster pace. In the 50's - first half of the 60's the volume of their production grew 4-5 times. Enterprises of group "B" (light industry, food, woodworking and other industries) developed more slowly, but their growth was two-fold.

During the three years of the sixth five-year plan (1955-1958) 2,690 large industrial enterprises were put into operation. In summer 1958 the construction of Kuibyshev hydroelectric power station was completed. Completion of the construction of Volgograd (Volzhskaya) hydroelectric power station initiated the creation of the unified energy system. Irkutskaya and Novosibirskaya hydroelectric plants, Tom-Usinskaya and Verkhnetagilskaya GRES, Serovsky Ferroalloy Plant, Saratov Chemical Plant, Novogorkovsky and Volgogradsky oil refineries were put into operation, the Stavropol-Moscow gas pipeline was put into operation. Development of the gas industry in the North Caucasus, the Volga and other regions allowed to gasify more than

160 towns.

The volume of industrial production during the Seven-Year Plan (1959 - 1965) was increased by 84% instead of the planned 80 (at that, the enterprises of the group "B" did not fulfill the plan); about 5.47 thousand new large industrial enterprises were put into operation. The greatest industrial success was associated with the accelerated development of oil and gas industry, introduction of automation, and construction of metallurgy and electric power giants. Power plants were built in Siberia (Belovskaya and Nazarovskaya), in the Urals (Troitskaya and Yaivinskaya) and Konakovskaya in Kalininskaya oblast. In 1960 the Stalingradskaya hydroelectric power station, the biggest in the world at that time, with the capacity of 2,541 megawatts, was put into operation. In June 1959, Angara HPP, where Bratskaya HPP was constructed, was dammed; it became the most powerful HPP in the world after the last aggregate was installed in 1964. In March 1963 the builders of the Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric power station blocked the Yenisei, where the construction of a more powerful electric energy giant with 6 thousand megawatts capacity was in progress. In 1963 the first power units of Novovoronezh and Beloyarsk nuclear power plants were put into operation and the next year the plants supplied commercial power.

One after another, new facilities were commissioned at the metallurgical plants of the Urals and Cherepovets, Novotulsk and Novoliptsy factories. The Kachkanar mining and processing plant, the Barnaul tire plant, the Chekinsk chemical plant and the Soligorsk potash plant were built.

March 18, 1962 in the north of the Irkutsk region, near the taiga village of Markovo on the banks of the Lena River, a powerful oil fountain (350-400 tons per day) gushed forth - the first oil in Siberia. In 1946, Stalin said, that for communism it's enough to produce 60 million tons of oil a year. Already in 1955, its production in the USSR was 70.7 million tons, in 1960 - 147.9 million tons, and in 1964 exceeded 223 million tons. Expansion of oil production and export became a lifesaving source of petrodollars to replace the depleting resources of the village and agriculture.

In 1961, electrification of the Moscow - Baikal railway was completed; the world's largest hydrofoil passenger ship was created; Aeroflot surpassed all countries of the world in growth rates of air traffic. The number of workers engaged in mechanized labor, raising the general educational level and skills of the workers, support of rationalization and invention, various forms of competition, spread of best practices, patronage of the Komsomol over the construction of enterprises, etc. contributed to the implementation of the targets.

Young people responded to the calls to participate in the building of "communism's construction projects" in the uninhabited regions of Siberia and the Far East. In April 1958, the staff of the Moscow-Sortirovochnaya railway station started an initiative to hold annual Communist subbotniks with the transfer of earned money to various funds. In the same year, V. I. Gaganova, a spinner from Vyshny Volochok, initiated a movement for the mass transfer of foremost workers to the backward sections, in order to raise them to the level of the foremost. These and other examples of various public initiatives found many followers.

The military-industrial complex was developing ahead of schedule in the 50-60s, as before, the enterprises of which were notable for their high labor productivity and excellent quality of production. As of 1962 the enterprises of military industrial complex produced the following kinds of military products: general defensive weapon systems and ammunition (about 270 thousand people were employed in research, design and production organizations of this profile); general and special munitions (about 439 thousand people were employed in research, design and production organizations of this profile); arms and ammunition (about 439 thousand people were employed in research, design and production organizations of this profile); general and special munitions; general and special aviation equipment (250 thousand); surface and submarine combat ships (428 thousand); electronic warfare equipment (1 million); space rocket systems (over 100 thousand); nuclear and thermocouple munitions, the latter industrial and technological complex is part of the atomic industry, including enterprises engaged in mining raw materials, production of fissile materials for atomic nuclear reactors and nuclear warheads, as well as reprocessing, containment, and disposal of spent fuel wastes.

Much of this work was done in so-called "closed" cities (Arzamas-16, Chelyabinsk-70, Tomsk-7, etc.). All in all, at least 1 million people were employed at nuclear industry enterprises in the early 1960s. If we do not take into account the nuclear industry, in 1962 the defense industry enterprises employed 3.6 million people - about 5% of the total number of workers and servicemen engaged in industry, education, science, culture and

public health.

More than 800 enterprises of "civilian" ministries and departments were also involved in the production of military products. At the same time, the military-industrial complex had to produce a considerable amount of civilian goods. In 1962. According to the planning assignments, 22 thousand machine tools, 35.5 thousand tractors, 438 thousand motorcycles and scooters, 1,450 thousand bicycles, 342.5 thousand refrigerators, 804 thousand washing machines, 150 thousand sewing machines, 3,175 thousand watches, 2,150 thousand TVs, 4,765 thousand radios were to be produced there. In the total output of the military-industrial complex in 1962, peaceful production was 42%, in aviation - 25%, in shipbuilding - 40%.

The average annual growth rate of industrial production in the USSR in 1951-1955 was, according to official data, 13.1%; in 1956-1960 it was - 10,3%; in 1961-1965 - 8,6%. Alternative calculations (economist G.I. Khanin; 1990) presented each of these indicators as several percentage points lower, but did not question the general dynamics of industrial development.

Agriculture.

The new course of the domestic policy proclaimed at the August 1953 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet supposed to turn the economy "to people" by increasing the people's welfare through accelerated production of consumer goods and stronger agriculture. Meanwhile, the level of its development barely exceeded the pre-war level. In 1952, agricultural production was 101% of the level of 1940. In the early 50's only about 20% of the

total investment in industry was invested in the village. In 1953, only 22% of collective farms were electrified, most peasant huts continued to be lit with kerosene lamps and candles.

The foundations of the new agrarian policy were approved at the September (1953) plenum of the CPSU Central Committee. The main reasons for the backwardness of the village were said to be material disinterest of collective farmers in the results of their labor; low level of its mechanization; lack of sensible management of collective farms, state farms and MTS.

To improve the rural economy, it was decided to sharply (2~5 paj) increase the purchasing prices of milk, butter, potatoes, livestock and poultry. At the same time, the norms of supply from private farms were reduced, taxes were reduced and the order of taxation of collective farmers was changed. The tax was now levied on the size of a homestead plot, and not separately for cattle, gardens, beehives, etc. Already in 1954 the taxes on the peasantry were halved in comparison with 1952; the purchasing prices in the next five-year period rose by 3%; cash income of the collective farms per each collective farm yard - by 2.3%; issuance of money per labor day - by 3 times.

State financing of the agro-sphere industries was increased. In 1954-1955 machine-tractor stations, state and collective farms received more than 400 thousand tractors, 227 thousand trucks, over 80 thousand combines.

To strengthen the leading personnel of collective farms, over 30,000 party workers ("thirty thousand") were sent

to work as chairmen. Over 120 thousand agricultural specialists of the administrative apparatus were transferred to work in the countryside.

The situation in the countryside began to improve. Productivity of labor and agriculture in 1955 increased by 38% compared with 1940. For 5 years after the September (1953) plenum, the average annual increase in production of the agrarian sector exceeded 7%, but was lower than during the New Economic Policy, (NEP) when it was then 10%.

At the February-March (1954) Plenum of the Central Committee it was decided to develop 13 million hectares of virgin and fallow lands in the areas of Kazakhstan, Siberia, Ural, Volga region in order to rapidly increase the production of grain within the next three years and to create there, state grain farms. The appeal to the youth received a wide response. More than 500 thousand boys and girls from various cities and villages of the country went for development of virgin lands. Their labour enthusiasm in the first three years (1953-1956) allowed to develop 32 million hectares of new land and increase gross grain output in the country from 82.5 to 125 million tons. In 1956-1958 the virgin land provided the country with every second, and then - every fourth tine of bread. Because of wind erosion of soils in the 60's, part of the developed yumel had to be transferred into pastures.

Much less effective was the attempt to hasten the country's pro-soil problem by planting corn everywhere. In 1954. Addressing Komsomol members leaving for the virgin lands, Khrushchev said: "We must have more corn. And not only for people to eat it, but mainly for fattening poultry, guineas and other kinds of cattle".

In January 1956 the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to consider the distribution of this crop the most important party task. The development of cattle breeding was also planned under the expansion of corn crops. After Khrushchev's visit to America (1959) a true corn rush began in the country. By 1963 the area under corn was increased to 37 million hectares (from 18 million in 1955). However, the "queen of the fields" failed to bring the country into the "orbit of communist abundance. The reduction in wheat and rye crops for the sake of corn led to an overall decline in grain harvest. The "competition" with the U.S. in per capita production of meat, milk and butter ended in embarrassment.

The desire to catch up with America did not only lead to increased production (in the first year of the "competition" in the USSR, the USSR managed to increase the production of meat by 301 thousand tons, and in 1960 - by 1007 thousand tons), but also do to falsifications and the creation of the appearance of success.

The most telling was the attempt of the Ryazan Oblast leadership to increase meat production four or five times in 1959. Meat was bought up from the population and in neighboring regions, schoolchildren raised rabbits, even dairy cattle were slaughtered on collective and state farms. In December it was reported that the region sold 100 thousand tons of meat to the state instead of the planned 50 thousand. Secretary of the Regional Committee, A. Larionov was awarded the title of Hero of Socialist Labor and the experience of the Ryazan team was recommended for dissemination. But at the end of 1960, the deception was revealed, and the secretary

shot himself. In 1964. When the main leader of the competition left the race, meat production in the USSR reached only 8.3 million tons. The continuation of the "competition" in the new conditions led to the fact that in 1983 the USSR produced 16 million tons of meat (as much as the United States in 1956), and the United States - 27.8 million tons.

In 1963 the authorities began to pin their hopes for a rise in agricultural production not on corn and enthusiasm in "competition" with the United States, but on the development of the mineral fertilizer industry and the chemicalization of agriculture. In October the CPSU Central Committee and the Council of Ministers of the USSR published a letter to scientists and workers in the chemical industry on increasing the production of mineral fertilizers and chemical means of plant protection; the December (1963) plenum of the Central Committee adopted a special resolution on the accelerated development of the chemical industry. The return on chemicalization occurred in the 1970s.

The reorganization of machine and tractor stations into repair-tractor stations which was carried out in accordance with the resolution of the February (1958) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee did not give the expected result either. The equipment was sold to collective farms. It was supposed that this measure would strengthen the material base of collective farms and eliminate "dual power" on the land (collective farms and MTS), wake up the initiative of collective farmers. However, for many weak collective farms the cost of acquiring machinery was beyond their means. Repair base in agriculture was undermined. A large part of the mechanics and specialists of MTS did not want to turn

into collective farmers and went into the cities.

Unpromising Villages

Disastrous for the village was the resettlement of "unpromising" villages which began in the second half of the 50s. As a result of Khrushchev's activities, there were 139,000 villages disappeared in Russia - 13 per day. The enlargement of collective and state farms and the curtailment of private subsidiary farming were equally destructive. In 1939 there were 234,100 collective farms (excluding fish farms) and 4,000 state farms. By the end of 1965, the number of collective farms decreased to 36,300 (6.4 times), the number of state farms increased to 11,700 (2.9 times); they employed 18.6 and 8.2 million people, respectively.

In 1958-1964 the size of garden plots on collective farms decreased by 12% (to 0.29 ha), on state farms - by 28% (to 0.18 ha). Production of meat and milk in private subsidiary plots fell by 20%. On August 20 1958 a decree "On Prohibition of keeping cattle in private property of citizens living in cities and workers' settlements" was adopted. It applied to about 12 million urban families who had their own vegetable gardens, and was perceived as a "small dekulakization". Minimization of small peasant farms devastated the most important source of food supply, shortage of which the country sharply felt already in the early 60s. All this significantly affected the level of agricultural production in general and the general mood of the villagers, especially the youth. In 1960-1964, there were 7 million villagers, including 6 million young people (up to 29 years old), moved to cities. With Khrushchev's

resignation, the unreasonable restrictions on subsistence farms were lifted.

The overall balance of successes and failures in the development of agriculture can be seen in the following figures. Agricultural production in the USSR during 1951-1955 grew by 20.5%; in 1956-1960 - by 30%; in 1961-1965 - by 18% (for 3 years of the sixth five-year plan - by 32%, in the years of the seven-year plan - by 15% instead of the planned 70%). The average annual growth rate of gross agricultural output was much lower than in industry. During the first of the mentioned five-year periods, they were 4.1% per year; during the second - 5.7%; during the third - 2.4%. The plans for the rise of agriculture could not be fulfilled.

The low rate of agricultural development slowed down the growth of the country's national income (the newly created value in all branches of material production). Nevertheless, the years 1951 - 1960 were record-breaking in the average annual growth of national income in the national history of the XX century - 10.3% according to official data. During the next decade they were 7% per year. Alternative calculations (economists V.V. Popov, N.P. Shmelev; 1990) show that in the 1950s national income grew annually by 9.3%; in the 1960s - by 4.2%.

A study by Academician N. P. Fedorenko (2001) found that the national wealth of the country in the 1950s grew by an average of 10% per year; in the 1960s - by 10.5%. In general, the Khrushchev period of rule (1953-1964) was characterized by an annual increase in national wealth of 9.3% percent. The result could have been more impressive, if it were not for the costs of

unrestrained reformism.

The Social Sphere. The first post-war census of the USSR conducted on January 15, 1959.

On January 15, 1959 the first postwar census of the USSR reflected a considerable increase in the number of the country's inhabitants. There were 208.8 million of them against 190.7 million recorded on January 17, 1939. The proportion of urban residents was 48%. In 1962, for the first time in the country's history, the number of urban population (111.2 million) exceeded the number of rural population (108.6 million). During the fourth decade of the 20th century, the number of factory workers and office workers increased 1.17-fold, but during the fifth decade the number increased almost 1.5-fold (from 15.3 to 22.3 million). Growth occurred at the expense of collective farmers and members of urban artisans: the share of industrial cooperation in 1955 accounted for 8% of all industrial production. In addition to the production of a variety of products of daily demand, this sector of the economy provided a variety of services to the population. In 1956, the largest industrial Artels were transferred to the state ownership, and in 1960 the urban industrial cooperation completely merged with the state sector of the economy. Thus, 1.4 million former members of Artels acquired the status of workers and employees.

The most encouraging phenomenon of the 1950s was the completion of the Gulag Archipelago with its peculiar population structure. The influx of new convicted "counter-revolutionaries" practically ceased, while the flow of those released and rehabilitated after the 20th Party Congress intensified (after February 1956). On

the 1st of January 1955, the camps and colonies held 309,000 political prisoners, but by the beginning of 1956 – 114,000, and by April 1959 – 11,000, or ½ of the total GULAG population. The reduction of the number of prisoners in the camps was also due to the easing of penalties for criminal offenses. As a result, the size of the Main Administration of Camps of the Interior Ministry had been more than halved by 1959, as compared with 1953: there were 948,000 prisoners in it. From the materials of the party conferences, held after the XXV Congress of the CPSU, we know that in 1955-1957 about 6% of the party members, arrested here in 1936-1939, returned to Moscow. In the USSR as a whole, of the one million party members arrested in the second half of the 30-s, about 60-80 thousand returned after 15-18 years of imprisonment.

Even more sweeping changes in the social structure of society were introduced by the reduction of the number of such compatriots as exiles. In 1954, restrictions were lifted on former kulaks evicted from their places during collectivization, and in 1955 special settlers began to be issued passports and drafted into the Soviet Army. An amnesty was declared for citizens who collaborated with the occupiers during the Great Patriotic War. In 1956 followed a series of decrees which removed legal restrictions from the evicted during the war Karachais, Kalmyks, Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Crimean Tatars, Meskhetian Turks.

In 1956-1957 the statehood of the Chechens, Ingush, Balkars, Karachais and Kalmyks was restored. The Volga Germans and the Crimean Tatars were not restored. In 1964, the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of August 28, 1941 was canceled in

relation to the Soviet Germans, but only in part, containing sweeping accusations of collaborating with the occupants. And in 1967 such accusations were withdrawn from the Crimean Tatars. In the late 60's, the rehabilitation process was curtailed.

The development of national economy in 1953-1964 allowed the state to spend an increasing portion of the national income for social needs, improve working conditions, increase wages, food and commodity provision of the population. Already by 1956 people began to buy almost twice as much meat and butter, as well as clothes and shoes. After the 20th Congress, this line was continued. From January 1957, the minimum wage in manufacturing, construction, and transport was raised, and a nontaxable minimum wage was established. In March 1957, taxes on workers and employees were reduced. Internal loans, which used to be at least a month's wages and were of a compulsory nature, were discontinued. In 1956 the working day for workers and employees on Saturdays and public holidays was shortened by two hours, and in 1957 the transition to a seven-hour working day began. The real incomes of workers and employees grew by a factor of 1.6 from 1950 to 1958, and have been growing ever since. The minimum wage rose from 40-45 rubles in 1957 to 60 in the mid-60s; the average monthly wage from 78 rubles in 1958 to 95 rubles in 1965. Food accounted for the bulk of family expenditures of townspeople - more than 50% of wages.

Family incomes increased somewhat with the abolition from September 1956 of all school and university fees, introduced on the eve of the war, and especially - with a radical reform of pension legislation. From July 1956,

men could receive a pension at age 60, and women at age 55. The state pensions ranged from 55 to 100% of the average salary, which led to a doubling of pensions for some groups.

The general improvement of living conditions in the country was reflected in the increased life expectancy of the people living there. The average life expectancy in the USSR was 44 years in 1926-1927 and in 1953-1957 - 63 years, in 1958-1959 - 68 years. Compared with pre-revolutionary times, life expectancy in the USSR more than doubled by the end of the 50s. In 1896-1897 people lived (on average with lots of child mortality) 12 years.

A real revolution in the social sphere was the introduction of pensions for collective farmers. On July 15, 1964, the Supreme Soviet of the country passed a law on pensions and benefits for members of collective farms, which for the first time in the history of the Soviet village established a state system of social security for collective farmers. Old-age pensions became effective for men at age 65 and women at age 60.

Payments were made from a central fund established from deductions from the collective farms and annual allocations from the state budget. Until 1964, elderly and disabled collective farmers received pensions from the collective farms. However, only one-fourth of these people were pensioners; three-fourths of them were supported by working children and relatives.

The amount of the monthly pension for workers and civil servants ranged from 30 to 120 rubles (in the scale of the 1961 prices), for collective farmers - from 12 to 15 rubles. By 1980, pensions for collective farmers were

increased to 28 rubles. It was believed that retired collective farmers could get the rest of their livelihood from subsistence farming. In February 1958 the gradual passport-ization of the collective-farm peasants began. The passport regime in the city and the countryside was finally unified only in 1974.

The rapid development of the building materials industry made it possible to transfer housing construction to an industrial basis and expand it many times. In 1954 a special decision condemned "gaudiness and ornamentation" in architecture. In 1954-1957 a whole series of decisions was made to introduce the typical housing construction, symbolized by Moscow's Cheremushki (plain looking). The cost of housing construction using the new method decreased by 25%, labor intensity - by 3-4 times, deadlines for delivery - down to one and a half months. This allowed in 1958 to give up for the first time the planning of "communal flats" and begin to solve the problem of settling into separate apartments in families. During 1956-1960, almost 54 million people moved into new apartments, a quarter of the country's population. And although over time cheap housing ceased to meet the increased needs of people, its importance for its time can hardly be underestimated. The acuteness of the housing problem was smoothed out by widely spread housing cooperatives on fairly favorable terms, with installment payment of the entire cost of the apartment for 15 years.

§ 3. Culture and Social movements, Science and Technology.

The processes of the liberation in the sphere of culture

from rigid party control and petty regulation by the special services of the state, the overcoming of dogmatism, the relative tolerance for pluralism of opinions of literary and artistic and scientific schools in the 50-60s were manifested in different ways in different areas of culture. With the greatest dramatic change were the thoroughly ideologized spheres of culture and the social movements generated by them. With the least shocks, "de-Stalinization" affected the development of the natural and technical sciences and the educational system.

The vital need to resolve the atomic and missile problem in the second half of the 1940s gave rise to a special relationship between the country's leadership and scientists and science in general. Colossal successes of Soviet science, which in a number of priority areas surpassed the world level, further raised the prestige of scientists in society.

The ideology of entering the country in the epoch of scientific and technological revolution, supported by the decisions of the July (1955) Central Committee Plenum, broad propaganda of scientific and technological achievements of the USSR along with the veil of secrecy around certain scientific institutions made the scientific path attractive and romantic for young people. The material basis of science was constantly expanding.

From the early 50s to late 60s, spending on science increased almost 12-fold. It was in those years which included almost all the Soviet works awarded Nobel prizes in the exact and the natural sciences: research of academicians N.N. Semenov (1956), P.A. Cherenkov, I.M. Frank and I.E. Tamm (1958), L.D. Landau (1961),

N.G. Basov and A.M. Prokhorov (1964). Later Nobel Prize winners were P.L. Kapitsa (1978), Zh. I. Alferov (2001), A.A. Abrikosov and V.L. Ginzburg (2003).

During these years there is a significant quantitative and territorial expansion of the network of research institutes. In 1956-1958, 48 such institutes were organized in the system of the USSR Academy of Sciences alone. In 1957, the Novosibirsk Akademgorodok was founded, which took the leading positions in the field of applied mathematics and physics. At the same time, the Siberian Branch of the Academy of Sciences with the Far East, West Siberian, and East Siberian branches was established; research institutes in Krasnoyarsk and on Sakhalin appeared. The priority in scientific developments in the 50's, as well as in the 40's, was given to the interests of the military-industrial complex. The work of outstanding scientists I. V. Kurchatov, S. P. Korolev, M. V. Keldysh, Yu. B. Khariton, A. D. Sakharov, designers A. N. Tupolev, V. P. Glushko, P. D. Grushin, N. A. Pilyugin, V. N. Chelomey, M. K. Yangel, and others.

The greatest achievements of science and technology of that time were: creation of the turbojet passenger airliner TU-104 (1955), launch of the world's most powerful synchro-phasotron (1957); tests at the Baikonur Cosmodrome on August 21, 1957. the launch of the intercontinental missile R-7, which had military significance and made it possible to launch an artificial Earth satellite into space (October 4, 1957); the launch of the nuclear-powered icebreaker "Lenin" (late 1957); sea trials of a nuclear submarine (July 1958); flight of K. A. Gagarin's into space (April 12, 1961); the launch of the Beloyarsk and Novovoronezh nuclear power plants

(1963). In the 50's the work in the field of genetics, despite the fact that N.S. Khrushchev continued to support T.D. Lysenko, an influential opponent of this direction in science.

Paving new paths into the future was associated with great risk. On September 29, 1957 at Chemical Combine № 817, located near Muslyumovo station of the South Urals Railway (now Industrial Association Mayak), an explosion of a container with radioactive waste occurred. It was followed by the so-called "Eastern Urals Radioactive Trace", which contaminated about 23 thousand square kilometers of the Chelyabinsk, Sverdlovsk and Tyumen Regions; about 300 thousand people were exposed to radiation. Radiation that entered the Techa River still causes diseases and genetic mutations in nearby residents of different generations. On October 24, 1960, during preparations for the launch at one of the Baikonur sites of a new rocket built at the design bureau of M.K. Yangel's design bureau, there was an explosion that took the lives of dozens of people. Among the dead was Marshal Mikhail Nedelin, Commander-in-Chief of the USSR Missile Forces.

In 1967 there was a terrible heat wave in the Chelyabinsk region. The Karachay Lake, where the wastes from the Mayak Chemical Combine were discharged for many years, had grown shallow. The radioactive dust from the sun-dried shores of the lake was blown away by the wind almost to 2 thousand kilometers. This time 400 thousand people were affected, and residents of 42 settlements were evacuated. In rainy years Karachay overflows, creating the danger of poisoned water entering the region's general hydrosystem.

The gradual overcoming of Stalinist dogmatism, the restoration, even if only partially, of the truth about historical processes, events and individuals contributed to the expansion of the second half of the 50's publication of statistical materials, memories, access to archives. The publication of Lenin's last articles related to the formation of the USSR and the characteristics of political figures from Lenin's circle, including Stalin, that had been concealed earlier, was of great importance. The social sciences have developed along the lines of a "return to Leninism", an excavation of Stalin's mistakes, even where there were none, and the romanticization of the "pure" communist idea of the revolutionary period and the 1920s. New journals such as the History of the USSR, Questions of the History of the CPSU, New and Modern History, World Economy and International Relations, Questions of Linguistics, and others gave room for the development of humanitarian research.

At the same time, attempts by the scholarly intelligentsia to expand criticism of the "cult of personality" beyond the limits outlined by the well-known decree were not allowed; references to Trotsky, Bukharin, Rykov, and other oppositionists were carefully restricted by the censors. Discussions of topics of repression were suppressed, often with the involvement of the KGB.

In January-March 1957 more than 100 people were prosecuted for "slander of Soviet reality. In the "case of Л. In August 1957, a number of students and graduate students of the Department of History of Moscow State University were arrested and had called for the struggle for socialist renovation in the spirit of the 20th Congress of the CPSU. In 1958 the young Leningrad scientists R.

I. Pimenov was sentenced to capital imprisonment. I. Pimenov and B. B. Weil, who wrote and tried to distribute comments on Khrushchev's "secret" report.

Socialism's subversives were rare among the dissenting social scientists. Often their views fell within the concept of "democratic socialism. One of the leaders of the informal circle united by the ideas of democratic socialism was the historian I'. A. Medvedev, who published a journal called Political Diary from 1964. As Sakharov described it, it was "a kind of samizdat for the top officials" who held the most liberal positions in the establishment of the time.

Education.

The 1950s saw significant changes in the entire education system. According to the 1959 census, 43% of the population had higher, secondary, and incomplete secondary education. This figure increased by 76.1% over the 1939 figure. However, secondary school graduates, just as in the 1930s, were focused on higher education and were reluctant to go into production. There was a need to reform the school in order to turn it into a reserve for replenishing the working class and the technical intelligentsia.

The discussion about bringing schools closer to production, which began in 1956, resulted in the adoption in December 1958 of the law "On strengthening the link between the school and life, and further development of the national education system". The seven-year school system was replaced by a compulsory eight-year polytechnic school. Young people

received secondary education by completing a secondary vocational school, a technical school, an evening (correspondence) school for working youth, a similar rural school, or after three years of study at a secondary educational labor polytechnic school "with production training". For those who wished to continue their education at an institution of higher learning, a compulsory apprenticeship was introduced.

By the fall of 1963 it was clear that the reform had failed. Schoolchildren were still reluctant to go to production, evening and part-time night senior classes did not give good knowledge. The poor material and technical base, narrow and random choice of occupations offered in schools with on-the-job training did not provide adequate vocational training. The quality of education was in decline. In 1964 secondary school became ten years old again, and the school reform of 1958-1964 is a relic of history.

The efforts made in the 1950s to saturate high school with young people from production led to the development of the system of evening and precision education. While in 1946 these forms of education were used by 28% of all students, in 1961 they accounted for 61%. For the same purpose, in 1957 the rules for admission to institutions of higher education were changed. The priority right was given to those demobilized from the army and those who had worked at least two years in industry. By the mid 1960s, the number of students admitted on privileged basis amounted to 70%, which inevitably led to a decrease in the requirements to the level of training, to the devaluation of higher education.

"Thaw" in literary and artistic life

Criticism of the "cult of personality," the beginning of the rehabilitation of the repressed, and other signs of a thaw in the socio-political atmosphere aroused a passionate response across the board. One of the first sectors to respond to the changes were the writers. In the fall of 1953, edited by A. T. Tvardovsky, Novy Mir published an article by V. Pomerantsev "On sincerity in literature". It held the idea of the beneficence of various literary schools, directions and the need to "write honestly," without thinking "about the expression on the faces of high and low readers". The novel "The Seasons" by V. Panova, published in this journal in October-December 1953, was written in an updated vein. The articles of V. Ovechkin published earlier, which showed the reality without any embellishments and lacquering. In April 1954, F. Abramov's article "People of the collective farm village in the post-war prose" with a sharp criticism of schematic representation of reality in the "exemplary" novels about the village created in the forties appeared on the pages of the magazine. In the same spring in the journal "Znamya" appeared chapters from the novel by B. In the same spring, Znamya published chapters from Pasternak's novel Doktor Zhivago and Novyi Mir published Ehrenburg's novella Ottepel (Thaw).

These works brought readers to the realization of the pernicious atmosphere that had previously prevailed in the Soviet country. The story "Thaw" gave its name to the features of the new historical period in the development of the country, which began after the death of Stalin.

However, the first "thaw" as early as May 1954 was

replaced by a "freeze." Central newspapers suddenly found major flaws in the novels of Panova, Ehrenburg, articles by Pomerantsev, Abramov, plays by Zorin, Marienhof, Gorodetsky, Yanovsky and subjected them to harsh criticism for "defamatory nature" and "denigration of Soviet reality." And on July 23, 1954 the Secretariat of the Central Committee, chaired by N. S. Khrushchev, adopted a resolution in the spirit of 1946: it condemned Tvardovsky for his poem Terkin in the New World, which he had prepared for publication. In August 1954 he was dismissed from the leadership of the "New World", and K. M. Simonov was appointed in his place. The poem that caused Tvardovsky's dismissal was first published with Khrushchev's blessing on August 17, 1963 in the newspaper Izvestia. At the 11th Congress of Soviet Writers, held December 15-26, 1954. The first "thawed" works were condemned as manifestations of the "spontaneous" development of literature.

This conservative line of literary development, connected with the great doubts about the adopted course on "de-Stalinization" and the necessity to stop the fight against cosmopolitanism in the newspapers, "October" and "Neva".

A literary monument to the conservatism of the beginning of the post-Stalin era is the novel The Gap by I. Shevtsov, whose characters - young Moscow artists - struggle "for realistic art" with the critics, who are patronized by the famous artist-modernist Barcellonsky (a parody of I. Ehrenburg). The novel was written in 1952 and was being prepared for publication in the publishing house "Young Guard" and the journal "Neva". Of course it was not published after Stalin's death, and was first published after Khrushchev's sacking of the

modernist artists at the Manezh Central Exhibition Hall on December 1, 1962.

Thus, shortly after March 1953, the groups of anti-Stalinist reformers and conservative-Stalinists made themselves felt, and these groups gave rise to a whole variety of later trends in literary-artistic and public life in the country. The part of the intelligentsia that sided with Khrushchev's reforms and later, in the late 1960s, was called the "liberal intelligentsia", but at first had nothing in common with liberalism as an ideological current that advocated freedom of enterprise, the bourgeois-parliamentary order, and bourgeois democracy. With respect to this part of the intelligentsia, the term "liberalism" applies only in its original sense, meaning a kind of free-thinking, tolerance, leniency.

The Stalinists of the early 1950s had nothing in common with conservatism as an ideological current. Their adherence to "outdated traditions" did not suggest "bourgeois nationalism" and the resurrection of the traditions and orders of pre-revolutionary Russia. They simply saw anti-Stalinism as a threat to the foundations of the socialist system and, by virtue of party discipline, did not openly oppose the struggle against the "cult of personality". But they were irreconcilably opposed to any new tendencies in artistic culture that went beyond dogmatic guidelines.

The specificity of the situation in the literary and artistic world after March 1953 was largely determined by the fact that the group of writers and artists who were active in the struggle against cosmopolitanism was relatively small, and clearly outnumbered the "victims" of the anti-cosmopolitan struggle. After the rehabilitation of Mihoels

and the "poison doctors," it turned out that the "cosmopolitans" and "low-worshipers" for the most part did not suffer much socially, but also demanded rehabilitation and compensation for the damage caused.

The "groupism" that emerged in the literary and artistic milieu became a problem for the entire subsequent history of Soviet culture. This situation was well summarized later by the writer L.N. Vasilyeva in her book *Children of the Kremlin* (Moscow, 1997). "In our literary world, divided into right-wing Slavophiles and left-wing Westerners. The Jewish question was the litmus test for determining whether a writer belonged to one camp or another," she writes. If you are Jewish, you are a Westerner, a progressive. If you're half Jewish, then you're a Westerner. If neither, then a Jewish husband or wife entitles you to enter the left wing. If neither, neither, or the third, you have to show loyalty to the Jewish question in your work. Similarly, on the Jewish basis, the right-wing, Slavophile flank groups were not too accepted into their ranks."

A. B. Chakovsky, a prominent representative of Soviet literary politics and longtime editor-in-chief of *Literaturnaya Tazeta*, explained the reason for the general dissatisfaction of the Jews with the situation during the war and the postwar years of Stalin's rule as follows: "When the war began, Stalin saw that all the international ideas, *all the talk of solidarity with the German working class and the international proletariat was a fiction*". He decided to bet on the only real card - the national feeling of the Russian people. Gradually all the Jewish political instructors were removed from the army, propaganda in every way began to use the names of Russian generals, the top began to flirt with the

church, and after victory, Stalin made the famous toast to the Russian people. But there was nothing to pay the Russian people for its sacrifices, and the only thing left was to declare it the greatest, the most talented. And in favor of this began a campaign against cosmopolitans, the case of doctors, the dispersal of the Jewish Committee.

What happened! People fled from hospitals, pulled blankets over themselves when Jewish doctors approached them. And when '56 came and there were all kinds of rehabilitations, among these rehabilitations were not rehabilitated Jews who had suffered in anti-Semitic campaigns. Now explain to some Private Chaim why this did not happen. He lives with resentment in his soul. And on top of this resentment all sorts of Zionist propaganda easily lay down, and Chaim applies to leave for Israel. Thus, the main reason for the dissatisfaction of the Jews about their situation in the country was the fact that their representatives were not rehabilitated as victims of Stalinism during the fight against cosmopolitanism, and the status quo ante bellum apparently quite satisfactory to them was not restored. The implication, of course, was that the Russians should also be happy with this status quo.

The conflict of group interests began to explode between April 1955 and March 1956. The demand for the rehabilitation of the former "cosmopolitans" and the investigation of the concrete faults of certain literary officials provoked accusations of "revanchist sentiments" on the part of writers who denounced cosmopolitanism. The existence of "group structures" in the literary milieu was already denounced at the Second Writers' Congress in December 1954. It was the opinion of L. Sobolev, the

leading writer of that time and one of the leaders of the Russian national movement in literature.

The "liberal camp" from the mid-1950s controlled the situation in the major Moscow and Leningrad writers' organizations and had a strong influence on the capital's literary journals and newspapers. Its central organs were the magazines *Novy Mir* and *Yunost*, as well as *Literaturnaya Gazeta* (since 1959). Of the other magazines subordinate to the board of the Union of Soviet Writers, the 'October' magazine (until 1961) was sympathetic to liberals.

After the 20th Congress of the CPSU the ideological pressure from the official political and literary bosses on the literary and artistic workers was eased. Stalin and Zhdanov were made responsible for the "excesses" of earlier years. The names of repressed figures of literature and art (V. E. Meyerhold, B. A. Pilniak, I. E. Babel, I. I. Kataev) were restored. New editions of S. A. Yesenin, A. Akhmatova and M. M. Zoshchenko appeared. In May 1958, the Central Committee resolution on the correction of errors in the evaluation of the operas *Great Druzhba*, *Bogdan Khmel'nitsky* and *From the Heart* was adopted, which "rehabilitated" those accused of "formalism". Shostakovich, S. Prokofiev, A. Khachaturian, N. Myaskovsky, and V. Shebalin.

However, A. A. Fadeev's attempts to change the style of leadership of the Union of Writers by taking ideological functions away from the Ministry of Culture led to the disgrace of the writer, who committed suicide shortly after the XX Congress of the Party, May 13, 1956.

The intensity and inconsistency of the renewal process

in culture and ideology was expressed in the work of the 1st Congress of Artists and the 2nd Congress of Composers (1957), the 3rd Congress of Writers (1959), the meeting of historians (1962), in the periodic meetings of the Party leaders with the creative intelligentsia (1957, 1962, 1963), and in the expansion of museums and exhibition halls. The opening of an entire epoch was the 1962 art exhibition. It was the first exhibition of the 20s-30s, which could not be seen as part of the regime of "socialist realism" and which had been kept in the storerooms of museums.

The warming of the social atmosphere was also reflected in cultural relations with the outside world. The Summer Festival of Youth and Students held in Moscow in the summer of 1957 marked the beginning of the post-war conventions of Soviet and foreign youth. In 1958, the first International Tchaikovsky Music Competition was held in the capital. Tchaikovsky-K1 International Competition, which became a triumph of the Soviet school of performance. The victory of the American pianist Van Cliburn in the competition made him a lover of Soviet music lovers. In the late '50s, exhibitions of ishadnyh art - paintings from the collection of the Dresden Gallery, vypavlyayuschih their government GDR, paintings by P. Picasso and others. All this was a milestone in the establishment of normal relations with the foreign world.

New literary-artistic magazines, such as Yunost, Nash' Sovremennik (Our Contemporary), Molodaya Gvardiya (Young Guard), and Vyacheslav Krupskaya (Young Guard), contributed to the development of literature.

The Soviet Screen, etc. are also a center of attraction for

liberal intellectuals. The center of gravity of the liberal intelligentsia was the New World, again headed in June 1958 by A. T. Tvardovsky. The stories of V. M. Shukshin, V. D. Dudintsev's novel *Not by Bread Alone*, devoted to the intelligentsia, and especially the story, *One Day in the Life of Ivan Denisovich*, by Solzhenitsyn (originally titled *Sh-854*), about the life of a political prisoner in a camp.

In December 1960, Yunost published an article by the critic St. Rassadin "The Sixties" - about the writers of the new literary generation, their heroes and readers. Later the term "sixties" became commonplace: it was used to refer to writers of the democratic trend who worked in the second half of the 1950s and 1960s. In an article (1999) devoted to the sixties writer B. Rassadin presented other **famous Sixties writers**, publishing a "three-step list of people to whom Okudzhava dedicated his poems" compiled by Yuri Koryakin. The list includes representatives of the creative intelligentsia, "first, those who have passed away, then the ladies, and finally the representatives of the stronger sex, who were alive and well at that time: K. Paustovsky, Yu. Paustovsky, J. Dombrowski, P. Antokolsky, Ar. Tarkovsky, I. Brodsky, V. Nekrasov, J. Smelyakov, S. Narovchatov, B. Slutsky, Y. Vasilyev, B. Balter, B. Fedorov, S. Shchipachev, Y. Nagibin, Y. Daniel, A. D. Sakharov, Y. Trifonov, B. Vysotsky, K. Kuliev, P. Luspekayev, V. Kondratyev, V. Fogelson, R. Christmas Adamovich, O. Volkov, A. Ivanov, B. Gerd, B. Chichibabin, L. Karpinsky, V. Sokolov, L. Kopelev, B. Akhmadulina, B. Kramalnikova, A. Belyakova, I. Badaeva, O. Batrakova, T. Kulimanova, N. Matveeva, I. Lisnyanskaya, MV Polyakova (Marina Vlady), E. Kamburova, V. Dolina, Yu. Moritz, A. Pugacheva; St. Rassadin, I. Schwartz, E. Evtushenko, Y.

Davydov, F. Iskander, F. Svetov, V. Motyl, K.
Vanshenkin, Y. Nikulin, V. Nikulin, A. Volodin, M.
Khutsiev, M., Kozakov, V. Spivakov, L. Razgon, A.
Pristavkin, V. Aksenov, A. Zhigulin, C. Ammrejibi, V.
Astafiev, L. Lose, A. Kushner, V. Frumkin, D. Bobyshev,
E. Rein, A. Rybakov, V. Zolotukhin, M. Kvli-vidze, N.
Gritsyuk, V., Ermakov, B. Sarnov, S. Lominadze, B.
Birger, A. Mezhirov, S. Nikitin, Yu. Kim, O. Chukhontsev,
R. Gabriadze, T. Chiladze, D. Charkviani, N. Korzhavin,
O. and Y. Ponarovsky.

Calling the distinctive feature of the sixties, Y. Karyakin said about himself and many other "children of the XX Congress": *"We cursed Stalin, but it was an Aesop language, because we really wanted to curse Lenin"*.

The activities of the Sixties found "understanding" and support from high-ranking liberals in the ruling Communist Party. The article "Bolshevism as a social disease of the 20th century" by A. N. Yakovlev, the famous "architect of perestroika", in *The Black Book of Communism* (Moscow, 1999), confirms this. "After the 20th Congress," he wrote, "in a super-close circle of my closest friends and like-minded people, we often discussed the problems of democratization of the country and society. We chose a method as simple as a sledgehammer to propagandize the "ideas" of the late Lenin. We had to distinguish the phenomenon of Bolshevism clearly and distinctly, separating it from the Marxism of the last century. They were then relentlessly talked about the genius of the late Lenin, about the necessity of returning to the Leninist "plan for building socialism" through cooperation, through state capitalism, etc. A group of true, not imaginary reformers developed (verbally of course) the following plan: to strike at Stalin,

at Stalinism, with Lenin's authority. And then, if successful, Plekhanov and Social Democracy would hit Lenin, liberalism and "moral socialism" would hit revolutionarism in general. A new round of exposing the "personality cult of Stalin" has begun. But not with an emotional scream, as Khrushchev did, but with a clear implication:

"Not only Stalin is a criminal, but the system itself is criminal."

Conservative tendencies in the development of culture in the 50s and early 60s were manifested in periodic bouts of N.S. Khrushchev's activity aimed at maintaining the ideological purity of culture. And in early 1957, Dudintsev was sharply criticized for his novel "Not by bread alone" for his "nihilistic redrawing of Soviet reality". The writers L. Voznesensky, D. Granin, S. Kirsanov, painter R. Falk, sculptor E. Neizvestny, director M. Khutsiev were subjected to insulting criticism. Khrushchev demanded artists to "reflect" the achievements of the Communist Party and the Soviet people, considering this the main task of literature and art. The loudest scandal broke out in December 1962, when Khrushchev visited an art exhibition at the Manege and subjected the works of the young artists to ridicule.

The humanistic tendencies in the development of Soviet literature and cinematography of those years were most clearly reflected in the artistic treatment of the war theme, which was given a completely new voice in Mikhail Sholokhov's story A Man's Fate, about the Russian soldier Andrei Sokolov's arduous journey through the war and fascist captivity; in the first part of Simonov's trilogy Zhizni (Life in the Life of a Man), about

the war and the fascist occupation. M. Simonov's "The Living and the Dead"; in films by G. Chukhrai "Wallada about a soldier" and M. Kalatozov's "The Cranes Are Flying".

The development of the literary and artistic and social life of the country was largely influenced by the formation of the Central Committee Bureau for the RSFSR (Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic), within the framework of the decision of the 20th Party Congress on the expansion of the rights of the Union republics. The Bureau was established on February 27, 1956. Apart from the chairman (N. S. Khrushchev was a part-time chairperson) the Bureau included three Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee, the first secretaries of the largest regional committees (Moscow, Leningrad, Gorky) and the head of the Russian government. The structure of the new body consisted of seven departments of Schools and Culture, and was established in the structure of the new body. During the years of the Bureau's activity (1956-1966) a number of republican organizations were created in the RSFSR, including the Writers' Union, the Artists' Union, the Composers' Union, and the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences in Novosibirsk. Since July 1956 began to publish a printed organ of the RSFSR - the newspaper "Soviet Russia", was founded by the society "Znanie". All this had a significant impact on the development of cultural life in the RSFSR and the country as a whole.

The most significant impact on the development of literary and social life of the country was the Union of Writers of the RSFSR. The decision to create it was taken on May 13, 1957. In December of the same year

was held the constituent congress of the new Union. L. Sobolev became its chairman; many other writers, sympathetic to the Russian national idea, took administrative positions. Shortly afterwards, the central printed body of the Union of Russian Writers, the newspaper *Literatura i Zhizn* (Literature and Life), began to oppose liberal movements in literature, and the Union's almanac (since 1964, a monthly journal), *Nash Sovremennik* (Our Contemporary), became one of the main journals of the "conservative" trend in literature.

The group of Russian "conservatives" that had taken shape in the USSR Union of Soviet Writers by the mid-1950s basically consisted of two parts. The first consisted of the recognized writers S. N. Sergeev-Tsensky, L. S. Sobolev, L. M. Leonov, N. P. Smirnov, N. P. Konchalovskaya, M. A. Sholokhov, M. S. Bubennov, A. V. Sofronov, S. V. Mikhalkov, Ya. B. A. Zakrutkin, literary critics M. S. Shkerin, K. I. Priyma. The second group was made up of former front-line workers, most of whom were students of the Herzen Literature Institute in Moscow in the second half of the 1940s. Among them, M.N.Alekseev, Y.V.Bondarev, V.S.Bushin, M.M.Godenko, G.A.Isaev, I.I.Kobzev, M.P.Lobanov, A.Y.Markov, V.A.Soloukhin, I.F.Stadnyuk, N.K.Starshinov, F.G.Sukhov, V.D.Fedorov, I.M.Shevtsov have become famous, and C. I. I. Shurtakov. In the mid-1950s these former front-line workers began to occupy influential positions in the Union of Russian Writers. The frontline activists were the main force of the Russian social movement, the essence of which, in our opinion, was most accurately defined by the contemporary historian and writer S.N. Semanov. He believes that "the Russian national movement, revived as normal Russian patriotism during the war with Nazi Germany," is "a form

of struggle for human rights". Since the time of Khrushchev's "otepelia," the Russian nationalist movement has also left a visible mark on subsequent stages of Russian history.

Some scholars, such as N. A. Mitrokhin, historian whose materials are used in this section, call these writers nationalists and conservatives without any qualifications. This modernization is unlikely to be legitimate, especially considering that, in the years under review, a "nationalist" was supposed to be a "bourgeois nationalist," asserting the superiority of his people and their right to rule over others. None of these cultural figures consciously equated their stance with nationalism. We may speak of their nationalism and conservatism only as adherence to Russian national traditions and values.

The "conservatives-nationalists" coordinated their actions against the "liberals" with the "conservative-internationalists" V.A. Kochetov, N.M. Gribachev, and S.P. Babaevsky, the statists and anti-Westernists who believed that any liberal, especially pro-Western, trends lead to the destruction of the socialist state. The popular magazine of this trend was *Ogonyok*, headed from 1953 to 1986 by A. V. Sofronov.

The main print organ opposing the New World was the magazine *Oktyabr*. From 1961 to 1973 it was edited by V. A. Kochetov, known since his time in Leningrad and at the head of the *Literary Gazette* (1956-1961) as an implacable fighter against liberal trends in literature and art. He believed that the anti-Stalinist course posed a danger to proletarian principles and ideals. His novels *The Ershov Brothers* (1958), *The Secretary of the*

Obkom (1961) aroused the rejection of demanding readers. Some found them too politicized (a phenomenon that "goes back to the political circumstances," as Tvardovsky put it), others said - weak in literary terms, naturalistic, schematic, provocative. From the editorial board of October, the arrows of criticism flew to both young and venerable authors: V. P. Aksenov and I. I. A. Yevtushenko, V. S. Rozov and I. G. Ehrenburg. Solzhenitsyn's story, published in *Ion Mir*, was criticized as "ideologically flawed, designed for sensation". They found flaws in "October" in "The Cranes Are Flying" and "Clear Sky". Liberals were offended, thinking that the magazine "slops off" the most innovative things in cinema.

Nevertheless, both the editor's novels and the magazine found a mass audience. Its circulation surpassed that of *Novy Mir*. Kochetov as well as Kardovsky believed that the magazine he headed was pursuing the right-wing line of the party, and both enjoyed the support of the influential political circles. This manifested, in particular, in the fact that Kochetov was a member of the CPSU Central Revision Committee (1955-1966), and Kardovsky was a candidate for the UK CPSU (1961-1966). "October" did a lot for V. Shukshin: a number of works by this remarkable artist were published in its pages. "October" was the first magazine to publish the first selection of poems by Nikolai Rubtsov in Moscow in 1964.

In the early 1960s, the editorial board of *Znamya* formed an *Ipynna* of Russian "nationalists," students of Ya. Smelyakov. Its inspiration was the poet S. Kunyaev (since 1989 the editor-in-chief of *Nashego Novremennik*). The group included the poets A. K.

Peredreev, N. M. Rubtsov, V. N. Sokolov, and I. I. Shklyarevsky. This group was close to the famous literary critic and historian V. V. Kozhinov.

As Kunaev recollected, in 1961-1963, at my desk and on the sofa that stood in the far half of our magazine room, a small but very curious spiritual center of what later came to be called the Russian Party was formed. There were such foci in many parts of Moscow: under the Society for the Protection of Monuments, a so-called Russian club, where Peter Palievsky, Dmitry Zhukov, Oleg Mikhailov, and Sergei Semanov were worshippers. Such groups, according to the poet, were also in the journal *October*, and in the Young Guard under the wing of Nikonov grew Vladimir Tsybin and Viktor Chalmayev, Vladimir Firsov and Anatoly Poperechny. But we were not satisfied with the "Young Guard" or "October" circles, since both were under the powerful supervision of the state's denationalized ideology. We wanted to live in an atmosphere of pure Russian air, full of freedom, and a kind of Lyceum Tsarskoye Selo patriotic and poetic fellowship.

The balance of power that developed in the literary milieu was broken at the 21st Congress of the CPSU, which sharply criticized Stalin and increased the process of de-Stalinization and liberal sentiments in society. At the same time the political weight of the main patron of conservatives, A. N. Shelepin became Secretary of the Central Committee and simultaneously Chairman of the Party and State Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, and the Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. His closest associate, V. E. Semichastny, was appointed Chairman of the KGB of the USSR, which traditionally paid close attention to the

mood in the literary environment. With the strengthening of this tandem, the first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee, S. P. Pavlov, was given a great opportunity for independent activity. It was P. Pavlov, to whom the publishing house Molodaya Gvardiya was subordinated. The rise of Shelepin and Pavlov strengthened the position of the "conservatives" in literature. One of the results of the new arrangement of forces was the publication of the mentioned novel of I. Shevtsov "Aphrodite" by the publishing house.

A. N. Shelepin and the CPSU Central Committee Secretary for Ideology L. F. Ilyichev managed to provoke Khrushchev to fight against modern art, which was a symbol of liberal hope. The result was Khrushchev's scandalous statements at the Manezh exhibition in December 1962, meetings with intellectuals on December 17, 1962, and March 7-8, 1962, and meetings of the ideological commission of the CPSU Central Committee in November and December 1962.

As a reasonable alternative to the pro-Western sentiments of the "Liberals," Shelepin and Ilyichev did not propose Stalinism, but the return of traditional values. At a meeting of the Ideological Commission, the artist I.S. Glazunov expressed this very idea, at Ilyichev's suggestion. In his speech were calls for the preservation of monuments of Russian history and interspersed with condemnation of contemporary art.

In the midst of yet another attack on the Russian Orthodox Church, such appeals could not impress Khrushchev, but they did not lead to any harsh criticism of the new idea. Taking advantage of this, Russian "conservatives" became much more open to discussing

their problems in the press, especially the journal *Molodaya Gvardiya*. This led to the activation of the literary group formed around the magazine and the publishing house of the same name. By publishing novice authors, the publishing house was able to draw them into the literary milieu, to "make a name" and nurture new Russian "conservatives". Of the representatives of the older generation who professed the Russian national idea, the closest to him were M. A. Sholokhov and L. M. Leonov. The poets Ya. V. Smelyakov and N. K. Starshinov were employees of the publishing house.

The side of the "conservatives" in the polemic with the liberals in the pages of the Komsomol publications was supported by the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol P. Pavlov and his entourage. The leaders of the Komsomol were dissatisfied with the growing influence of the most radical branch of liberal literature - "confessional prose" (Aksenov, Gladilimp, Rozov, Yevtushenko, Voznesensky, Okudzhava). In 1961 Pavlov protested against the publications of "a pathetic group of morally ugly authors" in the youth magazine *Yunost*.

On March 22, 1963, the leader of the Komsomol sharply criticized the publications of *Novyi Mir*. "Under the pretext of the fight against the consequences of the cult of personality and dogmatism," Pavlov wrote, "some writers, filmmakers, and artists became 'ashamed' to talk about high ideas, about communism. Juggling with the high concept of 'vital truth', distorting this concept, they fill their works with people who are away from the interests of society, steeped in the narrow world of philistine problems. Indeed, it is worth to read the

memoirs of I. Ehrenburg, "Vologda wedding" by A. Yashin, travel notes by V. These works reek of such pessimism, mustiness, hopelessness, that the uninitiated person who does not know our life, can, goodness-knows, their brains are upside down. Tvardovsky was forced to seek protection in the party instances, and even threatened to resign his post.

During the discussion of candidates for the USSR Lenin Prize in the spring of 1964, Pavlov spoke out against Alexander Solzhenitsyn, a contender for the Prize, recalling that he had once been convicted not for political but for criminal offenses. The "anti-Pyilov" faction in the leadership of the Central Committee of the Komsomol, primarily B. D. Pankin (Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR in August-November 1991), sought to contrast Pavlovian nominees in literature (for example, the poet V. I. Firsov) with the most popular "Westerners," in particular Yevtushenko.

Liberalism as such and the liberal understanding of "vital truth" were opposed to historical optimism and Soviet patriotism as interpreted by the magazine *Molodaya Gvardiya*. This patriotism was associated with the traditions of military-patriotic education on the materials not only of the Civil War, but also of pre-revolutionary history, established on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. The prominent "Young Guard" V. N. Ganichev (he became deputy editor-in-chief of the magazine in late 1963) later noted: "All of us, who later realized ourselves as Russians and led one or another Russian national organization, were brought up in the mainstream of military patriotism". The Russian idea, without any contradiction, was combined in their understanding with the idea of socialism. "Reds" of the Civil War period they

perceived "first of all as Russians", while the Whites had the Entente (allied with foreigners) . This is the field on which the future Russian patriotism grew.

Having found himself in Komsomol work, Ganichev was among those who came up with the idea of supplementing popular hikes to places of military glory with hikes to memorable places of Russian culture, including Solovki, places connected with the activities of Avvakum and Lomonosov. The idea was supported "through several channels. The Russian spirit is already in the heads of some of our leaders." "The first one who supported me," Ganichev goes on to say, "was A. V. Nikonov, editor-in-chief of the journal Molodaya Gvardiya. I consider him the forerunner of the entire Russian movement". He graduated from the history department of Moscow State University, and everything connected with Russian patriotism, he carefully wrapped all the necessary Soviet content, he chose powerful quotations from the classics, he taught us the stylistics of the time. Other "pillars of the Russian movement" Ganichev calls I.S. Glazunov and V.A. Solokhin, and he believes that it was in the period between 1962 and 1964 that "the Russian nationalist worldview actually began to take hold". Prior to that, it had been held within the framework of the military-patriotic movement. Suddenly it became more widely recognized as a state worldview. The magazine Molodaya Gvardiya was the main hearth of the Russian spirit at that time.

Another area where Komsomol leaders helped the "cooperatives" in the writer's community to popularize Russian national ideas was in editorial and publishing. S. Melentiev, who in 1961 became director of the Young Guard Publishing House of the Komsomol Central

Committee, played a major role in these activities. V. O. Osipov, who was invited in 1962 to the post of the editor-in-chief of the Komsomol Central Committee and the director of the Komsomol Central Committee's Press, became an active member of the publishing house.

O. Osipov, who was invited as the Editor-in-Chief in 1962, and worked in this capacity until 1974. When V. N. Ganichev came to Melentiev in 1961 with a proposal to publish a book for students, he later, in 1968-1978, became the director of this publishing house. As the director of this publishing house, he directed its activities further cultivating genuine Russian cultural values and Russian ideas by means of fiction and journalism.

With Melentiev's active assistance, the publishing house established and strengthened ties with some of the most influential writers who supported Russian national ideas - Sholokhov, Leonov, Smelyakov, and Solokhin. An editorial board for work with young writers was established; "All-Union Meetings of Young Writers" began to be held regularly; special attention was paid to the winners of the Lenin Komsomol Prize. The first books by Komsomolskaya Pravda journalists V. Chivilikhin and V. Peskov, V. Shukshin, B. Mozhaev, M. Shaginyan were published here. Sholokhov was an iconic figure for the Pavlovites. In 1965 Melentiev was a member of the delegation, which left for Sholokhov to receive the Nobel Prize in Stockholm.

The main creative acquisition of the Russian "conservatives" in the mid-60's years was the authors of "country prose". Its progenitors were V. Soloukhin with his book Vladimir Proselki (1958) and I. Shukshin, who published one of the most brilliant books of the

"countryside trend" - Rural People - in 1962 at Molodaya Gvardiya Publishers. The mass arrival of "redneck writers" in literature began in the mid-1960s. It was connected with the names of F. Abramov, I. Astafyev, V. Belov, A. Znamensky, V. Likhonosov, E. Nosov, I. Rasputin, A. Romanov, G. Troyslovsky, O. Fokina, V. Shugaev. Representatives of two currents, liberal and conservative, formed in the literature by the mid-1960s and clearly defined, and were trying to find support in the power structures. The former, who relied on détente and "international" (anti-national) forces within the country, were often sympathetic to Leonid Brezhnev, Central Committee secretary, M.A. Suslov, and B. N. Kuznetsov. H. Ponomarev, and the latter, relying on the forces of internal national development - with the Secretaries of the Central Committee L.I. Shelepin and L. F. Ilyichev, K. G. Mazurov, first secretary of the UK Communist Party of Belarus, D. C. Polyanskiy.

The emergence of dissidence.

The term "dissident" (Latin for "dissenter") was used in postwar Russian history from the mid-1970s. It was used to refer to people who were openly disagreeing with the official doctrines in some or other field of public life in the USSR and who came to openly clash with the state apparatus. Л. М. Alekseeva, who made her first attempt to present the history of dissidence in her book History of Dissent in the USSR (Vil'n) s; M. 1992), includes in the concept of "dissident movements" such forms of dissent such as national, national-religious, national-democratic; movements of representatives of peoples for departure to their historical homeland; for human and socio-economic rights; and the socialist movement. She traces the prehistory of the movement as a whole, back to

1953. She attributes the start of the movement to December 5, 1965, when the first demonstration under human rights slogans was held at Pushkin Square in Moscow. It is easy to see that this approach to defining dissidence does not, in fact, allow us to identify the specificity of this phenomenon or to determine the chronological frame of the movement. For example, all forms of disagreement with the Stalinist regime in the 1920s and 1940s fall under the definition of dissidence.

In our view, what distinguishes postwar dissidence from other forms of dissent from power is the dissidents' lack of trust in the existing regime's ability to validate oppositional ideas and programs. Hence the willingness of dissenters to use extraordinary and illegitimate means to influence the authorities. Instead of appealing to the authorities, dissidents, as radical opponents of the regime, display a readiness to organize their activities by creating underground movements and groups that actively work toward achieving their goals. At the same time, Western-style dissidents often joined forces with social and state structures abroad that were hostile to their own country and its rulers - progressive and civilized, from the dissident point of view.

Dissidence emerged during the relative liberalization of Stalin's regime after the 20th Party Congress, 1956, when radical groups in opposition to the regime acquired comparatively greater opportunities for formation and existence than before, under Stalin. This also applies to the activities of individual prominent oppositionists, around whom a corresponding circle of supporters and followers eventually emerged.

The emergence of the dissident movement in the USSR

in the 1950s was distinguished by its clandestine activities, the use of the "tamizdat" and "samizdat" (published abroad or published locally), to mobilize supporters and promote opposition ideas and programs.

The first high-profile manifestation of dissidence that drew the attention of the authorities and society was the case of B. Pasternova. Pasternak, who was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1957 for his novel *Doctor Zhivago* published by the Italian publishing house Feltrinelli (the first case of "tamizdat"). The publication was the occasion for a noisy campaign to discredit the writer. Threatened with expulsion from the country, he was forced to refuse the prize. In October 1958 he was expelled from the Writers' Union. His common-law wife O. V. Ivinskaya was convicted in November 1960 for assistance in transferring the manuscript of the novel abroad and in receiving royalties for its publication.

Less visible to society were such early manifestations of liberal dissidence as the submission for publication in the West of A. D. Sinyavsky's grotesque satirical novel *Judgment is Coming* (1956); the activities in 1956-1957 of the Leningrad circle of the mathematician I*. I. I. Pimenov's circle (five of its members were convicted on September 6, 1957, for "forming an illegal group of students from the Librarian Institute to organize the struggle against the existing regime," and, in fact, for distributing a leaflet against non-alternative elections).

The same type of events can be referred to the activities of the circle headed by I. I. Trofimov, a student of the Leningrad Pedagogical Institute. On September 19, 1957, eight of its members were convicted of joining an organization that espoused revolutionary-Marxist theory

and distributed leaflets urging students to demand democratic freedoms.

Since 1956 a group of four professors and research workers, two MSU students, and two engineers operated in Moscow under the leadership of L. N. Krasnopevtsev, a postgraduate student in the History Department of Moscow State University. Members of the underground organization attempted to develop a new concept of the history of the CPSU and a new ideology. In the spring of 1957, they established contacts with the Polish opposition. They wrote historical notes about the necessity of destroying the USSR as an obstacle to the progress of civilization. Their goal was to fight against "Stalinist socialism" and for the establishment of workers' self-government. In July 1957 they distributed leaflets demanding the abolition of Article 58 of the Criminal Code, the trial of Stalin's accomplices, the strengthening of the role of the Soviets, and the right of workers to go on strike. On February 12, 1958, several members of this group were convicted for "anti-Soviet" activities and sentenced to 6-10 years of imprisonment.

Informal gatherings of non-conformist youth near the monument to Mayakovsky in Moscow were perceived by the authorities as extraordinary and dangerous. They began to gather quite often from the day the monument was unveiled (July 29, 1958). They featured poetry readings and speeches on the freedom of creativity in the USSR. The poetry recitations became more and more politicized as time went on. Along with permitted poems, pro- and (re)writing by repressed authors were read on the square. By the autumn of 1961, the meetings were broken up, and the most active participants (V. N. Osipov, E. S. Kuznetsova, I. V.

Bokshtein) were convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda.

In October 1958 the activity of a group of Leningrad University graduates led by M. V. Kuznetsov was suppressed. They were arrested for the content of the correspondence they kept among themselves, for discussion of the possibility of creating an organization and manuscripts on ways to reform socialism.

At the end of the 50s, a number of writers and publicists of the liberal wave began to place their works in typewritten journals, the so-called "samizdat" emerged. The most famous was the journal Syntax, edited by A. I. Ginzburg. It published the "camp" prose of V. Shalamov and E. Ginzburg, and works by B. Akhmadulina, V. Nekrasov, B. Okudzhava, etc. that were not accepted for official publication. The arrest of Ginzburg in 1961, sentenced to two years in the camps, interrupted the publication of the magazine.

From the late 1950s, the practice of liberal writers transferring their works for publication in the West (A. Sinyavsky, V. Tarsis, etc.) became more frequent. "Tamizdat" (foreign publication), revealed a clear tendency toward further growth. The authorities did not understand V. Grossman's novel *Life and Fate*, completed in 1960: its publication was banned, and the manuscript was confiscated in 1961. The novel, as well as his work *Everything Flows* (1963), depicting the "Russian development" as a strange development of unfreedom and categorically not accepted by "Russophile" circles, was first published there. Compatriots became aware of these works thanks to copies imported from abroad.

Major General P. Grigorenko's speech at the Moscow City Party Conference in September 1961 devoted to discussion of the draft Program of the Party was a significant phenomenon in public life. He believed that the issue of the possibility of a new personality cult was not adequately addressed in it, and proposed "to strengthen the democratization of elections and wide rotation and responsibility before the electorate. To eliminate all the conditions that cause violation of the Leninist principles and norms, in particular, high salaries, irremovability, directly put in the program to combat careerism, unscrupulousness, bribery, stealing customers, deceiving the party and state in the interests of personal gain". The speech is very characteristic as a first step toward liberation from the dogmas of the past. Subsequent steps led to the creation of the "Union for the Revival of Leninism" headed by Grigorenko, to his expulsion from the Party, turning him into an active dissident and, as a result, to his placement in a special psychiatric hospital in February 1964.

Of great resonance was the speech of the famous film director M.I. Romm at the conference "Tradition and innovation in the art of socialist realism" on 27 November 1962. Five times laureate of the Stalin Prize for the first time publicly and unambiguously spoke about the famous campaign against "cosmopolitans" in the late 40s, claiming that it was created artificially, was anti-Semitic and essentially consisted in beating the writers' cadres. The perpetrators of this "beating" were called the surviving "anti-Semites" N. M. Gribachev, V. A. Kochetov, A. V. Sofronov, and "the like". According to Romm, they also carried out open sabotage against licero new and bright in cinematography. This speech

created a sensation in the intelligentsia, and its text was widely circulated in lists in Moscow, becoming one of the first "samizdat" documents. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union essentially avoided considering the complaints of these writers to the highest party bodies, thereby maintaining its ambiguous attitude toward the situation.

A. I. Solzhenitsyn said, that Romm's speech was very important for the further development of the dissident movement. From that moment he "became a kind of spiritual leader of Soviet Jewry". Since then, the Jews have been pouring into the 'democratic movement', the 'dissident movement' - and have become courageous members of it as well.

Perhaps the greatest influence on the further development of dissidence in the USSR was the unsuccessful attempt to publish A. Solzhenitsyn's novel *The First Circle* in *Novyi Mir*. On June 11, 1964 L. G. Tvardovsky managed to obtain the editorial board's permission to publish the novel. The manuscript was handed over for the highest approval of Khrushchev's assistant V.S. Lebedev. On August 21, Lebedev returned the manuscript to Tvardovsky, firmly refusing to participate in its "probing" through the censorship. This effectively transferred Solzhenitsyn from a member of the legal liberal social movement to the ranks of the dissidents. He began to look for the possibility of publishing the novel in the priceless press.

The growth of Russian national consciousness is associated with the acceptance of the authority of Russian history during the war, the victory over fascism and the postwar campaigns to educate patriotism,

overcoming low admiration and cosmopolitanism, determined the main directions of radical groups advocating the further strengthening of consciousness and a policy consistent with Russian national interests.

Illegal and semi-legal Russian public associations that emerged in the 50's were characterized by "Russian nationalism" (from the position of internationalism and liberalism - almost every explicit manifestation of Russian national consciousness) and "anti-Semitism", were seen in almost every case of disagreement with the ideas and deeds of the Jewish nationality, and in fact of the official judgment of the anti-cosmopolitan campaign.

Researchers of the dissident movement (L.M. Alekseeva, V.I. Daniel, M.N. Mitrokhin) note that this activity was typical mainly for the provinces, where numerous small dissident groups emerged and were quickly exposed by the KGB. Most of them were socialist-oriented in various hues - from neo-Stalinists to Mensheviks and anarcho-syndicalists. Among such organizations two Moscow groups stand out. They are believed to have started the dissident movement of "Russian nationalists".

One of them was the People's Democratic Party founded in the fall of 1955 by chauffeur V. S. Polenov, junior lieutenant V. L. Solonev retired from the army, and Y. A. Pirogov, a student at the Herzen Literature Institute. About ten people were involved in the "party". And the activity mainly consisted in talking to its members about the plight of the workers and peasants, dissatisfaction with the ruling party, which did not pay due attention to the needs of ordinary people. The economic views of the "Partyists" included the introduction of private property in

industry and commerce.

In 1958, members of this "party" turned to action: they produced on a typewriter several hundred leaflets describing the difficult living conditions and calling to "beat the communists". They put them in mailboxes and posted them around Vagankov, Gorky Street, the Garden Ring, the American Embassy, Mantulin Street, and in Krasnopresnensky Park. At the very beginning of these actions, in May 1958, members of the underground were arrested. On January 13, 1959 six members of the NDP, People's Democratic Party, were convicted by the Moscow City Court on charges of creating an anti-Soviet group to seven, five and two and a half years in prison. The group served their sentences in the camps, where the group around Polenov was notable for its desire to resolve inter-ethnic conflicts within the camp from a Russian ethnic perspective and with brute force, for which it earned the nickname "Pugachevites."

The second notorious Moscow group was the "Russian National Socialist Party," which was organized in December 1956. A.A. Dobrovolsky, a loader at the Pravda printing house. In fact it was a backyard company of workers born between 1937 and 1939 in the Kalanchevka neighborhood. At the same time, they were stilyagami, imitating the garish fashion that came from the West. Working in defense plants, they denounced the Soviet troops in Hungary and therefore decided to fight for the overthrow of the "Jewish Commissar yoke" in the USSR, to beat up the "cops" (policemen) and along with them the Komsomol and the opera squad members who often damaged (cut) the pants and long hair of the dandies. The group was inspired by dreams

of reviving the Russian nation.

This group had two actions on their account. During the Festival of Youth and Students in the summer evening of 1957, 20 members of the group carried over their ranks in a general festival procession from the Kirovskaya metro to the Red Gate five posters - "Long Live Free Hungary!" However, in the festive sea of slogans, no one paid any attention to these posters. The second action was the distribution of leaflets printed on a machine bought at a collection. These leaflets with the words "Death to Communists!" were posted in districts of Moscow far from Kalanchevka.

On May 23, 1958, Dobrovolsky, already a first-year student at Moscow State University, and about 10 of his supporters were arrested. At the trial, the student admitted nothing and did not repent of anything. But he was sentenced on charges of anti-Soviet propaganda and counter-revolutionary agitation, containing "appeals to the overthrow of the Soviet power and threats of reprisals against communists and Komsomol members". The rest of those arrested, who amicably blamed their leader, were exonerated and in a few days released. In the camp, Dobrovolsky became friends with members of Polenov's group and former Russian immigrants, members of the SS "Russian Legion," who were serving time as war criminals. Having served his term of imprisonment, he, along with B. D. Yevdokimov tried to create in July 1964 an anti-Soviet representation of the "Union of Working People".

In Leningrad in the early sixties a more serious anti-communist association arose. Its nucleus was formed in 1962. It took shape organizationally on 2 February 1964.

On that day, I. V. Ogurtsov, a graduate of the Oriental Department of Leningrad State University, read to his old friends, the linguist M. Y. Sado, the philologist Y. A. Vagin and the law student B. D. Averichkin, a program of the military and political organization Russian Social Christian Union of People's Liberation, established for the organized struggle against the existing system. In a few months the four founders distributed among themselves the duties of the organization: Ogurtsov was its leader, Vagin was its ideologist, and Sado, a former paratrooper and champion of Leningrad in classical wrestling, was responsible for the work with the personnel and counterintelligence, Averichkin was the keeper of the archive and the lists of the organization. An oath was developed, which was taken by everyone joining the union. New members were told that they were joining an organization that united thousands of *chkkyyu* (pollination?) throughout the country. L. I. Borodin (now a well-known writer and editor of the journal *Moskva*), a member of the organization and school director in Luga (Leningrad Province), believed that at least five hundred people were arrested in Leningrad in 1967 for the Union.

The structure of the All-Union of People's Liberation initially consisted of troikas, which later merged into platoons. Each unit had its own library, numbering 30 mandatory books for self-education. The political basis of the organization was a symbiosis of N. A. Berdyaev's ideas about social Christianity and the views set forth in M. Jilas' book "The New Class." The program of the All-Union Communist Party of the Soviet Union was improved as its members discovered Berdyaev's works not previously known. The final version was prepared by early 1965. Ionia also wrote the charter of the organization. The program suggested the creation of an

orthodox corporate state, the admission of private property and the state's control over the main branches of industry.

Unlike the Moscow groups, the "samizdat" of this union was no longer homemade leaflets with appeals (such as "People, Don't Believe the Communists!"), but detailed political documents, historical and art historical essays, and professional poetry. Leningraders had quite a few contacts with other underground and legal dissident groups. Union members actively sought suitable candidates among them. Most members, such as the Union for the Defense of Democratic Freedoms, joined the Union, which managed to establish contacts with the editors of Vestnik RSHD (Paris) and the Polish anti-communists, receiving literature from them.

The Union's activities were discovered in February 1967 through the denunciation of one of its members. By that time it had 28 members, 30 candidates and was the largest underground group discovered by the KGB in the post-Stalin period. Twenty-one people were convicted in the organization's case and about 100 witnesses were questioned nationwide in this connection. The RSFSR Criminal Code, Articles 64 (treason) and 72 (creation of an anti-Soviet organization) of the Soviet Union were sentenced in early December 1967. Ogurtsov was sentenced to 15 years in prison (7 years of which he was to spend in prison) and 5 years in exile; Sado received 13 years, including 3 years in prison; Vagin and Averichkin received 8 years each. In the spring of the following year, 17 rank-and-file members were convicted.

V. N. Osipov, a well-known dissident and representative of the Russian national liberation movement, believes that VSKhSON (**All-Russian Social-Christian Union for the Liberation of the People**), an underground anti-Soviet organization that operated in the Soviet Union during 1964–1967. The Union was founded by Leningrad State University alumni in February 1964, and counted 28 members and 30 candidates), was in fact an organizationally formalized "Berdyayev circle" of intellectuals engaged in self-education. It was an expression on going since the war, irreversible changes in spiritual life, in particular the growing interest in the works of Russian philosophers - pre-revolutionary and forced emigrants - V. Solovyev, N. Berdyayev, S. L. Frank, I. A. Ilyin, G. P. Fedotov, to the works of pre-revolutionary Russian historians V. N. Tatishchev, N. M. Karamzin, S. M. Solovyov, N. I. Kostomarov, V. O. Kluchevsky, etc.

Along with the writerly groups trying to encourage the authorities to strengthen the Russian component in the Soviet patriotism, in the literary and artistic environment of the 50s and early 60s announced itself intellectual groups inspired by the liberal Russian ideas and values. In the spectrum of currents of social thought and movements, they were located on the edge between the legal currents of Russian Soviet nationalism (patriotism) and the currents of anti-Soviet Russian nationalism (pre-revolutionary Russian patriotism).

One of these groups could be called the entourage of the artist Igor Glazunov (his mother's side - he came from a family of servile Baltic gentry), who in the late 50's began to lecture on Russian culture and collect icons in the villages. A group of anti-communist monarchists had

formed around him by 1992. It included, in particular, the famous and influential writer I.A. Soloukhin and a functionary of the USSR Ministry of Culture V.A. Desyatnikov, one of the most active participants in the movement for the protection of monuments.

According to Desyatnikov's diary entries, he did not know another person as sharply and irreconcilably as I. S. Glazunov, viukpovaya to Lenin and his entire "gang," who brought incalculable misfortune to Russia. Trotsky, Sverdlov, Dzerzhinsky, Stalin and Khrumilov together with their leader, according to Glazunov's conviction, were servants of the devil, "the devil's spawn. In the fight against them and their henchmen, he believed, all means are good. The misfortunes of his family - the deaths of their parents and relatives - and humiliated Russia for Glazunov are inseparable. The purpose and meaning of life he reduced to one - the service of the Fatherland. His wife, N. A. Vino-Fzdoda-Benoit, who was notable for her "extreme political convictions," as Desyatnikov writes, played a role in the ideological formation of Glazunov. Glazunov was greatly influenced by his patron, a sympathizer of Russian nationalists, an Orthodox, Nyuryan by birth, the famous Soviet writer S.V. Mikhalkov and his wife, the writer N.P. Konchalovskaya.

Desyatnikov himself had no sympathy for the revolution either, since he came from the Cossacks. His maternal grandfather, Life Guards Cossack George Popov, who served in a personal convoy of Nicholas I, died in prison in 1952. After his dismissal in the late '50s from the army 'Kentnikov studied at the Department of Art History of Moscow State University. He communicated much with such carriers of pre-revolutionary traditions as the

restorer P.D. Baranovsky, the artist P.D. Korin, the writer M. Leonov, and the heliobiologist A.L. Chizhevsky, who emerged from the camp.

The views of the Moscow State University graduates grouped around the literary critic A. L. Chizhevsky are marked by liberal radicalism, also grouped around the literary critics V. V. Kozhinov and P. V. Palievsky (both graduated from the Philological Faculty of P. Paliev in 1954 and 1955). They were still fascinated by the aesthetics of pre-revolutionary Russia in their university years and saw a positive alternative to communism in monarchism.

They tried to use the philosophy of the Silver Age as their frame of reference. This group includes the poet S.Y. Kuyev, the literary critic V.V. Petelin, and the historian S. Semanov. F.F. Kuznetsov and V.A. Chalmaev were close to this group in ideology, - who made their mark as members of the "Russian party". In the 1950s, Kozhinov had a long association with the important Russian philosopher M.M. Bakhtin and became a popularizer of his work, who made no secret of his orthodox views. He was also close to the circle of the philosopher A.F. Losev, one of his students and followers. Among his disciples and followers there were many famous scientists and public figures (Yu. M. Borodai, A. V. Gulyga, P. V. Palievski, and V. I. Skurlatov).

The "group of A. A. Fetisov, which called itself the Society for Study of Systems Theory, was well known. Having started its activity in the second half of the 1950s, it existed legally for a long time under the guise of this scientific society. It organized lectures and seminars

that were very popular among students of technical universities. In 1963 the Society split into "pure systemists", headed by the mathematician G.P. Shchedrovitsky, and "politicized systemists". The latter (10-15 people) under the leadership of Fetisov soon switched from scientific to political activities - the propaganda of ideas unconventional for those times. He was an ardent communist, but considered Marx's doctrine unsuitable for Russia. The ideal of a statesman for him was Lenin, who successfully adapted Marxism to Russian conditions. Fetisov was also a great admirer of Stalin. In 1967, he submitted an application to leave the CPSU, believing that by condemning the "cult of personality" in 1956, it "spat in the soul of the people".

The people of Fetisov used legal methods to propagandize their ideas. Their lectures and scientific discussions with their opponents were very popular in technical universities. However, beginning in 1965, the party committees and administrations forbade debates with their participation. Fetisov resigned from the institute and took a job as a worker at a woodworking machine factory. Now, using the mask of a working-class representative, he began to come to universities to defend his dissertations and speak at scientific councils as an opponent. A common conclusion of the "opponent" was: "If we really had the dictatorship of the proletariat, would he allow science to be in such a miserable state"? "Yes, he would take you, dear comrades, and sweep you away with a fucking broom". As a result of such speeches, Fetisov and three of his followers ended up in 1968 and in special psychiatric hospitals.

The position of Russian national liberalism was strengthened by the activity of the Russian Orthodox

Church priest S. Dudko, who, according to writer L.I. Borodin, "was not just a fighter, he was the spiritual leader of the fighters in the camp of 'unofficial Russians'". His preaching and missionary activities - illegal from the point of view of Soviet law - brought him widespread fame. Between 1961 and 1974, the number of mature converts in the entire parish rose from about 10 to more than 400 per year, and while at first most of the neophytes were poorly educated, in time people with higher education began to predominate among them. Already in the early 1960s, a large group of monastic believers had formed around the Orthodox priest. The Orthodox thinker and publicist G. M. Shimanov joined Father Dudko's flock in 1962-1979.

Chapter 4: National Politics and National Movements

The Initiatives of Beria, April 1953

The national sphere received perhaps the most notable impetus for change immediately after Stalin's death. First, it was related to the decisions made on the memoranda of the Minister of Internal Affairs, L. P. Beria's memos to the CPSU Central Committee of 1 and 2 April 1953. In them, it was proposed to rehabilitate and immediately release from custody the persons involved in the "case of the doctors-in-lieges", to condemn the "criminal operation of the brutal murder of Mihoels", and the "expulsion of P.S. Zhemchuzhina as a result of allegedly only provocative fabrications of anti-Soviet nationalist activity".

As early as April 3, the Presidium of the Central Committee adopted and the next day published a Resolution on the falsification of the "case of the doctors-in-law" and the acceptance of the proposals of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR. It sanctioned the full rehabilitation and release from custody of 37 doctors and their families, the prosecution of employees of the former Ministry of State Security, "particularly sophisticated in the fabrication of this provocative case and the most gross distortions of Soviet laws"; the implementation of measures that "exclude the possibility of recurrence of such distortions in the work of the Interior".

The thesis contained in Beria's note about "fabrications" of nationalist charges was practically the basis of condemnation and final termination of the campaign against cosmopolitanism, as well as the ambiguous reaction of the public to it. Rumors about Beria's (Beria) Jewish origins and his connivance with "tribesmen" were actualized. In early 1953, in an attempt to muffle unwanted antisemitic reactions in society, Khrushchev sent a closed letter to party organizations demanding that they not comment on the MVD report published in the newspapers or discuss antisemitism at party meetings. This explains why Beria's proposal to immediately rehabilitate those convicted in the case of the Jewish Antifascist Committee was rejected: the convicts were not rehabilitated until November 1955. The decision to rehabilitate them was not made public.

Another impulse for changes in national relations was given by the decrees of May 26 and June 12, 1953, adopted on the initiative of Beria. They were intended to "put a decisive end* to perversions of the Leninist-

Stalinist nationality policy" in the Ukraine, Lithuania and Belorussia. On June 12, on the basis of Khrushchev's schniski, a similar decision was made for Latvia.

The proposed concept of de-Stalinization of inter-ethnic relations was based on the korenization (the second after the 20's) of the party-state apparatus and the introduction of records in the Union republics in their native language. Beriev's "korenization" of the higher and middle levels of the party-economic apparatus, which in practice meant the destruction of the Russian cadres in the national republics, began with the replacement of the Russian Lev Melnikov by the Ukrainian A. Kirichenko as the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine. In Byelorussia the plenum of the Central Committee made decisions predetermined by the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee of 12 June. The decision read: "To relieve Mr. Patolichev N.S. of his duties as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, recalling him to the CPSU Central Committee", and "To recommend as first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus Mr. M. V. Zimyanin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and former second secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Belarus, and relieve him of his duties in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The report prepared by Zimyanin's group for the plenum of the CPB in the spirit of Beria's note suggested, in particular, to correct the violation of the principles of Lenin's national policy, to introduce the Belarussian writing in the state machinery, conducting all correspondence, meetings and congresses only in the Belarussian language. The report admitted that Russians,

of course, would find it more difficult to work in Belarus, as not all of them know the Belarusian language well. And the attitude to them in the speeches of the supporters of korenization, according to Patolichev's recollections, was as follows: "The Russian comrades helped the Belarusians in many ways. Earthly thanks to them for that. And now, if any of them find it very difficult, we will help them move elsewhere."

M. Masherov, Komsomol leader and Hero of the Soviet Union, who had had great authority in the republic since the war, was the first to oppose Zimyanin's report, followed by the other participants of the plenum. Nevertheless, the report, prepared on the instructions of the Center, was approved. However, even before the end of the plenum, Khrushchev called Patolichev and said: "Beria has been arrested... Do not tell anybody about it yet... We have received information from our inspector that the Plenum of the Central Committee supports you. If the Plenum asks the CPSU Central Committee, the decision can be reversed." As a result of changes in the situation in Moscow, Patolichev remained in his post until 1956. He later told T.U. Usubaliev, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Kyrgyzstan, about Beria's initiatives: "It was hard to find a worse kind of nationalism. The implementation of this delusional idea would have turned into a terrible tragedy for millions of citizens living in Belorussia. Beria "did not care at all about the development of the national language and the national cadres.

The implementation of Beriev's "national" plan would have led to the displacement of millions of people from one republic to another. On July 2, 1953 the decisions of

the Presidium of the Central Committee against "perversions of Leninism and the Soviet Union" taken at Beria's suggestion. Stalin's nationalist policy" were abolished as "contributing to the activation of bourgeois-nationalist elements."

The corporatization of the party-economic apparatus, was carried out in the spirit of Beria's proposals in Ukraine, Byelorussia and the Baltic republics. The attempts to introduce in the republics their own orders in honor of outstanding national figures to reward local workers of the cultural front, other measures to develop national traditions in culture and language that promoted a sense of national pride - all this did not pass without difficulty and had twofold results. On the one hand, it contributed to the elimination of the armed nationalist underground in these republics. On the other hand, it really activated the bourgeois-nationalist elements, nationalist-separatist and Russophobe constructs, and contributed to the emergence of numerous nationalist circles and groups, whose participants were mostly young people born in the 50s-60s.

B. Golikov, Leonid Brezhnev's long-term assistant, testifies that after Beria's famous notes, the situation in Moldova changed instantly: "there was a strong outbreak of nationalism". K.U. Chernenko, who had been working since 1948 as head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department of the Central Committee. The Communist Party of Moldavia, from 1950 - under the leadership of Krezhnev, after a while literally begged Golikov: "&u-mshy, help me. Moldovans come and say that I am eight children and am taking up space. God did not hurt them with their impudence. Help me go somewhere, only to Russia. Anywhere. The future general secretary of the

CPSU Central Committee became the head of one of the sections of the CPSU Central Committee Propaganda and Information Department, headed by L. F. Ilyichev.

In an effort to prevent the growth of local nationalism, N. S. Khrushchev sometimes reacted sharply to facts of apparent violation of the internationalist principles" of the personnel policy. For example, he personally reprimanded the Azerbaijani leader I.D. Mustafayev for adopting a number of decisions that discriminated against representatives of non-indigenous nationalities, in particular Russians. No one can suspect the Russians now," he said, "that they are pursuing some kind of chauvinist policy. Look, the Russians - they are often to the detriment of their republic, and have provided assistance to the brotherly peoples. And now these peoples are not only equalized, but often in terms of living standards are higher than some parts of the Russian Federation".

The first consequences of Khrushchev's rehabilitations.

One of N. S. Khrushchev's first initiatives, which had a generally negative effect on the development of national relations in the country, is connected with the celebration in early 1954. In early 1954, the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia was celebrated. On this occasion, on January 12, on behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it published the "Anniversary of Ukraine's Reunification with Russia".

It emphasized the enormous progressive significance of

the decisions of the Pereyaslav Rada, expressed mainly in three historical facts. ✓ "By uniting with Russia within the framework of a unified Russian state, Ukraine was saved from enslavement by nobleman Poland and absorption by Sultan's Turkey." ✓ "The growth of strength and power of the USSR made it possible to realize the age-old aspirations of the Ukrainian people for their national reunification" (the incorporation of Western Ukraine into Soviet Ukraine in 1939, Bukovina and the Izmil region in 1940, and Transcarpathian Ukraine in 1945). ✓ "Only thanks to the fraternal help of the great Russian people and other peoples of the USSR, Ukraine was liberated from the fascist yoke."

Ukraine's successes (17-fold growth of industry in Soviet times, ahead of all European countries in the number of students, etc. According to the "Theses", they were further proof that "only socialism ensures a free and happy life, development and prosperity of all peoples and nations, true friendship of peoples, their cooperation and mutual assistance", that the USSR "is an inspiring example of a country in which for the first time in the history of mankind the national question has been resolved". In propaganda literature the degree of unity of the peoples of the Soviet Union was given its final expression. It was said that "the complete and final resolution of the national question" was a consequence of the transformation of the lives of the Soviet peoples after 1917. In 1951, from the pages of the Party magazine (Bolshevik Ukraine).

Issue No. 9) declared that the unity of the peoples of the USSR had acquired a fundamentally new qualitative state. "In the course of the socialist transformations in our country, a community of people, unprecedented in

history, the Soviet people, the commonwealth of the two classes, the workers and peasants, and the truly popular intelligentsia, the commonwealth of all the peoples of the USSR, has been formed. The Soviet people of all nationalities are the laborers of a single socialist system of economy, have a single system of state life - the Soviet state, a single ideology - Marxism-Leninism, a single goal - the construction of communism, a single party expressing their vital interests leading them from victory to victory - the Lenin-Stalin Party. All peoples have one Fatherland - the Soviet Union".

Contradictions in national relations began to be attributed topically to the presence of prejudices in the minds of individual Soviet people and the intrigues of the capitalist environment. As long as the capitalist environment continues to exist," said the "Theses on the 300th Anniversary of the Unification of Ukraine with Russia", "the imperialist states will continue to send spies and saboteurs to us, to try to use for anti-Soviet purposes the remains of the defeated hostile groups, to activate bourgeois-nationalist elements, to revive nationalist prejudices in the minds of individual people and use them to undermine the friendship of the peoples of the USSR.

The transfer of the Crimea region from the Russian Federation to Ukraine under the decision of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of February 19th 1954 led to long-term negative consequences. This operation, fundamentally contradicting the interests of the Russian people, was accepted under the absurd pretext of the national and state interests of Russia. It took into account the alleged "commonality of economy, territorial proximity and close

economic and cultural ties between the Crimean oblast and the Ukrainian SSR".

The real reason for Khrushchev's gift of the Crimean territory with the predominant Russian population (according to 1954 data, there were 1.2 million inhabitants, 71.4% of which were Russians), was the desire to make up for personal guilt for the sanctioned repressions of 1938-1940. Their victims were 167,465 residents of Ukraine, including more than 2 thousand representatives of the leadership of the republic. N. S. Khrushchev counted not only on the support of the representatives of the Republic in the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU (as D. T. Shepilov put it), but also on the guaranteed 36 votes of the Ukrainian party organization on the plenums of the Central Committee, which had 175 members, with the implementation of this operation ("to win Ukraine to its side", as he said). It was not without reason that on his flight from Pitsunda to Moscow on October 14, 1964, Khrushchev was trying to talk his guards into promising to promote their commander to the rank of colonel and to confer the title of Hero of the Soviet Union on each of them: "There is a plot in the capital city! Lead them to Kiev.... There is our salvation."

One of the main national movements in the Soviet Union in the 1950s was the movement of the deported peoples for the provision of constitutional rights. Letters and complaints of the deportees about the illegality of the deportations began to reach the central party and government agencies almost from the moment of their deportation. With time, they began to flow in an uninterrupted flow. In 1952, about 6 thousand complaints were sent to various authorities per month, in 1954 -

about 11,000. In 1953, a delegation of Kalmyk immigrants, obtained a reception at the UN, at the U.S. State Department and asked to influence the Commission on Human Rights of the UN, so that it would achieve the release of Kalmyks and other repressed USSR peoples. However, until 1954, the deported peoples, who, according to earlier decisions, were to remain in the places of deportation for eternity, did not cause any particular disturbance. Even escapes to the home country were prevented by brutal measures. The situation began to change after April 10, 1953, when the party and government decrees on deportation of about 11 thousand citizens - "irregular elements", allegedly connected with the Mingrelo-Nationalist group from Georgia were annulled.

The rehabilitating decree of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee of April 10, 1953 ordered "all illegally evicted citizens to return to their former places of residence. The Government of Georgia was obliged to "return the property confiscated from the citizens who were returned to Georgia from the special settlements". In 1954, a half-hearted and contradictory process of rehabilitation and return of civil rights to the other deported peoples began. In this and the following year, all Germans, Crimean Tatars, Kalmyks, and Balkars were removed from the special settlement records without the right to return to their former places of residence. On July 5, 1954 the administrative restrictions were removed from the children of Karachais, Chechens and Ingush up to 16 years old. On March 10, 1955, Chechens, Ingush and Karachais received the right to have passports, as well as all the special settlers, and on May 9, 1955 the decree of the Presidium of the CPSU CC liquidated restrictions for CPSU members.

This was followed by the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR "On the removal of restrictions on the legal status of Germans and members of their families who were in special resettlement" of December 13, 1955. However, the peoples did not receive the right to return to their former places of residence. Consideration was given to the possibility of creating national-administrative formations of these peoples in the places of expulsion. The repressed peoples categorically objected to this and demanded, following the example of the Mingrelians, their return to their ancestral lands and the restoration of the earlier autonomous republics and regions.

The 20th Party Congress gave a new powerful impetus to the movement of the punished peoples. In the spring of that year the Decrees of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR were issued: "On the removal of restrictions in the legal status of the Kalmyks and members of their families who are in special resettlement" (March 17, 1956); "On the removal of restrictions in the legal status of the Greeks, Bulgarians, Armenians and members of their families who are in special resettlement" (March 27, 1956); "On Release from Special Resettlement of Crimean Tatars, Balkars, Turks - USSR citizens, Kurds, Hemshis and Members of their Families Displaced during the Great Patriotic War" (April 28, 1956); "On Release from Special Resettlement of Chechens, Ingush, Karachais and Members of their Families Displaced during the Great Patriotic War" (July 16, 1956).

The condemnation of Stalin's policy of deportation of peoples was perceived as a reversal of the unjust

decisions of the war years. The provisions of the decrees stating "that the lifting of restrictions on special resettlement does not entail the return of property confiscated during the eviction, and that they have no right to return to the places from which they were evicted" were perceived as being of a temporary nature. Without waiting for official permission, thousands of former deportees began to return voluntarily to their former places of residence.

Fearing that the situation would get out of hand, on November 24, 1956, the Party Central Committee issued a decree restoring national autonomy for the Kalmyk, Karachai, Balkar, Chechen and Ingush peoples. It stipulated their resettlement within 3-4 years, beginning in spring 1957. The resettlers would wait for the arrival of their new settlers for three to four years, beginning in the spring of 1957. The resettlers did not want to wait. Their mass exodus began. The authorities discouraged them in every way possible. Fourteen operative chalons were posted on the tracks at railway stations in Kazakhstan and Russia. The special settlers were taken off the trains and brought back. (They were told to sell tickets for airplanes and railroad transport going in the direction of their home. All this could not but make people angry. The spontaneous return of the displaced peoples exacerbated the inter-ethnic situation in the North Caucasus, where other people were already replaced. The return of the Balkars to their native lands was the most peaceful. This is explained by the fact that the party bodies and the local population, who settled the territories of the deportees, had a polite attitude to their return. However, the spontaneous return of the Karachais caused conflicts with the Russian and Georgian settlers on their lands. The return of the

Chechens and Ingush was even more aggravated. Residents of Grozny, Dagestan and North Ossetian ASSR categorically opposed their spontaneous return.

Their first parties arrived in small groups of six to fifteen men. They brought with them in bags the remains of relatives who had died in exile to be reburied in their own land. Those who returned were met with hostility. They were refused registration and were not taken to the hospital. However, this did not stop them. The newcomers would march through the villages armed and shoot, provoking the locals to retaliate and clash. By threats of force they forced Dagestan and Russian families that were living there in their homes, and drove them out. Some of the returnees joined the "rebel" detachments that had been active in the mountains since the war and were engaged in looting and pillaging. KO were engaged in looting and stealing cattle from collective farms. Their victims were ordinary collective farmers. *These hotbeds of interethnic tension were responsible for the mass exodus of the Russian population from the republics.*

The peoples' struggle for trampled rights gave the first results. On 9 January 1957, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet recommended restoring national autonomy to the Balkar, Ingush, Kalmyk, Karachai and Chechen peoples. In accordance with this, the Proushdium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet adopted decrees to transform the Kabardinian ASSR into the Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR, to revive the Chechen-Ingush ASSR, to transform the Cherkesskaya region into the Karachaevo-Cherkesskaya autonomous region and to establish the Kalmykian autonomous region. The Chechen-Ingush Republic was restored and its territory

expanded. A part of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Oblast, which was once transferred to North Ossetia, has been restored.

Nagorny district (977.5 sq. km) was left as part of that republic. At the same time, three lowland districts of the Terek River floodplain were added to the historical area of Chechen and Ingush settlements from the Stavropol Territory. These areas (Naursky, Nadterechny and Shelkovskoy, which together made up 5,200 km² or 27% of the entire 19,300 km² area of the Chechen ASSR. They were populated mostly by Russians. The inclusion of those districts allowed the republic's economy to become more stable and the authorities hoped to increase the influence of the Center on the social life of the autonomy by increasing the Russian population. In these acts and calculations, the *long-standing tradition of solving national problems in the country at the expense of the Russian people once again made itself felt.*

Soon after the national statehood of the repressed peoples was restored, they were awarded state decorations. The Order of Lenin in commemoration of the 400th anniversary of voluntary accession to Russia were awarded to Kabardino-Balkaria (July 1957) and Karachay-Cherkessia (September 1957), and in connection with the 350th anniversary of voluntary accession to Russia - to Kalmykia (August 1957). On June 29, 1958 the latter was transformed into Kalmyk Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic. Chechen-Ingushetia was awarded the Order of Lenin in 1965. The awards signified the authorities' desire to draw a line under the past misfortunes of the repressed peoples. However, this did little to promote good neighborliness and the "blossoming of friendship" between the ethnic

groups in the region.

Continuous minor nationalist excesses, with the connivance of the authorities, led to a real interethnic clash in August 1958 between the Russian population of Grozny and the Chechens and Ingush. It was triggered by the murder of a Russian by an Ingush. The funeral of the murdered man resulted in a pogrom of Chechens and Ingush by the Russians. For three days life in the city was paralyzed. The protesters demanded that all Chechens and Ingush should be expelled from the republic and the local authorities fled the town. Troops were urgently dispatched there. Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR M. A. Yasnov and Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee N. G. Ignatov arrived in Grozny from Moscow. The unrest was suppressed, but the confrontation between the indigenous and "newcomer" (Russian) populations in the republic could not be overcome. Nevertheless, in later years the return of Chechens and Ingush to the North Caucasus proceeded in a more orderly fashion, with fewer unrest.

By 1963 it was mostly complete. Out of 418,000 Chechens in the Kazakh and Kyrgyz SSR, 384,000 (91.7 per cent) moved to Chechnya-Ingushetia, while among the 106,000 Ingush, 84,000 (79.2 per cent) did. Another 8,000 (7.5 per cent) went to Dagestan and North Ossetia.

The right-bank part of the Prigorodny district, which belonged to the Ingush until 1944 and remained part of the North Ossetian SSR, became the stumbling block in Ingush-Ossetian relations after the re-establishment of the Chechen-Ingush ASSR. The Ingush did not stop

sending statements to the CPSU Central Committee and the government demanding that the Chechen-Ingush district be handed over, and they sent delegations of their representatives to Moscow.

The national movement of Soviet Germans was for a long time limited to the struggle to restore their autonomy in the Volga region. It only used legal methods of struggle: letters, appeals, footfalls, delegations and demonstrations. The December 1955 decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR lifted the restrictions on the legal status of the Germans. Rehabilitation movement resulted in the Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of August 29, 1964 amending the Decree on the Resettlement of Germans living in the Volga region, adopted on August 28, 1941. The provisions of the new Decree III removed the stigma of traitors and renegades from the entire nation. Up to that time the Soviet Germans had experienced latent discrimination. This disadvantage concerned cultural development, language development, entrance to higher educational institutions, Party membership, and appointments to senior party and economic positions. When called up for service in the Soviet army, German youth were not taken in the elite units (airborne, border, etc.). The unwillingness of the orphans to restore the autonomy of the Germans in the Volga region caused epiphytic sentiments. This was helped by the activities of "Deutsche Welle" radio station, religious, cultural and other organizations and religious groups who strengthened their influence among the German Spetsists in the years of their exile. The Mennonite ivkin was particularly active in this.

The Crimean Tatars' struggle for the restoration of

autonomy and the right to live in their own land took place under difficult conditions. The abolition of the special status from the people, indiscriminately accused during the war in their homeland, could not satisfy them. The suspicious attitude of the authorities toward all persons of Crimean Tatar nationality was supported by the memories of former commanders of partisan detachments in Crimea. The stigma of traitors and renegades, which had been all over the nation since the war, was removed by a decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet dated September 5, 1967 "On the Procedure for Applying Article 2 of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet of April 28, 1956".

Constant appeals to the highest party and state instances with requests to restore the autonomy of the Crimean Tatars in Crimea had no positive results. The Tatars who illegally moved to Crimea, as a rule, were immediately expelled. The prohibition by the authorities of Ukraine, to which the Crimean Tatars were transferred in 1954, to move to Crimea was the reason for the national movement led by "initiative groups" of Crimean Tatar intelligentsia, former senior Party and Soviet workers of the Crimea. The first of such groups was created in Uzbekistan in 1956. Thus, in 1958 the CPSU Central Committee received two letters from the Crimean Tatars with the request to return the people to their homeland (16 and 12 thousand signatures). In 1959, a similar letter signed by 10 thousand people, in 1961 - 18 thousand. In addition to petitions rallies and demonstrations were organized in conjunction with the anniversaries - the anniversary of the formation of the Crimean ASSR, the birth date of Lenin, who was considered the founder of the Crimean Republic. These

actions often ended with dispersal of the participants.

In order to somehow muffle the problem, the authorities made attempts to present Crimean Tatars as a part of the Tatar nation. Those of them who wanted to leave Central Asia were allowed to settle in the territory of Tatar ASSR. But it did not suit Crimean Tatars who demanded conditions for the development of their language and culture. In the beginning of 60's the Crimean Tatar movement became more organized. This manifested itself in the attempt to create a mass organization - the Union of Crimean Tatars with its program and charter. In 1962, two of its main members, M. Omerov and S. Umerov, were arrested and convicted in Uzbekistan. Repressions against activists of the Crimean Tatar movement forced its leaders to look for other ways and methods of struggle.

Representatives of other national groups - Greeks, Bulgarians, and Armenians - who had been deported from the Crimea also advocated their return. The insistent demands of Greeks to return their confiscated homes and lands went unheeded by the authorities. Their dissatisfaction with the half-hearted rehabilitation reinforced their feelings of emigration. The authorities prevented the departure: in 1959, 58 Soviet Greeks visiting Tashkent for passports to Greece, were simply arrested. The attempt of the Greek Embassy in Moscow to organize the repatriation of Greeks from the Soviet Union was not successful. Representatives of the Meskhetian Turks (Og-Ruzinnye Turks, or Ogurenien Georgians), Kurds and Hemshilons (Islamized Armenians), once deported from the Transcaucasian republics, advocated the idea of autonomy in the 50-60s. However, the authorities in Moscow and the

Transcaucasian Union republics ignored such demands of the small peoples, considering the national question in the country successfully and finally resolved.

The national-state structure of the USSR did not fundamentally change in the post-war years. At the beginning of 60's there were 15 union and 19 autonomous republics (15 of them in the RSFSR, two in Georgia, one in Azerbaijan and one in Uzbekistan). The number of the latter, as compared with prewar years, increased owing to the transformation in July 1956 of the Karelian-Finnish Union Republic into the Karelian Autonomous Republic, included in the RSFSR, and in October 1961 of the Tuva Autonomous Oblast of the RSFSR into an autonomous Republic. There were also eight autonomous regions in the country. Five of them were part of the Russian territories: Adygei - in Krasnodar, Karachay-Cherkessia - in Stavropol, Gorno-Altai - and Altai, Khakass - in Krasnoyarsk; Jewish - in Khabarovsk. Three autonomous oblasts were constituent parts of other union republics: South Ossetian - Georgia, Nagorno-Karabakh - Azerbaijan, Gorno-Badakhshan - Tajikistan. The list of national districts remained unchanged since pre-war times.

All of them were part of the oblasts and krais of the RSFSR. On its European territory, there are the Nenets Autonomous District (Arkhangelsk Oblast) and the Komi-Permyak Autonomous District (Perm Oblast). In the northwest of Siberia, there are Khanty-Mansi and Yamalo-Nenets (Tyumen Region), Evenki and Taimyr (Dolgano-Nenets) in Krasnoyarsk Krai; in the northeast of Siberia, Koryak (Kamchatka Region) and Chukotka (Magadan Region). In addition, there are national districts in Siberia: the Aginsky (Buryat) district in the

Chita region and the Ust-Ordynsky (Buryat) district in the Irkutsk region.

National Movements in the Union Republics

One of the problems and national relations of the 50-60s remained the "Baltic question". The recent bourgeois past of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, the tradition of liberal-democratic governing, the great influence of the church ministers in the society, the existence of numerous diasporas abroad, maintaining close ties with the motherland, the position of the USA and Western European countries, which did not recognize the legitimacy of the republics joining the USSR in 1940. All these factors were against the accelerated socialist modernization of the Baltic Soviet republics, caused the growth of national-separatist public sentiments, and supported the nationalist underground in the republics.

This was facilitated by the Beriev's corporatization of the upper and middle levels of the party-economic apparatus; former members of the armed nationalist underground returned from exile and were promoted to positions of responsibility in the fields of education and culture.

The condemnation of Stalin by the 20th Party Congress was perceived by many leaders in the Baltic republics as a carte blanche for the further normalization of the ruling cadres, for the elimination of the Russification costs of the Stalinist era. The congress gave rise to great hopes for a radical change in the entire policy of the Center toward the Baltic republics, which had been conducted up to the middle of the 50s.

The Baltic republics responded vividly to the autumn 1956 events in Poland and Hungary. Especially strong was the outburst of the national movement in Lithuania and Estonia. At the end of October, slogans and leaflets with headlines were remembered at Vilnius University: "Long live the revolution in Hungary, let us follow its example!"; "Lithuania to Lithuanians, Russian occupiers, get out!". At the beginning of November 1956 thousands of Catholics marched in Kaunas demanding freedom of worship. Demonstrators sang the anthem of bourgeois Lithuania, sang nationalist songs, and shouted slogans "Follow Hungary's example!"; "Russians, get out of Lithuania!". In Kaunas, participants of youth demonstration (up to 4 thousand) with slogans: "Down with Moscow!", "Down with the Communists! - tried to break through to the city center. After clashing with police, a group of 100-150 people managed to force their way to the buildings of the State Security Committee and the city party committee, but were dispersed by law enforcement. Nationalist songs were also heard on the streets of the Estonian capital. Leaflets appeared in Tartu, with slogans: "Down with the Russian rulers!"; "Death to Russian occupiers!"; "Russians, get out of Estonia!".

The indigenous population was especially disturbed by the considerable influx of Russian-speaking laborers to the industrial construction sites in the Baltics. According to the census of 1959. The proportion of the indigenous population in Lithuania was 79.3%; in Estonia it was 74.6; in Latvia 62. There were especially many people of other nationalities in the big cities. The proportion of indigenous people in Riga was about 44.7%, and in Vilnius about 33.6%. The local nationalists thought that

the acute housing problem would be "easy to solve if all the Russians were kicked out". In order to prevent Riga from losing its nationalist image, the party's city committee passed a resolution in which all non-Latvians were supposed to learn the Latvian language within two years and those who failed to master it during this time were released from work with a proposal to leave the republic. The decision imposed a restriction on the residence registration of non-Latvians in the city. In April 1959 the Communist Party of Latvia adopted a similar decision, covering the entire country. Similar decisions were made by the Tallinn District Executive Committee.

Letters from the Baltic republics to the CPSU Central Committee reported displays of hostility on the part of the indigenous population toward Russians in buses, stores and other public places. In June 1959 the Communist Party of Azerbaijan decreed that all non-Azerbaijani citizens should learn Azerbaijani language and pass a written and oral exam within six months. Those who failed it were also subject to dismissal from work, i.e. dismissal. Soon, however, these decisions were reversed, and the first secretaries of the Communist Party of the republics J.E. Kalnberzinsh and I.D. Mustafayev were removed from their posts. The negative attitude towards the Russian-speaking population in the Baltic States was also formed due to the fact that the majority of the police officers consisted of persons of non-indigenous nationality. This created a visible image of the Russian-speaking population as the "occupant".

The effectiveness of Soviet propaganda in the Baltics was not great, the work of Western radio stations and extensive correspondence with foreign compatriots from

capitalist countries was more effective. The anti-Soviet rumors and conversations were fed to the people. The most widespread was the rumor of an imminent war followed by the liberation of the Baltics from the "Russian colonizers" by the Americans.

By strengthening the ideological work and organizational measures the union and republican party leadership tried to prevent the spread of the nationalistic sentiments. The June Plenum of the Latvian Communist Party in 1959 considered as "manifestation of nationalism" the proposals of the Latvian top leadership to increase the investments into light industry, instead of building large industrial objects in the republic, planned by the Seven-year plan. In October 1959 another party plenum condemned the nationalist personnel and language policy of several party leaders of the republic. Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers V. Berklaivs, Minister of Agriculture A. A. Nikonov, Director of the Academic Institute of Economics P. P. Dzerve, Director of the Academic Institute of Economics, and V. K. Krumins, Minister of Education, who had made proposals not to develop the heavy industry in Latvia, which required imported labor, were removed from their positions and transferred to other jobs. Measures taken under pressure from Moscow eliminated the most obvious manifestations of nationalism, but could not eliminate it completely. Taking into account the sentiments of the majority of the indigenous population, the leaders of the Baltic republics sought to pursue a policy of "soft" derusification, while demonstrating ostentatious internationalism and loyalty to the central authorities.

The Ukrainian national movement had a wide range of

different currents and forms. The replacement of the first Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of a Russian with a Ukrainian in June 1953 revived the Ukrainization policy in the republic and caused a greater consideration of national specificity in the work of oblasts, first of all, in Western Ukraine. The repressive policy of the Soviet leadership in Ukraine, associated with the post-war struggle against the armed nationalist underground in its Western part and the new campaign against "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" - in Eastern Ukraine, softened and came to naught. However, some Western Ukrainians remained hostile not only to Russian cadres, but also to Eastern Ukrainians, given the category of "Moskals". The nationalistic outlook was explained by the recent annexation of Western Ukraine to the USSR, the negative reaction to the forced socialist reorganization of the region after the war, and the continuing influence on the broader population of the 1946 ban on the Ukrainian nationalist movement. The main goal of the national movement in Ukraine was the reorganization of the Soviet Union and a legal struggle for the preservation of national culture and language.

And at the beginning of the 1960s, the creative intelligentsia led the movement for purity of the native language, against its russification. In February of 1963 a conference on the Ukrainian language was held in Kiev. There were more than a thousand of workers of Ukrainian culture - writers, teachers and linguists. It asked the Communist Party of Ukraine and the government to conduct "all the businesses and enterprises, railroads, transportation and commerce in the Ukrainian language" and to open Ukrainian-language secondary schools in all the republics of the USSR where Ukrainians live. The proposals made at the

conference eventually became the demands of the dissidents and appeared in the pages of samizdat (local publications).

The movement of the Ukrainian "sixties" drew a significant portion of the national intelligentsia into its ranks. Intellectuals fighting for the preservation of national culture gathered in artists' studios, exhibition halls, museums, and apartments of admirers of Ukrainian antiquities. The club of creative youth in Kiev, which was headed by the young director Lesya Taniuk, was very famous. Literary and poetry evenings, exhibitions of Ukrainian artists were organized there. Under its aegis the students' intercollegiate folk and ethnographic circle and traveling choir "Skylark" were created. The club launched Shevchenko Readings on May 22 near the poet's monument. These traditional readings were openly dissident-motivated. That was the reason for the club's closure by the authorities in 1965.

One of the directions of the Ukrainian national movement was the struggle for independence by seceding from the USSR. The movement had many supporters in Western Ukraine. Here, and after the defeat of the nationalist armed movement of the OUN, there were cases of murder of Soviet workers, arson of party and economic buildings, and other anti-Soviet acts. Illegal groups, primarily student groups, with a pronounced nationalist character, were active.

They were engaged in displaying national flags and distributing leaflets with anti-Soviet content. Thus, in March 1957, leaflets calling for the organization of committees "For a self-styled Ukraine" were distributed in a number of cities in the Lviv Region. Leaflets with

similar content were found in the city of Sumy. The activities of these groups were not very successful and were easily suppressed by the KGB, but the fact of their existence testified to the existence in these oblasts of an opposition to the existing authorities. The situation in the eastern regions of Ukraine was relatively calmer, although there were cases of distribution of leaflets with anti-Soviet and nationalistic content (for example, in Kharkov in 1957).

The young people involved in the underground extremist groups were inspired by the name of Stepan Bandera, around whom they saw him as a consistent and unyielding fighter for Ukraine's freedom and independence from the "Russian Communist yoke". In 1962. The state security bodies liquidated a youth organization named after Bandera in the Lviv Region. Its members had underground nicknames, took an oath of allegiance to the "self-styled Ukraine," and discussed ways to fight against Soviet power: acquiring weapons, fonts, and producing and distributing leaflets.

Sometimes the current Constitution of the country served as a pretext for the formation of national-separatist groups. For example, in 1959 six residents of the Lvov region formed the Ukrainian Workers and Peasants Union, which had the goal of achieving the independence of Ukraine by constitutional means. Being arrested, the Union leader, lawyer L. Luk'yanenko told the investigator that he was acting within the legal framework of Article 14 of the Constitution of the UkrSSR and Article 17 of the Constitution of the USSR.

The answer to this statement (1959) was: "*The Constitution exists for foreigners!*" which was in many

ways typical of the legal consciousness of the Soviet period. However, the turn of the 50-60s for the Ukrainian national movement as a whole was a time of transition from the underground stage to a peaceful, open democratic movement for national rights.

In the 60s, there were cases of isolated national-separatist protests in Belarus and Moldova, which were not as widespread as in the Baltics and Ukraine. Only a small stratum of the national intelligentsia and students defended the national culture and language. Thus, in September, 1963, the State Security arrested the members of the Belarusian Revolutionary Party. The members of this party were intent on armed struggle against the Soviet Power and attempted to organize a branched illegal organization in the republic. The attempt of nationalist activity was registered in Minsk State University, where in October, 1963, a group of 13 Belarusian students was exposed, who at their meetings were denouncing the national policy of the USSR.

A characteristic feature of Moldova was the ethno-cultural affinity of Moldovans with Romanians. "Nationalism" in the republic more often than not manifested itself in conversations about the need to reunite with Romania. In this republic, such talk was stirred up by officials and the press.

One of the "weak points" of Soviet nationality policy in the 50s was Georgia. The worship of Stalin in this republic had a truly nationwide character. The disclosure of his crimes at the 20th Party Congress was perceived as a national insult. The discontent with the central government manifested itself in the tragic events of March 9-10, 1956 in Tbilisi, with numerous human

casualties. Pro-Stalinist youth rallies and demonstrations with many Komsomol and Communist pro-Stalinists.

Many other towns in Georgia were openly anti-Russian. Along with slogans such as "Down with Khrushchev!" and "Molotov - at the head of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union!" demonstrators also carried slogans such as "Russians, get out of Georgia"! The nationalist sentiment in the masses had not subsided for many years. The resentment "for Stalin" was supplemented by the pain for the compatriots shot in Tbilisi. In 1963 an underground group of young Georgian poets was suppressed in Georgia. They were engaged in manufacturing and distribution of anti-Soviet leaflets, condemning the speeches against Stalin at the XXII Congress of the CPSU.

The struggle to preserve the purity of the Georgian language led to the emergence of various kinds of illegal cultural societies. One of them, "Mekartvela Sazogadoeba" existed in Batumi from 1961 to 1962. Apart from intellectuals, it included public servants. For using Russian words at the meetings of the organization a fine was levied in favor of the "society fighting for purity of the Georgian language". The Georgian party leadership headed by V. P. Mzhavanadze condescended to the attempts of part of the Georgian intelligentsia to oppose "Russification" and at the same time resolutely suppressed any radical forms of nationalism. Therefore, extremism did not become a characteristic feature of the Georgian national movement.

The Armenian national movement was inspired mainly

by the idea of returning all the ancestral Armenian lands to a unified Armenian state. It referred to Kare, Ardahan and Sarakamish, which were part of Turkey, as well as Nakhchivan and Nagorno-Karabakh, which were included in Azerbaijan. Party and religious figures, radical Armenian nationalists, representatives of the creative intelligentsia and Armenian diasporas abroad united with rare unanimity around the idea of the return of these territories. The vast majority of Armenians abroad lived with thoughts of returning to their historic homeland. Only in the first half of 50s a 100 thousand repatriates came back to Armenia. They greatly contributed to the strengthening of nationalist sentiments in the Republic, and the popularity of the Armenian nationalist party "Dashnaktsutyun".

The Karabakh issue was raised by the leader of the Communist Party of Armenia in November 1945. G. Arutinov wrote Stalin that I. V. Shomie Residential Complex in ZAOI in the Nagorno-Karabakh autonomous region adjacent to the territory of Armenia, is part of Azerbaijan since 1923; the population of this region is mainly Armenian (137 thousand; 89.5%), and asked to consider the issue of inclusion of the region into Armenia. The requested First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan M. Bagirov agreed to the transfer, subject to the inclusion in Azerbaijan of the three Armenian districts adjacent to it with a predominantly Azerbaijani population.

The negotiations began, but the issue remained unresolved. The proposal to return the territories occupied by Turkey to the Armenians was made by Arutinoff in 1948 at his speech at the UN. A considerable part of Armenians linked the unresolved issues to the

unwillingness of the Soviet leadership to resolve the Armenian problem. This fueled anti-Soviet and nationalist sentiments among the masses.

The Muslim factor and socio-cultural alienation of the local population from the Soviet worldview dominated the national movement in Azerbaijan. There was no stable national opposition there in the period under review. The political "underdevelopment" of the national movement in Azerbaijan brought it closer to the national movements of the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Opposition to the Soviet power was weak.

The Armenian-Azerbaijani ethnic conflict was the most acute in the republic. The policy of ethnic discrimination against national minorities - Armenians, Lezgins and Talyshs was carried out with the tacit approval of the Azerbaijani leadership. The policy of Azerbaijanization manifested itself in the fact that the leading party and economic posts at the top and middle levels were occupied predominantly by representatives of the indigenous ethnic group, despite the fact that over 40% of the residents of the Republic were not Azerbaijanis.

The "immaturity" of national movements in Central Asia and Kazakhstan can be explained by their relatively late (in the 20-30s) entry into the process of nation-building. The Soviet policy of korenization led to the formation of a national intellectual and political elite. The rise of culture, science and education was also impressive. The local population was largely positive about the benefits of industrial and urbanized culture. At the same time, the forced modernization of traditional Central Asian cultures led to a notable loss of their own ethnic, cultural and environmental values. The Center's obsessive

propaganda about an older brother in the commonwealth of peoples, about the progressive invention of Russian culture and language had caused a backlash.

Islam, which is not just a religion, but a way of life, a worldview, and a system of ethical and aesthetic norms, had a tremendous influence on the behavior, character, and stereotypes of the peoples of Central Asia. State anti-religious policy led to the clarification of Islam from ideology and politics into the sphere of family and domestic relations. But that sphere remained virtually impregnable to the pietist-communist worldview. Thanks to this, the indigenous ethnic groups of Central Asia and Kazakhstan largely preserved the fundamental traditional values of life; a large family, hierarchy and collectivism of social organization, cultural and professional preferences. This can also explain the absence of a national movement advocating separation from the USSR.

Opposition to Soviet power took the form of sociocultural and ideological opposition of the traditional ways of life to the Russian-speaking ethnic culture and communist ideology.

With the weakening of the diktat over the republics of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, the expansion of the rights of the Union republics in 1957. (due to the formation of sovnarkhozes) the protest against the political tutelage of the Center by indigenous party leaders was expressed in demands for further expansion of regional rights, increased investment, reduced inflow of Russians, and speeches against the trend toward linguistic Russification. Moscow still reacted rather harshly to this. In 1958-1961, the highest party leaders

of Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (as well as Azerbaijan, Latvia and Moldavia) were accused of nationalist manifestations and were removed from their positions. Corresponding plenums of the Communist Party Central Committee condemned violations of national policies in these republics. The cadre movements provoked a painful reaction on the part of the indigenous intelligentsia and the nomenklatura, which saw in them a manifestation of the imperial essence of the Center and the Russian-speaking population.

Thus, with the transfer of N. Mukhitdinov from the post of leader of the Communists of Uzbekistan to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (1957) and the nomination to the leadership of his protégé, S. Kamalov, the republic began its second large-scale denationalization of personnel. The local population perceived this as the beginning of an epoch of national "pre-evangelization," characterized by a mass and demonstrative observance of Muslim rituals: visits to mosques, circumcision of boys, weddings, and burials of the dead according to ancestral customs. In this respect, the Communists behaved in the same way as the "backward bearers of feudal-baikal remnants". With the consent of the party leadership, the collection of donations for charitable purposes stipulated by the Koran, which was mainly intended to finance religious events, began to be revived. Many "red tea houses" turned into centers for the propaganda of the basics of Islam and the performance of religious rituals. The head of the Cultural Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan submitted the question of replacing the Cyrillic base of the Uzbek alphabet with the Arabic alphabet for the consideration

of the highest party instances. It was motivated by the need to create a cadre of Arabists to work in Arab countries.

Such korenization had no support and was condemned by the Moscow governing Center in the person of M. A. Suslov. In the republic, it was opposed by the chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, the People's Writer of Uzbekistan Sh.R. Rashidov. On March 14, 1959, at the Republican plenum of the Central Committee, Kamalov was removed from his leadership positions "for allowing the littering of personnel by politically disadvantaged elements" and "a conciliatory and patronizing attitude towards nascialist manifestations". Tursunov was also dismissed from the post of Secretary of the Central Committee for Ideology as "not credible and hiding his and his father's nationalist past, who was an active participant of the Basmachi movement". Rashidov was elected First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan, who had headed the Republican leadership for 24 years, until his death in 1983. In 1959-1961 dozens of heads of ministries and departments, many secretaries of regional, district and city party committees were appointed.

February 4, 1961 at a closed party meeting Rashidov made a report "The results of the two-year struggle against anti-Soviet elements", in which he thanked the leaders of the CPSU and the KGB, "the actual rescue of the Uzbek people from the imperialists' attempts to enslave them again." In April, at the plenum of the Central Committee, he urged the public of the republic "to take even more decisive measures to eradicate the remnants of nationalist elements." Rashidov managed to establish a strong system of personal power in the

republic. From year to year Uzbek increased the supply of cotton, the most important raw material not only for the light industry, but also for the defense ministry. However, its regime was very far from socialism. In October 1964, with the change of leadership in Moscow, Rashidov's enemies attempted to remove him from power. He was accused, in particular, of having "placed more than 300 of his relatives and those personally loyal to him in key positions". There were 14 of his relatives in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan alone. However, Rashidov quite satisfied Leonid Brezhnev, not least because of the generous gifts presented to the new CPSU leader.

By the beginning of the 1960s the migration of the Russian-speaking population to Central Asia, and especially to Kazakhstan, reached its apogee. In 1959 the proportion of native speakers in Kazakhstan decreased from 38.2% to 30% compared to 1939; in Uzbekistan from 64.4% to 62.1%; in Kyrgyzstan from 59.6% to 53.1%; in Kyrgyzstan from 51.7% to 40.5%; and only in Turkmenistan did it increase from 59.2% to 60.9%. Most settlers were not eager to fully integrate into Central Asian society. Many of them treated the locals with a sense of perceived superiority and disdain. They were paid back in kind, seeing them as personified carriers of the Soviet government's "imperialism. Former nationalism was along the lines of ethnic division and conflict between Russian-speakers (Russians, Ukrainians, Jews, etc.) and natives. National discrimination in favor of the local ethnic group was manifested in personnel policies and admissions to universities, and in the Russophobic attitudes of the local population. All this led to a relatively more rapid growth of national consciousness of the Russian population in

the national outskirts compared to the central regions of Russia. In the Russian national movement in these regions were not so much ethnic as "derivative" motifs. For many people here for the first time a simple fact became important, about which one Izvestia reader even felt it necessary to write to the newspaper's editorial board: "In the Russian Republic there is no Central Committee, as in other Soviet republics, where the first secretary is a representative of his nation*".

Adjustments to the theoretical foundations of national policy

On the wave of criticism of the "cult of personality" in 1956, Lenin's letters ("On the question of nationalities or 'autonomization'" of December 30-31, 1922, and others, were first published), testifying to the temporary disagreements between Lenin and Stalin on the formation of the USSR. The meaning of the publication was that Stalin had a special, "wrong" position on these issues in contrast to the "correct" settings of the true creator of the USSR. The common sense of Stalin's position and the historical experience of the mid-50s was essentially ignored. Meanwhile, from the perspective of our days the flaws of Lenin's plan to create a union state become clearly visible. The history of the formation and subsequent development of the USSR shows that *the Russian national-state interests in fact were sacrificed to the Leninist-Trotskyist utopia - the interests of the phantom World USSR and the nationalism of "oppressed" peoples of the former Tsarist Russia*. Stalin did not show the necessary persistence in upholding his "autonomization plan" for the USSR.

As many contemporary historians, including the authors of this publication, believe, the implementation of Stalin's plan would have created much better prerequisites for the subsequent optimization of the state system and the entire system of inter-ethnic relations in the country. The Leninist plan was completely unsuitable for the implementation of the famous principle of the participation of all peoples of the former Russia in the construction and functioning of the union state "together and equally". Clear evidence of this is the hierarchy of peoples and national-state formations, easily distinguishable in the architectonics of the USSR.

Instead of a realistic analysis of the processes in the national sphere and corresponding reforms in the national-state structure of the USSR, the government once again got carried away with the utopian project of the "final solution to the national question", linking it with a forced breaking down of "national partitions", with the erasure of national distinctions and the assimilation of the nations in Soviet society, in other words - with denationalization.

The revival of Leninist attitudes orienting national policy with progress towards the socialist goal, which was not only the rapprochement of nations, but also their fusion, took place in connection with the plan for the direct construction of communism in the USSR in the coming 20 years hatched in the late 50s. N.H. Khrushchev said in 1959, that with the implementation of this plan, "the process of merging the peoples into one community will go more successfully".

The "Communist family".

In the draft of the new CPSU Program, M.A. Suslov included a provision that "in the USSR, nations and their languages are merging, one nation with one language, with one common culture is being formed". The well-known statesman and politician A. A. Andreev proclaimed from the pages of the main theoretical party magazine: "A single socialist nation is being forged in the USSR" (Kommunist. 1960. №6). Khrushchev's colleagues on the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee (primarily O.V. Kuusinen and N.A. Mukhitdinov) managed to convince him not to set unrealizable tasks in the Party Program. Partly agreeing with them, Khrushchev actualized the idea he had expressed earlier about the emergence of a "new historical community" in the USSR. In the report on the Program of the CPSU, he announced that the results of the integration processes in the national sphere had already led to the fact that "in the USSR a new historical community of people of different nationalities with common features - the Soviet people". However, the provision was not included in the program document. This meant that it, like similar statements expressed in the literature in the previous years of the development of social thought (N.I. Bukharin, M.V. Nechkina, I. E. Kravtsev, N. I. Matyushkin, and M. D. Kammari), had not yet been given conceptual and methodological significance.

In practical-political respect, the section of the CPSU Program "Tasks of the Party in the Field of National Relations" is of the greatest interest. It characterizes their development in the USSR by the beginning of the 1960s as follows: "Under the conditions of socialism, nations flourish, strengthening their sovereignty". The

development of the nations is not on the way of increasing national discord, national narrow-mindedness and egoism, as it happens under capitalism, but on the way of their rapprochement, fraternal mutual assistance and friendship. The emergence of new industrial centers, the discovery and development of natural wealth, the development of virgin lands, and the development of all kinds of transport increase the mobility of the population, contribute to the expansion of mutual communication between the peoples of the Soviet Union. People of many nationalities live and work together in the Soviet republics. The boundaries between the union republics within the USSR are no longer important, because all the nations are equal, their lives are built on a common socialist basis, the material and spiritual needs of each nation are equally satisfied, they are all united by their common vital interests in the Fatherland family, and are together moving toward a common goal - communism. The Soviet people of different nationalities have formed common features of spiritual character, born of a new type of social relations and embodied in themselves the best traditions of the peoples of the USSR. This characterization is very indicative of the combination of lacquering half-truths with contradictory meanings.

Specific studies of the history of national relations, for example by V. I. Kozlov in his book *The History of the Tragedy of the Great People: The Russian Question* (Moscow, 1997), show that the "equality of nations" proclaimed in party documents and the USSR Constitution did not exist and could not be achieved in conditions of the privileged position of the "title nations" of the respective republics as compared to foreign national groups and the hierarchical status of the national-territorial formations themselves. The material

and spiritual interests of each nation were not at all equally satisfied, with the largest nation in the country, the Russian people, being in a disadvantageous position. It did not follow at all from the fact that the mobility of the population in the Soviet Union increased that the borders between the republics lost importance. This is clearly contradicted by the assertion that the sovereignty of nations was strengthened. The Program further noted that "the expansion of the rights of the Union Republics in the management of the economy has yielded great positive results," but the task was to overcome "manifestations of parochialism and national egoism". The party document contained a vague {permitting various interpretations} provision that national relations in the country are characterized by "further rapprochement of the nations and the achievement of their full unity".

When a commission chaired by Khrushchev was drafting a new Soviet Constitution, proposals were again considered to take into account that in the USSR "the consolidation of unified nationalities into a single communist nation" was in progress, so it was recommended that the nationality column be removed from passports. However, a complete renaissance of "leftist internationalism" did not take place in the 50s and 60s. The XXII Party Congress held after Khrushchev's resignation (March-April 1966) pacified the confused ranks of creative intellectuals from the Soviet republics. The report of the Central Committee of the Party to the Congress contained a new clarified formulation about the Soviet people. The term "multinational Soviet people" was used. This excluded the possibility of identifying the "new community" and the "complete unity of the nations" with the new communist nation, supposedly forged from

the traditional ethnic groups and replacing them. The traditionalists defeated the "leftists" in theory and in practical national politics.

§ 5. Foreign Policy

I. Stalin's death and the successful test of the hydrogen bomb were perhaps the two most significant factors that determined both the liberalization and confrontation of the USSR's foreign policy course in the decade following 1953. One of these tendencies was Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, who headed the USSR Foreign Ministry until June 1956, the other was Minister D. T. Shepilov and his successor, A. A. Gromyko, on February 15, 1957.

The year 1953 opened a short period of "thaw" in international relations. In June of that year, with the approval of the USSR, an armistice agreement was signed in Korea. In 1954, the USSR joined UNESCO. The rapprochement with Yugoslavia, which emerged in May 1953, ended in June 1955 with signing of the KoYugoslav declaration, which expressed the principles of indivisibility and of peace, independence of peaceful coexistence from ideology and differences in social structure, recognition of the right of nations to choose specific forms of socialism independently.

In May 1955 the USSR signed a treaty on the restoration of the sovereignty of Austria. The Soviet Union, in agreement with the other victorious powers, agreed to withdraw its troops from the country, which undertook to observe strict neutrality. The July 1955 meeting of the leaders of the four victorious powers in Geneva marked a warming of the global political climate - the "spirit of

Geneva". In September 1955, FRG Chancellor Karl Adenauer visited Moscow and agreed to terminate the state of war and to establish diplomatic relations between the USSR and FRG. In October 1956, relations with Japan were normalized.

The XX 1956, Congress of the CPSU paid much attention to the international situation and the prospects of global development. Its documents contained conclusions about the possibility to prevent a new world war and about the variety of forms of the transition to socialism. The policy of reconciliation with the West and tolerance of differences in the socialist camp was manifested in the dissolution in April 1956 of the Information Bureau of Communist and Workers' Parties, which was associated with the headquarters of the world revolution and the CPSU diktat against the "brotherly" parties. On 1' 1955, the Soviet leadership called for an end to the arms race and for convening a world conference on the matter.

As confirmation of the new foreign policy course, the Soviet Union more than halved the number of its Armed Forces. from 8 million at the beginning of 1955 it was reduced to 3.6 million by December 1959. As part of this reduction, Soviet military bases in Porculla-Udd in Finland and Port Arthur in China were eliminated, troops were withdrawn from Austria and Romania, and troop groups in Hungary, the GDR, and Poland were reduced. A new "significant reduction" of the Soviet Army was announced in 1960. According to Western estimates, the Soviet Armed numbers reached a minimum strength of 3 million men by July 1961. The number was increasing again due to the Berlin crisis. In the spring of 1958, the USSR stopped testing thermonuclear weapons.

International tensions were eased.

Development of foreign trade

By the end of the 1950s, the USSR was bound by trade treaties with more than 70 countries. At the same time, Soviet policy was characterized by firmness in defending the country's foreign policy interests. In response to inclusion of West Germany in NATO in October 1954, in May 1955 our country initiated establishment of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, the military-political alliance of the USSR and socialist countries, which opposed NATO and other military-political blocs that appeared under the US leadership. (The CFE existed until June 1, 1991.)

In August 1957, the USSR successfully tested an intercontinental ballistic missile that made the United States vulnerable in the event of war. The specter of Soviet nuclear retaliation became a new factor in Soviet leaders' negotiations with the West. In large part because of this in the fall of 1956 it was possible to stop the aggression of England, France and Israel against Egypt in the so-called Suez Crisis. It is associated with the resignation of D.T. Shepilov from the post of Soviet Foreign Minister, to which he was appointed on June 1, 1956. On the eve of Tito's visit to the USSR, Khrushchev said in this respect: "Tito arrives, and we have Molotov as Minister of Foreign Affairs". Molotov worked together with Stalin, who said that he would move his little finger and there would be no Yugoslavia, and Molotov supported all this. This is how Shepilov was appointed minister.

On July 26, 1956 Egypt nationalized the Suez Canal Company, stating that it would respect the freedom of navigation through the canal in accordance with the 1888 Convention. England and France opposed nationalization, qualified it as an arbitrary and one-sided act. Khrushchev advocated strong support for Egypt, promising to assist Egyptian President G. A. Nasser if necessary; by military force. England, France, and the United States attempted to have the canal "internationalized" at the London Conference on the issue. Shepilov supported the Indian project there, "which was based on the principle of strict observance of Egypt's rights to the canal in combination with and taking into account the interests of international users of the canal. The American project (the Dulles Plan), which involved putting the management of the canal in the hands of an international administration. was not accepted.

Shepilov thought the conference went well. However, before the conference was over, he received a message from Moscow from Khrushchev and Bulganin: "Just before you leave, slap those imperialists in the face. 1 sheets", i.e., England, France, and the United States. Shepilov considered this unnecessary, since the canal remained with Egypt, and left the "muzzles" intact. Khrushchev regarded this as Shepilov's unacceptable desire to independently lead the country's foreign policy. In essence, this was the reason for his removal from the ministerial post.

At the end of the conference, events in the Suez Canal Zone broke out against Shepilov's expectations. England and France used Israel to unleash aggression against Egypt. On the night of October 30, Israeli troops invaded

its territory, and England and France began bombing Egypt. On November 5 they landed a landing near Port Said. The Soviet Union issued messages to the British, French, and Israeli governments (November 5 and 15) with serious warnings. They had a decisive influence in stopping the aggression: on November 7, the military action was stopped. On December 22, 1956, the British and French troops were withdrawn from the Canal Zone, and on March 7, 1957, the Israeli troops were withdrawn. In the course of those events, on February 15, 1957, A.A. Gromyko, who never allowed himself to violate the instructions of the high command, was appointed foreign minister.

A sense of power allowed the Soviet Union to be bolder in its use of force against Western partners. The Air Defense Forces methodically shot down American planes that violated our airspace. In the fifties and first half of the sixties, 39 aircraft were shot down. After May 1, 1960, when in the sky over Sverdlovsk was destroyed high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft U-2, and the American pilot Gary Power was captured, violations were kept to a minimum.

The emergence of new types of weapons changed the views on the construction-implementation of the Armed Forces. "If one approaches reasonably," said N. S. Khrushchev in September 1958. It is possible to convert the army to missiles in a short time and use them as a shield to deal with peaceful affairs. In 1957-1959 the first units and formations of intercontinental missiles were formed in the Armed Forces, their launch pads were under construction.

In the late 1950s, West Berlin remained a hotbed of

tension in Europe. In November 1958, the USSR proposed that the United States of America conclude a peace treaty with the two German states and simultaneously declare West Berlin a free city. But this proposal was rejected. The German question was also not resolved at the meeting of the foreign ministers in Geneva. The USSR insisted on the recognition of the GDR, the West - on the unification of Germany under the aegis of Germany. An agreement on this question was also not reached during Nikita Khrushchev's visit to the USA in September 1959. A meeting between the Soviet leader and American President D. Eisenhower in Paris, scheduled for Mid 1960, was frustrated by the U-2 plane flight. Nor did Khrushchev's shoe-in speech at the U.N. (September 1960) add any peace to Western politicians.

Nevertheless, in June 1961, Soviet-American relations were further developed at Khrushchev's meeting with the new American President J. Kennedy in Vienna, during which the situation around Berlin again became the main issue. Because of the rigid position of Khrushchev, the meeting ended in failure. As a result, West Berlin did not become a free city and remained a part of FRG, but on the recommendation of the meeting of the leaders of the Warsaw Treaty on the night of August 12 to 13, 1961, the border between East and West Berlin was closed by wire barriers, and then by a concrete wall. In total, the system of barriers on the border between East and West Berlin stretched for 162 kilometers, including 45 kilometers in the city. Existing before the construction of the wall the order of traffic and control on the roads between West Berlin and West Germany was preserved, but the mass outflow of people from the GDR to the West was stopped, as well as the daily influx of West Berliners in the GDR to buy cheaper products and some

services, that actually was the main cause of the crisis. Tensions still lingered around West Berlin for a while, but the threat of a military confrontation was removed. The wall, which became a symbol of the Cold War for many decades, was dismantled after the annexation of the GDR to the Federal Republic of Germany (October 3, 1990).

In 1962, the so-called "Caribbean crisis" in Soviet-American relations broke out after the importation of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba and brought the world to the brink of nuclear war. The peak of the confrontation was on October 23-28. The prudence of Khrushchev and JFK made it possible to avoid a catastrophe at the last moment. The USSR agreed to withdraw nuclear missiles from Liberty Island in exchange for U.S. security guarantees for Cuba and the *withdrawal of U.S. missiles from bases in Turkey*.

After the crisis began a new period of relative détente in Soviet-American relations. On August 5, 1963, the USSR, the U.S., and Great Britain signed a treaty banning nuclear testing in the atmosphere, in space, and under water, and in 1964 they signed an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The Soviet Union paid great attention to developing relations with Third World countries: India, Indonesia, Burma, Afghanistan, and others. They were given assistance in the construction of large economic objects (a metallurgical plant in India, the Aswan Dam in Egypt, etc.). In 1953-1964, with the financial and technical assistance of the USSR about 6 thousand enterprises were built in different countries.

The Soviet Union's nuclear technology achievements

However, the CPSU's course to expose the cult of Stalin caused a growing outcry from the leadership of the Communist Party of China. *Its Beijing followers believed that armed clashes with imperialism were inevitable, world socialism could triumph through nuclear war. The victorious peoples, the Maoists argued, would "create at an extremely rapid pace on the ruins of imperialism a civilization a thousand times greater than that of capitalism, to build their own truly beautiful future".*

Relations were complicated in the late 1950s, when the PRC leadership rejected the Soviet Union's request to place Soviet military bases on its territory. In response, the Soviet Union refused to implement an earlier agreement on cooperation between the two countries in the field of nuclear physics. In the spring of 1960, the Soviet leadership withdrew several thousand of its specialists who were helping China to create an industrial base. In 1963, Soviet-Chinese relations entered a phase of ideological warfare. The Soviet side was accused of bourgeois-ization, revisionism, hegemon-ism, capitulation to U.S. imperialism during the "Caribbean crisis," etc. China's positions were to a certain extent shared by Albania, the DPRK, Romania, the "leftist" national liberation movements of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. Soon the relations between the USSR and China deteriorated to such an extent that China put forward its territorial claims against the USSR for 1.5 million sq. km in border areas. The foreign political conflicts of the early 60's had a negative impact on the prestige of the USSR.

Chapter VIII "BROKEN SOCIALISM", 1964-1985

§ 1. Early "developed socialism". 1964-1977 and Brezhnev's assertion of power

In the transition to a conservative domestic political course, on October 16, 1964, newspapers reported the plenum of the CPSU Central Committee two days earlier, had "granted the request of N. S. Khrushchev to relieve him of his duties as First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers due to his advanced age and deteriorating health".

The population met this decision with a sense of satisfaction and wariness. The first was caused by hope for the correction of the negative consequences of the endless reforms. The second by apparent untruths about the "deterioration of health" and fears of a return to Stalinist orders.

Indeed, the leaders who came to power were united in their determination to put an end to Khrushchev's innovations and the new edition of the "cult" - a change in the principle of collective leadership. In all other respects they differed considerably. A. N. Kosygin was known as a supporter of reforms, of introducing some economic incentives and of the administrative-command system; Y. V. Andropov was a supporter of consistent continuation of the 20th Party Congress course and of resolute measures in defense of socialist values; A. N.

Shelepin was a Stalinist. Leonid Brezhnev was a centrist, M.A. Suslov a center-right. The position of the new first secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, combined with his personal qualities (lack of ambition, radicalism, indecision, and cautious use of power) proved the most acceptable to the majority of the new collective leadership.

The first steps of the new leadership were dictated by the desire to put an end to Khrushchev's "voluntarism" in the field of party-state management. At the November (1964) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, N. V. Podgorny made a report "On the unification of industrial and rural regional and territorial party organizations and Soviet bodies". The counter-reforms were extended to the Soviet, Komsomol and trade union institutions.

In November 1965, a regular plenum of the Central Committee announced the liquidation of the soybean farms and the restoration of the branch ministries from the beginning of the new five-year plan. However, A.N. Kosygin, addressed the plenum with a report on the improvement of industrial management and the perfection of the Soviet coordination. In an unofficial statement, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Well, what did he come up with? Reform, reform... Who needs it, and who will understand it? You have to work better, that is the problem". Later, the rejection of reforms became one of the essential characteristics of the new political course.

An important step to the transition to a conservative course was made in May 1985, at the celebration of the 20th anniversary of victory in the Patriotic War. L. Brezhnev's report for the first time after many years of Khrushchev's denigration mentioned Stalin's contribution

to the victory over Nazi Germany. The mention literally drowned in applause, bringing calm to the nomenklatura, which condemned Khrushchev's unmotivated outbursts of anti-Stalinism. The line of refusing to expose further the "horrors of Stalinism" was also demonstrated at the XXIII Party Congress (March-April 1966). It was most clearly expressed in the speech of N. G. Yegorichev, First Secretary of the Moscow City Committee of the CPSU. And lately, he said, "it has become fashionable to seek out in the political life of the country some elements of the so-called 'Stalinism', as a bugaboo, to frighten the public, especially the intelligentsia. We say to them: no way, gentlemen!"

The election of Brezhnev not as first secretary (like Khrushchev) but as general secretary (like Stalin) of the CPSU Central Committee responded to pro-Stalinist sentiments. The name Politburo was returned to the Central Committee Presidium. In addition, the Stalinists were given the opportunity to condemn dissident writers angrily from the rostrum of the Congress. This congress signaled a turn toward the ideological reference points of the past, the most important of which was the strengthening of control over public life.

Rehabilitation sentiments regarding Stalin reached their peak in 1969. In that year, a number of members of the CPSU top leadership (G. I. Voronov, K. T. Mazurov, P. M. Masherov, D. C. Polansky, A.N. Shelepin), who adhered to the moderate Stalinist line, attempted to substantially correct the official assessments of his legal activities. The Kommunist magazine published a Stalinist and pro-Stalinist editorial. For the 90th anniversary of Stalin's birth, they were preparing to publish his essays. Plans broke down mainly because of the publication in

the West of Khrushchev's memoirs (see "The Russian version"). Khrushchev N. C. Prsmya. People. Power (Memoirs): In 4 K. M., 1999). New revelations of Stalin's repressive regime sharply increased protests by Communist Party leaders and all "progressive figures" in the West against the emerging partial or indirect rehabilitation of Stalin. The positions of anti-Stalinists inside the USSR strengthened. The rehabilitation did not take place. No doubt, it was also opposed by a sense of self-preservation, coming from the feeling of most Party and state apparatchiks that a return to Stalinism might threaten their own position.

The amendments to the CPSU Charter, adopted at the XXIIIrd Party Congress, were also aimed at strengthening the position of the party nomenclature. The instructions on the norms of rotation in the composition of party bodies and secretaries of party organizations, introduced in 1961, were removed from it. Rotation "according to the law" introduced elements of uncertainty that bothered party leaders. They were almost entirely eliminated by the new statutory provision on the need for systematic renewal of the party organs and continuity of leadership, which ensured that a significant part of the entire secretary corps remained in power virtually indefinitely. The stability of the cadres turned out to be their aging, pernicious "gerontocracy".

The most important component of the new political course was the concept of "developed socialism," which replaced the concept of the unfolding construction of communism with its promises to "catch up and overtake the United States in two or three years and "live under communism" by the current population of the Soviet Union. On December 21, 1966, Pravda published an

article by F. M. Burlatsky entitled "On the Construction of a Developed Socialist Society. The following year, in a speech on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the October Revolution, L. I. Brezhnev announced that a developed socialist society had been built in the USSR.

This conclusion was officially enshrined by the decisions of the XXIV Party Congress (March-April 1971). It proclaimed a course for increasing the efficiency of social production and combining the achievements of the scientific and technological revolution with the advantages of the socialist economic system; for blossoming and rapprochement of socialist nations; for achieving greater social homogeneity of society in the conditions of "developed socialism". No effective mechanisms were created to realize these goals, but the divergence of theory from real social processes and the fall of the efficiency of social production became less noticeable than under Khrushchev.

The concept of "developed socialism" was essentially a major revision of the ideas about the possibility to build communism in a single country in the historically foreseeable future. But it was very convenient in the sense that it did not destroy the belief in communism, but transferred its construction from a concrete-historical task to a theoretical one. According to the conception, the road to communism presupposed an indefinitely long phase of development during which socialism became integral, harmonious combination of all aspects and relations - industrial, sociopolitical, moral and legal, and ideological.

In 1973, the collective Communist Party and state leadership of the SS began to take measures to "raise

the authority" of its leader, taking the well-known road of cultivating a "cult of personality". Leonid Brezhnev, Hero of Socialist Labor since 1961, soon became the "bearer" of many new awards and distinctions. In 1975 he was promoted to the rank of General of the Army and in 1976 - to the rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union. He was awarded the Order "Victory", the Gold Star of the Hero of the Soviet Union (1966, 1976), became a laureate of the International Lenin Prize "For Consolidation of Peace between Nations" (1973). Public praise for "dear Leonid Ilyich" and the flood of awards increased as Brezhnev became increasingly incapacitated by a stroke he suffered in 1976. On June 16, '77, he was elevated by his entourage to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. By that time, the conservative course of the Soviet party-state leadership had taken full shape, and its consequence was the "stagnation" in the development of society characteristic of the late Brezhnev and the late "developed socialism" era.

Changes in Brezhnev's political environment

With the formation and approval of a new political course, the composition of the country's top party and state leadership also changed. The first reshuffles in the cadres were made a month after the perestroika. At the November (1964) plenum of the Central Committee, P. E. Shelest (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and a zealous critic of Khrushchev) and A. N. Kruchyuk were elected as new members of its Pre-speech Committee. A.N. Shelepin was one of the main orchestrators of the October coup. In December 1965 he accepted the resignation of the Chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet

Arkady Mikoyan, who had been one of the most influential politicians during the whole Khrushchev decade and the only member of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to defend Khrushchev during his dismissal. An active participant of the anti-Khrushchev conspiracy he was elected to this post in August 1966. I. Podgorny, who had been the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine from 1957 to 1963, and later the Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

However, since 1965 another tendency emerged. As a result of a subtle behind-the-scenes game, of which Brezhnev was the real mastermind. Comrades-in-arms who posed a threat to the new political course began to be pushed to the periphery of power. At the December 1965 meeting of the Central Committee, the Committee of the Party and State Compliance was reformed. It was renamed the Committee of People's Control, and the authority of its head was considerably reduced. This was done with the express purpose of removing A. N. Shelepin, the creator of the Committee, who had held the highest office in the party and who was not sympathetic to the other members of the collective leadership, to a secondary role. In September 1967 Shelepin was relieved of his duties as Secretary of the Central Committee due to his election as Chairman of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, and later, in 1975, he was safely removed from the Politburo.

The same fate befell Shelepin's friend and his successor, V. S. Semichastny, head of the Committee for State Security. The reasons for his dismissal from one of the key positions in the government were the shortcomings of the Soviet security services that failed to

prevent the March 1967 death of Stalin's daughter, Svetlana Alliluyeva.

In April 1973, G. I. Voronov, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR and P. E. Shelest, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine, lost their Politburo positions; in June 1977, N. V. Podgorny lost his post. They were replaced by the people, personally close to the Secretary General from his work in the Ukraine, Moldova and Kazakhstan: A. P. Kirilenko (Secretary of the Central Committee since 1966), K. U. Chernenko (Secretary of the Central Committee since 1976), D. A. Kunayev (First Secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan since 1964). M. A. Suslov (party ideologist), all remained loyal associates of Brezhnev, A. A. Gromyko (Minister of Foreign Affairs), A. A. Grechko and his successor in 1976. D. F. Ustinov (Minister of Defense), N. A. Schelokov (Minister of Public Order in 1966-1968, then Minister of Internal Affairs), N. A. Tikhonov, who in 1965 became Deputy and in 1976 - first Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers with a clear aim to replace with A.N. Kosygin in this position.

Kosygin's Reforms

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, who had been approved for the post after the resignation of Khrushchev in October 1964, was well aware of the fact that the administrative reforms of Kosygin alone were not enough. He was well aware that the negative tendencies in the economic development could not be overcome by a mere administrative counter-reform (a transition from the territorial principle of management to

a sectoral one). At the heart of his approach to the leadership of the national economy was the idea of the need to supplement the party and administrative levers with economic incentives, in other words, elements of a market economy.

This idea was not born in 1964. The search for an optimal planning model by Soviet economists (L. V. Kantorovich, V. S. Nemchino, B. V. Novozhilov, etc.) had been conducted since the end of the 1950s.

On September 9, 1962, E. G. Liberman's article "Plan, Profit, Bonus" published in "Pravda", argued that profit should be regarded as one of the most important criteria of an enterprise's successful work. In the discussion of the article various ideas were expressed on the necessity of transition to *economic methods* of management and revival of commodity-money relations. The system proposed by Lieberman was introduced at two factories as early as August 1964. Khrushchev's resignation only accelerated the realization of the proposals made during the discussion and experiment. The new economic course was defined by the decisions of the two plenums of the CPSU Central Committee in 1965 - the March Plenum (on agriculture) and the October Plenum (on industry). The decisions marked the beginning of the construction which went down in history as the *Economic or the Cochín reform*. In essence, it was patterned on the system existing under the New Economic Policy, but with the absence of private enterprises.

The March Plenum outlined a series of measures designed to reform the agriculture based on the combination of public and private interests,

strengthening the material interest of the collective farmer and employees of state farms in the growth of production. The plan of compulsory purchase of grain was reduced and declared unchanged for the next 10 years. Purchase price for agricultural products was increased 1.5-2 times. Super-scheduled purchases had to be made at higher prices (surcharges were 50% of the basic price). Prices for machinery and spare parts were reduced. Debts to the state were decreased from the collective and state farms. Income tax rates on peasants were reduced. The number of reporting indices set for the farms from above was sharply limited. The farms were given full independence in production planning within the limits of state assignments.

At the same time, the decisions of the plenum emphasized the increased role of the Ministry of Agriculture in planning and management of production and increased capital investments. The measures brought significant benefits to collective and state farms already up to 15%. For delivered this year, they received almost 15% (more than in the previous year). Significant benefit was received from the reduction of prices for machinery, electricity and writing off loan debts from collective farms.

Innovations in industry were proclaimed at the September (1965) Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in the report of A.N. Kosygin "On Improvement of Industrial Management, Improvement of Planning and Strengthening of Economic Stimulation of Industrial Enterprises". Calling for the rejection of state farms and the restoration of the branch principle of management, the chairman of the government stressed that it was not a question of simply restoring the pre-

nacho-powers system, but of combining centralized management with the expansion of operational and economic independence of enterprises.

This was to be achieved primarily by reducing the number of obligatory planned indicators to 9 instead of 30 in the previous years. The main thing in the work of enterprises and industries became the volume of sold products instead of the volume of gross output. Thus the producer was made directly dependent on the demand for his products. The natural target indicators were replaced by the cost indicators. To increase the interest of the collectives in the better use of production funds the payment for these funds was introduced. Salary was determined by the level of profitability, profit, and fulfillment of plans. The generalizing result of management was measured by the amount of profit. From the deductions from profits, enterprises were shipped funds of production development and material incentives. From these funds, money was spent on bonuses and "13th wages" for the July of the year; on improving working and living conditions, in particular, on housing. In this way the producers became more interested in the results of their work. In the development of the decisions of the plenum and the October 1965 laws on the change of the management bodies. In the same month the government approved the "Statute of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". It set forth the new rights and obligations of enterprises, which freed them from petty tutelage, regulating all the details and peculiarities of their work.

In accordance with the tasks of the reform the main directions of economic activities in the next, eighth five-year period (1966-1970) were defined. The directives for

the new Five-Year Plan were adopted at the XXIII Congress of the Party in the end of March 1966. It was planned to reach the new milestones in "the construction of communism" by increasing the industrial output by 47-50% and agricultural output by 25% within five years and real incomes of the population by 1.5 times in comparison with 1965.

The process of industry's transition to the new conditions of economic management was gradual. In January 1966, the first 43 plants and factories in 20 cities of the country switched to the system of self-financing. These were the most experienced teams. They had previously excelled in their work. The experience of working under the new system showed that the reform had a positive effect on the performance of the enterprises as measured by profit. In 1967, already 7 thousand people were working under the new system of enterprises with more than 10 million people employed. They accounted for about 40% of all industrial production. Entire industries had already switched to the new system. It began to be implemented in the transport industry. By the end of the five-year period the transition of industry to the system of self-accounting was largely completed. In the course of the reform, small enterprises merged with large ones. Production associations were created. The plants and factories they comprised were linked by the production cooperation on the output of finished products or the integrated processing of raw materials. The largest associations (AvtoZIL, etc.) located plants, branches and divisions in different economic regions and union republics.

The work in a new way made it possible to successfully fulfill the eighth five-year plan, increase the production

output by 50.5% and somewhat stop the fall of the average annual growth rate of industrial production. During the five years were built 1900 new large industrial enterprises and facilities, including unique objects West Siberian and Karaganda Metallurgical Combines, Volzhsky Pipe Plant, the Krasnoyarsk hydroelectric power plant, thermal power plants in Krivoy Rog and Konakovo, the first phase of the Volga Automobile Plant in Togliatti, knitting factories in Volgograd, Shakhtersk and Leninogorsk, shoe factories in Volgograd and Cherepovets. The formation of the unified energy system of the European part of the country was completed, and a unified energy system of Central Siberia was created.

The Lieberman-Kosygin reform details. The Further Elimination of the Planning System in the USSR. 1965-1987

September 9, 1962 in the newspaper "Pravda" published an article by Evsei Grigorievich Lieberman, "Plan. Profit. Prize", in which the author, later nicknamed "the ideologist of Kosygin's economic reform", proposes to make a rejection of the development of a unified economic system in the country in favor of the autonomy of individual enterprises, the priority of enterprises over the interests of the economy as a whole.

It was formulated in these words - "...It can be argued with good reason that the proposed order will free centralized planning from petty tutelage over enterprises... The reserves are best known and can only be discovered by the enterprise itself...Let the enterprises themselves show what they can do in the

competition for better results...".

At the same time, profits, according to Lieberman, should become "an indicator of the economic efficiency of productions". These ideas were the basis of the Lieberman-Kosygin economic reform.

Alexei Nikolaevich Kosygin was Chairman of the Government of the USSR (1964-1980).

On October 4, 1965, the Decree of the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers "On improvement of planning and strengthening of economic incentives for industrial production" is issued. This decree is a kind of foundation of further economic reform. According to this decree, it is decided to reduce planning indicators again and prioritize monetary indicators over in-kind ones.

In the indicators of the plan now in the first place, prevail, the indicators measured in money. Any other indicators in the planning are not subject to approval by higher organizations, but are simply taken into account as calculation materials for drawing up plans.

We can say that it was a kind of transition to such, pseudo-market economy, but completely without market competition and market motivation of the enterprises themselves, their management and employees, without strategic goal-setting, without quality and organizing planning. Motivational elements of a market economy are not introduced, and important and useful elements of planning are destroyed.

Two monetary indicators in plans become the main ones - the total volume of products sold in wholesale prices and the total amount of profit.

The first indicator is the so-called "gross plan. It increases annually.

The second is calculated as a certain percentage to the costs, which gives rise to the enterprise's interest in justifying their growth to the planning organizations.

The general rule becomes the hidden growth of wholesale prices, violation of the planned assortment in favor of more profitable products, and reducing the quality of products.

Here is how Nikolai Konstantinovich Baibakov, chairman of the State Planning Committee of the USSR from 1965 to 1985, spoke about it, using the food industry as an example

"...The production of the food industry sharply deteriorated. Food workers produced more sausage from the former amount of meat, increasing its starch content. The profits increased not at the expense of production efficiency and resource-saving, but by means of hidden price increases for the goods produced. Manufacturers reduced the quality of products, increasing their quantity. In short, they were chasing numbers. Corporate profits created the appearance of well-being. Money was piling up in the accounts of the enterprise, but had no resources to support it. We began to buy grain, meat and other foodstuffs abroad. Imports of finished goods increased considerably, at the expense of fewer imports of new machinery. We were bailed out by oil and gas exports, whose prices had risen considerably..."

A system of relations is created, in which enterprises are interested not to reduce, but on the contrary - to increase costs. But there is no incentive to cut costs, introduce

new technologies, increase the quality of products. The main driving force of the enterprise becomes not efficiency, not development, but "inflating" profits, as well as bargaining for resources - the so-called "beating out of funds".

Also in 1965, two more decisions were made that systematically increased the costs of the enterprise - the enterprise's payment for fixed assets and the enterprise's payment for money were established.

Credit replaces grant financing of capital investment.

In general, the 1965 reform reduced the integrity of the economic system, led to an increase in the technological backwardness of the USSR. The interests of individual enterprises (and their tens of thousands!) became autonomous and detached from the development of the economic system as a whole.

An inefficient and wasteful model of economic development was launched.

The same N.K. Baibakov, characterizing the reform, noted: *"...What is the reason for the failure of the reform? The reason, I believe, is not the only one. First of all, the question of the separation of functions of the state, its center, on the one hand, and the ministries and republics, on the other, was solved incorrectly. In practice, this led to the fact that the funds, the revenue part of the budget went to the enterprises, while the expenditures remained with the state. And the plan of the first year of reform had this flaw: finances were balanced normally, but the state budget could not be brought together without a deficit at the expense of current funds. Kosygin came to the conclusion that having given enterprises the right to freely maneuver*

resources, we could not establish proper control over their use. We had to make a temporary, as we thought, borrowing to cover the state budget costs from the enterprises' income. But we couldn't stop once we had borrowed."

The Lieberman-Kosygin reform did not restore the artels and private homestead farms which had been abolished before, it did not restore the mechanisms of purposeful increase in labor productivity and cost reduction and the system of regular price cuts, and it did not restore the technological and technical development of the entire economy.

Meanwhile, the growth rate of the economy continued to fall. In response to this, attempts were made to restore the orderliness and efficiency of the economic system.

There was a return to a number of former planned economic indicators. Labor productivity, output of consumer goods, improvement of product quality, etc., were added to the former ones. In fact, the indicator of the reduction of production costs was restored.

However, the previously adopted indicators, including indicators of monetary volume on sold products (the same "plan on the shaft") - were not abolished. As a result - the introduction of new planned indicators did not lead to the expected results, enterprises found a way to bypass the new requirements. The economy was going into a mode of steadily increasing costs, mismanagement and falling efficiency, and the growth rate of the economy continued to fall.

In 1979, attempts are again made to restore and organize the economy.

On July 12, 1979, the USSR Government adopted Decree No. 695 which, among other things, provided for a significant increase in the targets of the plan. Their number is to grow to 6 thousand for engineering products alone.

An attempt is made to abandon the same "gross output plan" and to replace it with the indicator of normative net production, which does not include material costs.

With the involvement of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR and the State Committee on Science and Technology decisions on the technological development of the economy are made. However, even these decisions do not bring results. Paraphrasing the well-known words, we can say - "To build is not to break". In its time it was broken down to the ground, and now attempts to build something again have not been successful.

E.G. Yasin said this about the 1979 decisions - *"...the mountain gave birth to the mouse... Now it is clear that such a decision could not fix anything. But at the time, people had some hope: maybe this time something will come out. Of course, it did not. Moreover, the decree was virtually ignored. In essence, it was simply not enforced ..."*

In short, so much has been done since 1953 that with great speed the train with the inscription "USSR" was flying into a dead end, where disaster awaited it. There were a few years to go...

The slowdown of the socio-economic development of the country, the signs of which began to appear at the end of the eighth five-year plan.

The economic reform of A.N. Kosygin was brought to an end. The directive economy managed to neutralize rather quickly the reforms that implied the expansion of democracy and independence of labor collectives. From the very beginning, the conservatives in the country's leadership saw economic reforms as a threat to political stability. The events of the Prague Spring of 1968 were, from this point of view, the real proof of the threat. Using the events in Czechoslovakia as an excuse, the guardians of dogmatic ideology began to "openly and drastically twist" the reform in the late 1960s. It did not develop further in the 1970s. The shortcomings inherent in the reform itself also contributed to this.

It gave enterprises a wide margin for maneuvering, but did not create a thrifty owner, because the domination of state property preserved the alienation of the employee from the means of production. The reform's defects were largely determined by the absolutization of profit as a generalizing economic indicator. It could be obtained both by optimizing production and/or by artificially raising prices and producing lower-quality products. Such aspirations sometimes united both enterprises and ministries; the mechanism of inflation was introduced into the economic mechanism. The stimulation of overproduction caused the enterprises to underestimate their plans. Their over-fulfillment promised greater benefits than the work on the tight schedule.

In this regard, attention is drawn to an experiment at the

Shchyokin chemical plant in the Tula region. Here, in 1967, it was decided to cut the redundant personnel and transfer part of the salaries of the laid-off workers to the remaining ones. During the first years of working under the new conditions the number of the plant's employees was reduced from 6 to 5 thousand people (not only the workers of the secondary industries, but the leading specialists were dismissed) and the output was increased by 20%. The profits of the plant were used to build housing, and cultural and public facilities in the town.

However, the large-scale implementation of the experience was fraught with unemployment and social tension. At the same time in one of the workshops of the plant, which worked on the Dutch equipment, and after the reduction there were about 800 workers, and according to Dutch standards, such equipment could be served by about 280 people. This meant that in the Soviet economy there were 3-4 people at one work station, respectively, distributing wages among them. Among other things, the reform created a favorable environment for the growth of the shadow economy.

The new system of management in the eighth Five-Year Plan was introduced in the agricultural sector as well. State farms switched to full cost-accounting, covered all production costs from their own funds and created funds. By the end of the five-year period, the new terms worked on more than 40% of state farms. The economic reform allowed to abandon the system of collective farmers' labor payment by labor days, which existed since the time of mass collectivization. Since May 1966, collective farms introduced a guaranteed monthly payment of labor in money according to the wage rates of the

corresponding categories of state farm workers. For this purpose, a special fund was created, primarily formed from the collective farms' revenues (previously, the funds remaining in the collective farms after settlements with the state were used to pay for labor). If the state lacked its own funds for the formation of the fund, it provided the collective farm with a loan. At the end of 1966, monthly guaranteed labor payment was introduced in most collective farms.

The new conditions of collective farm management, expansion of independence and democracy (election of not only members of the collective farm management, collective farm chairmen, but also foremen, and heads of other subdivisions) were reflected in the new Model Collective Farm Charter adopted in November 1969 in Moscow at the III Congress of Collective Farmers of the USSR. It replaced the 1935 Charter. It enshrined the rights of collective farmers to a guaranteed wage and pension security. The Congress elected the Union Council of Collective Farms, whose task was to discuss the most important issues of collective farm life and activities; to generalize experiences; and to make recommendations for improving production. Councils of collective farms were elected in the republics, territories, regions and districts.

In order to ensure the steady pace of agricultural development in accordance with the decisions of the Central Committee Plenum in May (1966), land reclamation and improvement of soil fertility were carried out at the expense of the state budget. The October (1968) Plenum of the Central Committee took measures to increase the supply of machinery and mineral fertilizers to collective and state farms. By the end of the

Five-Year Plan, about 2 million tractors and 623 thousand grain harvesters worked in the fields of the country; almost all collective and state farms used the electric power from the state power network.

In the years of the Eighth Five-Year Plan, the transformation of collective farms into state farms was further developed. In 1970, there were 15 thousand state farms in the country! State farms accounted for 40% of all marketable agricultural output. Widely practiced the creation of mezhkolkhoz, kolkhoz-sovkhoz production associations, agrarian industrial complexes with enterprises for processing agricultural products, the production of building materials, for feed stations. The composition of the personnel of the collective farms' leaders was improved. By the end of the five-year plan 95.5% of directors of state farms and over 80% of heads of collective farms had higher or secondary vocational education; the number of agricultural specialists increased by 400 thousand people. As in the previous five-year plans, great importance was attached to supporting the competition for high labor productivity.

The labor of collective and state farm workers resulted in an increase in agricultural production from 1966 to 1970 by 21% instead of 12% in the previous five-year period. However, even in this, relatively prosperous, five-year plan was underfulfilled. The plan was to increase agricultural production by 25%. The reform did not produce the expected effect.

Socio-Economic Development of the USSR in the 1970s.

The development was carried out under the sign of the strengthening of centralized management, the curtailment of reforms and the decline in growth rates of major socio-economic indicators. It was determined by the plans of the ninth and tenth five-year plans, the directives of which were approved by the XXIV (1971) and XXV (1976) Party Congresses respectively. The plans stipulated an increase in the country's output and national income, but no acceleration of growth rates was envisaged. The decline in growth rates was explained by the increasing scale of production. While in 1966-1970 the rate of growth in national income percent increase in national income was equal to 1.9 billion rubles, in 1971-1975 it was supposed to be 2.7 billion rubles.

During the ninth Five-Year Plan it was possible to increase the volume of industrial production by 43%, in the tenth - by 24% compared to the previous Five-Year Plan. Production of agricultural products increased for the ninth five-year plan by 13%, for the tenth - by 9%. However, the five-year plans were not fulfilled. The plan to increase the gross volume of industrial output in 1971 - 1975. was fulfilled by 91%, in 1976 - 1980 - 67%, agricultural production, respectively, - 68% and 56%. All this could not but lead to a decrease in the average annual growth rate. Production of industrial products in the eighth Five-Year Plan increased annually, according to official data, by 8.5%; in the ninth - by 7.4%; in the tenth - by 4.4%. Agricultural production increased in the eighth Five-Year Plan by 3.8% annually; in the ninth, by 2.3%; in the tenth, by 1.7%.

The emphasis in industrial development in the 1970s was on the creation of huge territorial-production complexes (TPCs). There were several dozens of them.

The main attention was paid to the West Siberian TIC. Huge deposits of oil and gas were discovered in the Tyumen Oblast back in the 1960s. In 1969, the Party Central Committee and the USSR government made a joint decision on the accelerated development of oil and gas production there. The development of oil and gas producing areas of Western Siberia (Samotlor, Surgut, Urengoy, Yamburg, etc.) involved the sending of human resources from all republics of the country; the development costs were not taken into account. As a result, oil production in Western Siberia grew tenfold in the 1970s. In the 1980s, Western Siberia began to produce more than 10% of the world's oil and gas production.

Coal production was accelerated. Two open-pit coal mining complexes were developed: in Kazakhstan - Pavlodar - Tatarstan, in Kazakhstan - Pavlodar - Oblast - Vladivostok, and in Kazakhstan - the Urals - Ural - Orenburg. Ekibastuz Fuel and Energy Complex in Kazakhstan, and Kansho-Achinskiy in Krasnoyarsk Krai. The cheapest coal in the country was mined here. The Bratsko-Ust-Ilimsky timber industry complex was created on the basis of the Ust-Ilimskaya HPP, and the Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP was used as the basis for the Sayansk TIC for non-ferrous metal processing.

In order to activate the economic development of Siberia and the Far East, the construction of Baikal-Amur Mainline was resumed in 1974: the first attempt of its creation was made on the eve of the Great Patriotic War. Its construction was over 4 thousand kilometers long and was basically finished in 1984.

The country's leadership made the most of the USSR's

natural advantage over other countries - its enormous natural wealth. However, extensive development of the economy restrained the development of science-intensive industries, which determined scientific and technological progress - electronics, cybernetics, robotics, biotechnology. Increased sales of oil and gas to Western countries provided currency, which was used to buy the missing grain, high-tech equipment.

In the field of agriculture in the 70s the emphasis was placed on agro-industrial integration, the unification of agriculture with the sectors that serve it - industry, transport, trade, construction. Such integration was considered as the main direction of joining the two forms of ownership - state and cooperative-collective farms. Great efforts were deployed to reclaim agricultural land. Grandiose canals (Bolshoi Stavropolsky, Severo-Krymsky, and Karakumsky) and systems for watering and irrigation were built. In 1974, the Party Central Committee and the Union Government adopted a joint resolution "On measures for further development of agriculture of the Non-Black Soil Zone of the RSFSR".

The Program of the Non-Black Soil Zone Development was designed for 15 years and implied a sharp increase in capital investments in the socio-economic development of Russia's 29 regions and republics. Funds were allocated, but there was no significant improvement of the situation in the countryside. The money was spent on "extensive land reclamation", "comprehensive mechanization and chemicalization"; the social sphere was clearly underestimated. Moreover, it was aggravated by the mass liquidation of "unpromising villages". The number of rural settlements, according to the population censuses of 1959 and 1979. The number

of rural settlements decrease from 1959 to 1979 was 294,000 to 177,000. This means that the number of "unpromising" villages decreased by 16 every day.

Scourge of national economy remained the diversion of the "patronage assistance" to the village during the harvesting season to 20% of the entire active population of the country, and huge, up to 30-40% loss of crops. The economy was less and less able to cope with the tasks of food supply of the country. Since the 1970s, meat, sausages and, in some regions, cheese and dairy products became more and more scarce.

At the same time it should be noted that despite all the contradictions of economic development at the stage of early "developed socialism", the economic potential created during the eighth and ninth five-year periods (1966-1975) was equal to the potential which had taken half a century to create in the country. While in 1922 the USSR's share in world industrial production was 1 percent, in 1975 it rose to 12.6 percent.

The victory of the guideline economy over the sprouts of reforms was promoted by the Cold War. Competition with the United States and NATO countries, as well as with China, in the field of military buildup led to militarization of the Soviet economy. Military expenditures consumed nearly a fifth of the gross national product. Orders of the military-industrial complex worked for a significant part of the country's machine-building plants. "The defense industry" reduced the opportunities to intensify "civil" production, reconciled with the irrational consumption of raw materials and electricity, extensive capital construction, and the growing disproportion in the development of national

economy branches. The Soviet Army, which increased from 3.68 to 4.19 million troops in 1965-1977 (by comparison, the U.S. Army reduced from 3.5 to 2.06 million in those years), absorbed colossal funds.

The slowdown of the economy affected social programs and the welfare of Soviet people. While national income grew 3.2 times in the 60s and 70s, real incomes of the population grew only 2.3 times. The rate of housing construction slowed down from the middle of the 1960s. The legislation on pensions did not change since 1956, and the number of pensioners in the USSR grew from 32 million (1966) to 46 (1977). Increased equalization in the wages for skilled and unskilled labor led to the fall of prestige of intellectual professions (engineer, teacher, doctor, etc.). The gap between the volume of money supply and its coverage with goods that began to grow in the 1970s led to a shortage of goods, which at first began with the most prestigious and durable goods, and from the years 1960s began to affect practically the entire sphere of public goods and services.

The "monolithic nature" of the Soviet people as a new historical community of people, contrary to propaganda clichés, was not but shaky because of the economic inequality of the republics and the differences in their contributions to the development of the country.

According to official statistics, in 1975 the Russian Federation could keep 42,3% of the turnover tax collected on its territory; Ukraine - 43,3%; Latvia - 45,6%; Moldova - ??%; Estonia - 59,7%; Belarus - 68,2%; Azerbaijan - 69,1%; Georgia - 51.5%; Russia - 72,7%. Tajikistan, 99.1%; Kyrgyzstan, 99.2%; Lithuania, 99.7%; Uzbekistan, 99.8%; and Kazakhstan and

Turkmenistan, 100%.

The rates of capital investments in the economy of the Soviet republics were 2-4 times higher than in Russia. At the same time, outside Russia there were strong sentiments that it and the Russians were to blame for the economic and all other problems of the Soviet republics. An alarming manifestation of Russophobia was the explosion in the Moscow metro on January 8, 1977 organized by Armenian nationalists.

Foreign Policy

From the second half of the 1960s, a certain "détente" in the atmosphere of Soviet Union's relations with the West became apparent. This détente was a consequence of the strategic military parity that the USSR and the United States had achieved by that time, which made it impossible for any of the superpowers to win a nuclear war. In relations between the USSR and Western countries the tendency to reduce confrontation and normalize relations between them increased. In 1969, the West supported the proposal of the Warsaw block countries to hold a pan-European Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe.

In 1970, the Soviet-Western German Treaty recognized finalized postwar borders in Europe. Similar treaties were concluded by the FRG with Poland and Czechoslovakia, and in December 1972, mutual recognition of the FRG and GDR took place. In May 1972, the USSR and the USA concluded the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement on limitation of strategic

offensive arms for five years, later called OCB-I Treaty. The treaty established for both sides limits on the number of intercontinental ballistic missiles, as well as missiles launched from submarines; however, the number of nuclear charges of the parties was not specified, their build-up by the parties continued.

In November 1974 a new strategic offensive arms limitation agreement (START II) was negotiated. This treaty was to regulate limits on a broader range of weapons, including strategic bombers and multiple warheads. The treaty was scheduled to be signed in 1977. However, this did not happen due to the emergence of a new type of weapon - cruise missiles - in the United States and its refusal to set limits on them. Thus, without stopping the arms race, the treaty narrowed its front. The convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons and on their destruction signed in 1972 and entered into force in March 1975 contributed to it.

In May 1976, the Soviet-American treaty regulating peaceful underground nuclear tests was signed. The fruitful development of U.S.-Soviet cooperation made possible the joint space flight of the two spacecraft Soyuz and Apollo in July 1975. The culmination of international tension détente was the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, signed on August 1, 1975, by 33 European leaders, the U.S. and Canada. It stipulated that henceforth the relations between the countries participating in the Conference would be governed by a number of principles. Sovereign equality, non-use or non-threat of force, inviolability of post-war borders, territorial integrity

of states, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms.

However, as later events showed, the USSR viewed the Act primarily from the perspective of the recognition of borders in North Europe and its special position in it. Western countries, on the other hand, considered the clause on human rights in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to be the key one. With the deployment of the human rights campaign in the West, détente has been undermined; with the outbreak of war in Afghanistan (December 1979), it was buried altogether.

Relations with "Third World" countries during the early "developmental socialism" in the USSR were determined by its desire to acquire allies and establish mutually beneficial cooperation with them. The Soviet Union sided with Egypt and Syria in the "seven-day flood plain" with Israel in June 1967. It helped put out another military outbreak in the Middle East in the fall of 1973 and supported India in its conflicts with Pakistan in the mid-1960s and in 1971. In relations with developing countries, priority was given to "socialist-oriented" countries. (Kampuchea, Laos, Somalia, Angola, Mozambique, Nicaragua). They received billions of dollars in economic and military aid. The non-bloc logic of Soviet foreign policy also led to the establishment of allied relations with dictatorial regimes (Iraq, Syria, Libya, Ethiopia). The same policy was followed by the United States, which supported extremely reactionary regimes with anti-communist and anti-Soviet orientation.

Relations with socialist countries during this period experienced certain difficulties. China, Albania,

Romania, Yugoslavia, and the DPRK stood apart from the postal policy agreed upon with the Soviet Union. Relations with China worsened due to its territorial claims. In March 1969, there were armed clashes in the vicinity of Damascus and then in other parts of the Sino-Soviet frontier. In all, there were about 500 incidents involving Chinese military and civilians. In the fall of 1969 negotiations on border disputes began. They were going hard, purely at a standstill. After the death of Mao Zedong (September 1976) the situation did not improve.

The USSR supported North Vietnam in its struggle to unify the country under Communist rule against the South Vietnamese regime and the United States, which openly sided with it. On February 5, 1965, our government declared that "the Soviet people will fulfill its international duty to the brotherly socialist country and pledged to take, together with its allies, all necessary measures to protect the security and strengthen the defense capacity of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The aid (mainly in arms and specialists in maintenance of anti-aircraft missile launchers) was provided for more than 10 years, until the defeat of the South Vietnamese regime and the United States...

The war, which began in August 1964 was ended with the entry of North Vietnamese troops into Saigon on April 30, 1975. The reunification of Vietnam and the proclamation of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam took place in July 1976.

"The world system of socialism" experienced great turmoil in Eastern Europe as well. In December 1967, A. Dubcek came to the leadership of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia. In April 1968, the program which

opened the road to economic reform and democratization was adopted in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. However, already by summer, the signs of socio-political crisis were distinctly outlined in the country. The mass media were out of the party's control, the authority of the CHR was in rapid decline, and the prospect of its defeat in the National Assembly elections scheduled for the fall was becoming quite real. The leaders of the "fraternal parties" saw all this as a threat to socialism in their countries as well.

"The Prague Spring ended with the invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 by troops from the USSR, Poland, Hungary, the GDR and Bulgaria. Thus, the "threat of counterrevolution" was averted. But this action intensified the split in the socialist camp. Albania withdrew from the Organization of the Warsaw Pact countries. Another reaction to the Czechoslovak events was a series of interstate treaties and agreements within the CMEA framework aimed at strengthening the economic and military integration of the countries of Eastern Europe. The role of the USSR in the commonwealth increased.

In the West, the "right to invade" of the Soviet Union under the pretext of protecting socialism and "limiting the sovereignty" of East European countries was called the "Brezhnev Doctrine". It proved ineffective, however. The crisis soon made itself felt in Poland. In the 1970s, the inhabitants of Poland began to demonstrate en-masse against the existing political regime. Poland was the first country in the socialist commonwealth where an alternative political power was actually emerging.

§ 2 The USSR Constitution of 1977 and the situation in the country in the years of late "developed socialism"

The new Basic Law, called the Constitution of "developed socialism," was adopted in the Soviet Union on October 7 1977. Ironically, its completion and enactment came at a time when "developed socialism" had lost its capacity for further progressive development. Work on the draft law took many years: the first one to replace the 1936 Constitution was being prepared and discussed shortly after the end of the Great Patriotic War. However, the adoption of the new Constitution did not come to fruition. New commissions for its development were created at the 19th and 20th Party Congresses. At the Twenty-second Congress of the CPSU and in 1961, its Program was adopted. Then the leaders of the Party and the country decided once again to work out a new Constitution which, N. S. Khrushchev stressed, "must be brought into conformity with the Program of the Party and legally fixed new forms of social and state structure of our country, corresponding to the period of the widened construction of the communist society".

In April 1962, the USSR Supreme Soviet approved the composition of the Constitutional Committee headed by Khrushchev. In its work it proceeded from the premise that the new Constitution had to designate the main features of the "period of unfolded communist construction", showing the advantages of the new social system. One of the key points of the new Constitution was to conclude that the state of dictatorship of the proletariat would "grow into a nationwide state" and, in

this connection, transform the Soviets of Workers' Deputies into the Soviets of People's Deputies.

The main direction of development of the political system was our "deployment of popular democracy, expressed in an unprecedented growth of activity and self-determination of the masses in the management of the state and national economy, in the transfer of certain functions of government bodies to public organizations, in the strengthening of the public principles in the activities of government bodies". It was also suggested that the leading and guiding role of the CPSU in Soviet society should be enshrined in the Constitution. It was even proposed to write in the Basic Law that the highest authority in the country belonged to the Communist Party, while the actual leadership of political and economic activities in the republics belonged to the Central Committees of the Communist Parties and their first secretariats. There was a desire to reflect in a special provision of the Constitution that in the USSR "there is a consolidation of various nationalities into a single communist nation" and, on this basis, remove the nationality line from passports.

With Khrushchev's resignation and the revision of the course of direct construction of communism, the direction of further work on the draft Constitution naturally changed. The threat to the existence of traditional nations from the coming "communist nation" (and the concerns of the national republics in this regard) was removed by the entry in the resolution of the 21st Congress of the CPSU, which stated that the Soviet people, as a new community, was multinational.

The work on the draft Constitution was completed in

accordance with the directives of the 25th Party Congress (February 1976), when the liberal and technocratic tendencies in the country's leadership were broken, the party doctrine was finally dominated, a rigid foreign policy based on the development of military-industrial complex was formed, and the personalization of power and strengthening of the position of the party-state bureaucracy were pronounced. At the same time, theories about strengthening the leading role of the working class, increasing social homogeneity of society, expanding the rights and freedoms of citizens (following the signing of the Helsinki Final Act of 1975), increasing democratizism, the participation of almost every adult person in the management of his own state affairs were popularized. All these contradictions were reflected in the new Draft Constitution, the authors of which were sometimes forced to combine the discrepancies.

The final draft of the Constitution was prepared in May 1977. Then it was approved by the Plenum of the Central Committee and submitted for public discussion. A session of the Supreme Soviet was scheduled for October for final consideration of the amended and supplemented draft. On October 7, at the extraordinary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the ninth convocation, the constitution was adopted. It emphasized the continuity of the ideas and principles with the previous constitutions of 1918, 1924 and 1936.

The Constitution consisted of a preamble and nine sections: 1. Fundamentals of social system and politics; 2) State and personality; 3) National and state structure; 4) Soviets of people's deputies and the procedure of their election; 5) Supreme bodies of power and administration; 6) Principles of state power and

administration structure of the Union republics; 7) Justice, arbitration and prosecutorial supervision; 8) Emblem, flag, anthem and capital city; 9) Operation of the Constitution and the procedure of its application.

The main innovation was the preamble, which stated the construction of "the developed socialism" and creation of "the all-people state". Thus, "the withering away of the state" was postponed for an indefinite period, and the task of all-round strengthening of law and order was becoming a priority. As the supreme goal of the state was to build a "classless communist society". The economic system of the USSR was based on socialist ownership of the means of production, the political system - on the Soviets, and the social basis - on the union of workers, peasants and intellectuals. New sections appeared in the text of the Constitution: on political system of society, social development and culture, the status of people's deputy.

The new chapter (unparalleled in the previous Soviet Constitutions) treated issues of foreign policy. It emphasized that it aims to provide favorable international conditions "for building communism in the USSR"; "to strengthen the positions of world socialism; to support the struggle of peoples for national liberation and social progress". The principle of socialist internationalism was consolidated in the relations of the USSR with socialist countries and states which had been freed from colonial dependence. In practice, these provisions sometimes conflicted with commitments to the principle of sovereign equality and rights of nations to master their own destiny, and justified the foreign policy expansion of the socialist state.

For the first time, the Basic Law reflected the actual mechanism of power in the USSR. The Communist Party was described as "the leading and guiding force of Soviet society, the core of its political system, state and public organizations" (famous Article 6). This legitimization of the real role of the party led to monopoly control by party organizations over the activities of enterprises and institutions. It dramatically increased the importance of the party apparatus throughout the vertical of power, making membership in the party virtually a prerequisite for any career in office.

The new forms of "direct democracy", which were guaranteed by the Constitution, were oriented toward the development of "true democracy": popular discussion and referendums; new civil rights - to appeal against the actions of officials; judicial protection against encroachments on honor and dignity; criticism of the actions of state and public organizations. For the first time, the Constitution consolidated the rights to health protection, housing, cultural achievements, and freedom of creativity. However, the implementation of these rights, as well as the freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, was hindered by the multitude of laws and regulations in force, remaining often unrealizable as before.

According to the Constitution, all the Soviets of People's Deputies: The Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Supreme Soviets of Union and Autonomous Republics, krai, oblast and other Soviets, constituted a single system of state power bodies. The supreme body of state power was the bicameral Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities. The Supreme Soviet had the

power to make decisions regarding the independence of the Soviet Union.

During the breaks between the sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, consisting of the Soviet of the Union and the Soviet of Nationalities, was the supreme organ of state power. During the intervals between the sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, its functions were performed by the Presidium. Day-to-day administrative activities were carried out with the help of the state management system, which was headed by the USSR Council of Ministers. The Constitution also enshrined the increased economic and political role of the Union Center at the expense of the corresponding rights of the republics. By the end of 1970s, the USSR comprised almost 90 central ministries and departments (in 1924 there were 10, in 1936 - 20).

The new Fundamental Law retained the provisions of the 1936 Constitution regarding the national-state structure. Numerous proposals aimed at eliminating the hierarchy of national statehood (and peoples) within the Union of SSR by returning to the traditional, pre-revolutionary territorial principle of administrative division of the country, equalizing the status of republics, transferring certain republics from autonomous to union ones, were not taken into account. At the same time, the very definition of the USSR as a "single union multinational state" (Article 69) testified to the desire to strengthen the federal neutralist principles. In conflict with that, the Constitution accorded each union republic the "right to freely secede from the USSR" (Article 71) and stressed its sovereignty (Articles 75 and 80).

The Constitution distinguished among the Soviet peoples

"nations and nationalities", but did not provide any criteria for such a distinction. This was the reason for the deafening dissatisfaction among the peoples, classified as "second-rate". Constitutional provisions relating to the sphere and regulation of national relations remained largely contradictory and contributed little to the real consolidation of the state unity of the "new historical community" and the unification of the peoples of the country "for the purpose of joint construction of communism" (Article 69).

Thus the USSR Constitution of 1977 finally formalized the conservative course of Brezhnev's domestic and foreign policies, it legitimized the party's rigid ideological control over society, and conserved the explosive contradictions in the national question.

Changes in the state and political leadership in the last years of Brezhnev's reign.

The consequence of the rejection of economic management methods was centralization and bureaucratization, and the rapid swelling of the administrative apparatus. By 1985, the total number of managers in the country approached 18 million: there was one manager for every 6-7 employees. The most significant of the bureaucratic layer (11 million) was the lower apparatus of enterprises and organizations. Up to 10% of the state budget was spent to maintain bureaucratic structures; the system of benefits and privileges for employees of all levels was expanding. The emphasizing of a steadily increasing role of the CPSU was accompanied by a constant growth of the party, which reached 19 million people by the mid-

1980s. Correspondingly, the Party apparatus was also expanding.

In 1982 the party structure included 14 Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Republics, 6 Regional Committees, 150 Regional Committees, 2 City Committees tantamount to Regional Committees (Moscow, Kiev), 10 District Committees, 872 City Committees, 631 City District Committees, 2885 Village District Committees, 419,700 primary party organizations. Thus, only the first persons in the party hierarchy in the early 80's were recruited (if you do not count the primary party organizations, 80% of which consisted of 3-45 party members) 4,570 people. However, the rise to the top was no longer, as before, associated with the compulsory ascent of the party ladder. From the 1970s, the country's top elite began to reproduce itself not through bottom-up promotion, but through the selection and training of Party, trade union and Komsomol cadres, and diplomatic personnel at elite schools. These were the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee, the Higher Party School, the Higher School of Trade Unionism, the Higher Komsomol School, and the Diplomatic Academy. Institute of International Relations.

The ministries and departments were transformed into veritable bastions of bureaucracy. By 1985, the Soviet administrative apparatus of the ministries and departments totaled 107 thousand people, the republican apparatus 140 thousand. The number of employees of the ministries of ASSR, krai and oblast managements and departments was 280 thousand people. Since 1965, the ministries were absolute monopolists in their industries. They were in charge of all

the resources and directly managed the enterprises and organizations all over the country. Every day in Moscow they were receiving information about the results of work over the past day, the fulfillment of monthly, quarterly, annual and five-year plans. Hundreds of businessmen were sent to Moscow to organize the decisions needed by the places; a counter flow was sent to the places for inspections, control, familiarization with the cases.

The move to build giant enterprises in virtually every industry led to an increase in the influence of their executives. The directors of the largest enterprises and production associations were often reckoned with far more than the local party and Soviet leaders.

The CPSU Central Committee, and especially its apparatus, became the main support of the supreme power during the Brezhnev's rule. In the second half of 1960s, the basic decisions were made at the Central Committee plenums, but in the following decade the power center was more and more moved to the departments of the Central Committee. The total number of responsible employees of the Central Committee apparatus reached 1500 people in those years. Central Committee plenums and party congresses, although they met regularly, became more and more of a formal nature, only "approving" decisions prepared by the machinery. The mechanism of replenishment of the Central Committee staff and the Central Committee itself by the end of the 1970s was fine-tuned to perfection. The representation of republican party organizations, krais and oblasts, the military-industrial complex, scientists and artists, and law-enforcement agencies was observed in certain proportions. The interests of all power structures were reflected in the Central

Committee and its apparatus. Such a situation became favorable for lobbying the interests of regions and industries. Lobbyists of the military-industrial and agrarian-industrial complexes had great "penetrating" capacity, and the significance of the "Muslim" local and central elites with their inherent heightened corporate cohesion grew.

According to Pikhoi's calculations, the highest level of power in the country was represented by about a thousand people in Moscow and about three thousand in the entire Soviet Union. This number included the heads of the apparatus of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Council of Ministers, the largest ministries (defense, internal affairs, Foreign Ministry), the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees, Central Committees of the Communist Party of the Union republics. This stratum included ministers, deputy ministers, members of the boards of ministries and union departments, senior representatives of the Soviet apparatus, army, KGB, justice, industry, science, propaganda and culture, who were members and candidates for membership in the Central Committee and the CPSU Central Committee. At the local level, the list was extended to the heads of the departments of the regional committees, regional committees, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Union Republics, directors of major industrial enterprises, commanders of local military districts and large military units, heads of departments of the KGB.

By the end of the 1970s, the country's top leadership had degenerated into a real gerontocracy (the power of the old). The average age of Politburo members (21-22 members and candidate members), Central Committee

secretaries (10~11) rose from 60 to 68 in 1971- 1981. The "collective leadership" was exceptionally attentive to each other's health. Special decisions were made to limit the working hours of Politburo members over 65. The duration of vacations was increased, they could work at home one day a week, on other days they had to begin their work at 10 a.m. and finish it at 5 p.m. with a mandatory lunch break. For the past six years, Brezhnev had been medically certified to have three days off per week; the doctors demanded one more day off for him. For this reason, meetings of the Politburo, which took the most important political decisions, often lasted no more than 15-20 minutes.

The order established under the late Brezhnev remained in place until 1985. "One can look at the age composition of the Politburo in many ways," said V. Andropov in 1983. People are not always in the best interest of the cause. There was indeed no hurry to replace them. In 1978, M. S. Gorbachev, the First Secretary of the Stavropol Regional Committee of the CPSU, was elected Secretary of the Central Committee for Agriculture instead of F. D. Kulakov, who had died. In March 1976, G. A. Aliyev, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, became a new candidate for the Politburo, then (from November 1978) - E. A. Shevardnadze, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Georgia. Having died in October 1980 in a car crash, P. M. Masharov was replaced as a candidate member of the Politburo by the new first secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus T. Kiselev who then died in 1983.

At the same time, representatives of the old guard in the Politburo willingly awarded themselves with all sorts of prizes, orders and medals. L. I. Brezhnev received two

more "gold stars" as a Hero - in 1978 and 1981. Three brochures of the General Secretary's memoirs ("Tselina", "Minor Land", "Rebirth"), prepared with the help of professional journalists, were awarded the Lenin Prize for Literature in 1979. Brezhnev's speech was not fully recovered after his stroke, but he appeared regularly on television until literally the last days of his life. The question of his successor, Brezhnev was inclined to decide in favor of K.U. Chernenko. First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine V. V. Shcherbitsky was considered as a reserve figure. According to V. V. Grishin, shortly before his death, Brezhnev *"wanted to recommend Shcherbitsky to the Plenum of the Central Committee to be the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and himself to be Chairman of the Central Committee-Party". In this case, history would have taken a different path, and the collapse of the USSR might not have happened.*

The "stagnation" of "developed socialism" became a time of flourishing nomenklatura privileges, which still included state houses, special medical treatment, special transport vehicles, etc. However, all these attributes of power could not be transferred into personal ownership and transferred to heirs. The nomenklatura, established under Brezhnev, sought to provide a comfortable living for their relatives and nephews in safety from persecution and repression, which meant that they did not feel obliged to live by the "moral code of the builders of communism". Different moral laws were established in their circle, closed off from society, and in the nomenklatura milieu.

Abuse of position, the desire to attach relatives to the "bread" position, to an elite university, etc. became

commonplace. For example, a far-fetched Ministry of Machine Building for Animal Husbandry and Fodder Production, headed by Brezhnev's brother-in-law, K. N. Belyak, was established. In 1973 it was separated from the Ministry of Tractor and Agricultural Engineering, but soon after the minister retired (1986) it was merged with the Ministry of Agricultural and Tractor mechanical engineering. Leonid Brezhnev's son became First Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade without due cause (dismissed by Andropov in 1983). Brezhnev's son-in-law Yu.M. Churbanov (arrested in 1986 for corruption; released from prison in 1993) once boasted that his father-in-law intended to make him his successor as Secretary General. I. Y. Andropov (son of Yuri V. Andropov) had a successful career in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs since 1979, and in 1984 he became ambassador to Greece.

The most corrupt in the years of late "developed socialism" were the Central Asian republics, where bribes to officials constituted the entire system. The party and state apparatuses began to merge with the shadow economy. All this happened against the background of obsessive pseudo-communist propaganda, continuous celebrations and awards on the occasion of various anniversaries, anniversaries and successes in "the improvement of developed socialism".

The search for ways to strengthen socialism under Andropov and Chernenko

On November 12, 1982, two days after the death of Leonid Brezhnev, the plenum of the Central Committee of the Party appointed Yuri V. Andropov general

secretary of the Central Committee. He was 68 years old. For many years, beginning in June 1967, he was the chairman of the KGB in the rank of candidate and Politburo member. After Suslov's death in February 1982, he was the Party's "chief ideologist. Intolerance for dissent, adherence to an authoritarian style, a reputation as an enlightened Party bureaucrat, and personal modesty outweighed the other contenders for the highest office. They could not better meet the expectations of "the common people": to establish order in the country, to curtail privileges, to curb bribery, and to wage a war on shady dealings. Andropov's first steps as secretary general did not fail to meet these expectations. In December 1982, he declared, "Although everything cannot be reduced to discipline," but it is necessary to begin with it. At the same time, Andropov gave instructions to prepare serious measures in the sphere of economy. In 1983, he began a large-scale economic experiment in three republican and two union ministries (Mintyazhmash and Mintelektroprom).

From the beginning of 1983, the KGB officers began performing functions unusual for them before, -revealing the violators of labor discipline. Raids on stores, cinemas, bathhouses, etc. identified and punished those who were supposed to be at work at that time. At the same time, high-profile "cases" of corruption were launched, and the fight against unearned income and speculation was announced. The struggle against abuses in trade acquired a large scale. The head of the Main department of trade of Moscow city executive committee was put on trial and shot; after him 25 officials of Moscow Glavtorg were put in custody, the directors of the largest Moscow groceries and automobile store. The Minister of Trade, A. I. Struev, was retired. The positions

of the "cotton mafia" in Uzbekistan; got to the first secretary of the Krasnodar regional committee of the CPSU, S. F. Medunov, Interior Minister N. A. Schelokov, and his deputy, Colonel-General Y. M. Churbanov, who were heavily involved in corruption. As a result, Politburo member Sh. R. Rashidov, CC members S. F. Medunov and N. A. Schelokov committed suicide, while Churbanov and many others were sentenced to prison. During Andropov's rule more than 30% of party leaders were replaced in Moscow, 34% in Ukraine, and 32% in Kazakhstan.

The country followed with intense attention the information innovation that foreshadowed the future "glasnost". Every week, newspapers published a report in the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee. Relying primarily on D. F. Ustinov and A. A. Gromyko, Andropov "rejuvenated" the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee with new forces. G. A. Aliyev, who became the first deputy chairman of the government of the (SSR N. A. Tikhonov; V.I. Vorotnikov Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR since June 1983); M. S. Solomentsev (Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR until June 1983, Chairman of the Party Control Committee under the CPSU Central Committee since July 1983). V. M. Chebrikov (Chairman of the KGB) became a new candidate for the Politburo. N. I. Ryzhkov (head of the economic department of the Central Committee); Politburo member G. V. Romanov (first secretary of the Leningrad regional party committee, in charge of coordination of the military-industrial complex in the Politburo); Ye. K. Ligachev (head of the department of organizational work of the Central Committee).

V. Andropov's article "Karl Marx's Doctrine and Certain Questions of Socialist Construction in the USSR" (Kommunist. 1983. № 3) has caused a great stir in social science. The secretary general warned "against possible exaggerations in the understanding of the degree of the country's approach to the highest phase of communism". Recognizing the contradictions and difficulties of "developed socialism," Andropov's phrase "we do not know the society in which we live" was a necessary precondition for further self-knowledge and possible reforms of Soviet society. However, the "revival of communist fundamentalism" was short-lived. On February 9, 1984, Y.V. Andropov, who was suffering from an incurable kidney disease, died.

Some reestablishment of order, discipline, and other measures associated with his name had a tangible economic effect. According to official data, the 1983 economic growth was 4.2% (against 3.1% in 1982); national income increased by 11%; industrial production - by 4%; agricultural production - by 6%.

K.U. Chernenko

K.U. Chernenko, Brezhnev's old ally, succeeded Andropov as Secretary General of the Central Committee and Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. He was 73 years old at the time, and had a form of asthma. From 1948 to 1956 he worked in Moldova, there he fell into Brezhnev's "team" and followed him to the Central Committee, the Supreme Council; in 1965 he was appointed head of the General Department of the Central Committee, and in 1978 he became a member of the Politburo. Chernenko was considered the successor to his friend Brezhnev,

and after Andropov's death the older generation in the Politburo wanted him as Secretary General.

At the arrival of K. Y. Chernenko coming to power, immediately rejected Andropov's innovations. There were no new appointments to the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Central Committee under Chernenko, but Mikhail Gorbachev was promoted to the second place in the leadership instead of N.A. Tikhonov. The struggle for discipline was curtailed, the threads of corruption cases were severed at the middle management level. Representatives of the party and state elite were once again beyond suspicion. For a time, the most important thing was the discussion of the new CPSU program and the discussion of the "stage of development of society", which it was proposed to call not developed, but developing socialism. Chernenko believed that in this way the work was beginning to give "a powerful acceleration to the development of the national economy."

The milestone for Chernenko's period in power was the restoration of V. M. Molotov to the party by decision of the Politburo in June 1984. The pro-Stalinist mood of the old Politburo generation was clearly expressed by Ustinov, who proposed that Malenkov and Kaganovich be also restored to the party. In his words, "Not one enemy has brought as much trouble as Khrushchev brought us with his policy toward the past of our Party and state, and toward Stalin as well." Many people agreed with Ustinov, including "young" Gorbachev and Romanov. However, V. M. Chebrikin recalled the resolutions on the lists of repressed and the flood of letters of outrage to be expected in the event of reinstatement. It is not known how this issue would have

been resolved, as the "renaissance" of late "Brezhnevism" soon came to an end. On December 20, 1984, D.F. Ustinov died, and on March 10, 1985, K.U. Chernenko died.

The situation in the economy and the social sphere. The deteriorating situation in the national economy and the leaders' inability to change the situation determined a further decline in the rate of economic development in the late 1970s - first half of the 1980s. During the tenth Five-Year Plan (1976-1980) the national income increased by 21 %, industrial production by 24 %, agricultural production by 5 %. In the eleventh Five-Year Plan (1981-1985) the corresponding indices were 16.5%, 20% and 11 %. At the beginning of Gorbachev's presidency on the wave of "acceleration" it was planned to increase the national income in the twelfth five-year plan (1986-1990) by 20-22%, industrial output by 21-24%, agricultural output - by half again. The goal was to catch up with the United States in 2000, in terms of industrial production.

The average annual growth rate of national income, which, according to official data, was 5.7% in 1971-1975. In the Tenth Five-Year Plan period it fell to 4.3%, in the Eleventh - to 3.6%. The corresponding indices of the average annual growth of industrial output were 7.4%, 4.4% and 3.7%, and those for agriculture were 2.3%, 1.7% and 1.4%. Similarly, the indicators of the growth of social labor productivity were decreasing. The planned tasks of increasing the gross output of industry in the tenth five-year plan were fulfilled by 57%, in the eleventh - by 77%; the increase in agricultural production was even less - by 56% and 42%, respectively. The latter figures testify, among other things, to the low quality of

economic planning.

The objectives of the 11th Five-Year Plan approved at the 26th Congress of the CPSU (March 1981) were not fulfilled by any indicator. However, it should be noted that the growth rate of national income (newly created value in all sectors of material production) throughout the 1970s remained at the level of 4.9% of annual growth and even in the most "stagnant" five-year period (1981-1985) the annual growth rate was on the average 3.6% per year. Alternative data (economists V.V. Popov, N.P. Shmelev; 1990) show that in the 1980s national income grew annually by 2.1%, and in 1981-1985 by 0.6%. - By 0.6%, i.e., the indicators were not much lower than in most developed countries of the world.

A study by Academician Fedorenko (2001) found that national wealth increased by an average of 7.5 percent per year in the 1970s and 1980s, compared with 10.5 percent per year in the 1960s. On the whole, the Brezhnev, Andropov and Chernenko periods of Soviet rule (1964-1985) were characterized by an annual increase in national wealth of 6.5%, and only in the Gorbachev period did this figure drop to 4.2% per year.

The USSR had a powerful, diversified economy, supplied with almost all kinds of raw materials, scientists, engineers, and workers. The production potential was quite high and allowed conducting experiments on restructuring the economy in the right direction without radical changes in the lives of the peoples of the country. However, the Soviet leadership of the late "developed socialism" period was unable to cope with this task. "Of course, many people at the top were aware that the economy was not doing well". Attempts were also made

to find a way out of the situation.

In 1979 a group of analysts under the leadership of Academician V.A. Kirillin, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, prepared a report on the state and prospects of the Soviet economy. It contained a realistic picture of the plight of the Soviet economy: the country was beginning to lag hopelessly behind in the use of advanced technologies, and the growing problems could not be solved without radical, structural reforms of the economy. It should be noted that the Kirillin group's proposals, like all the earlier economic reform projects, were in one way or another related to the notions of the need to expand the role of elements of market relations in the socialist economy, and later with the need to replace the planned economy with a self-regulating market economy. Interestingly, China, which was beginning its transition from a planned economy to a market economy, was consistently guided by the following attitudes. In 1979 a planned economy is the main thing and market regulation is an additional factor; 1984: socialism is a planned commodity economy; 1989: planning and market should be of equal value; 1992: the goal is to create a socialist market economy system.

The difference in Chinese attitudes to the ratio of market and planned-state methods of economic regulation in the two countries is reflected in the fact that during the years of reforms China rose, according to our economists' calculations, from 5% of per capita income to 15%, while Russia fell from 30% to 15%.

The document prepared by Kirillin's group caused only irritation and dissatisfaction among most Politburo members. The head of the developers of the report was

removed from his job. On August 1, 1976, while kayaking alone, Kosygin suffered a circulatory disorder in the brain, after which his kayak overturned with him, and he nearly died. In the late 70's he suffered a myocardial infarction. Appointed during his illness as first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, N. A. Tikhonov, who had direct ties with Brezhnev, more and more acted as head of government, although he continued to work another first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers K. T. Mazurov. Frequent exacerbations of the disease weakened his health more and more, but Kosygin categorically rejected the proposed heart operation. In August 1980, Konstantin Chernenko called to Kosygin's hospital ward and offered to submit his resignation. On October 21, the Central Committee Resignation Commission relieved Kosygin of his duties on the basis of the resignation letter, in connection with the deterioration of his health. On December 18, 1981) he died of a heart attack. N. A. Tikhonov, appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers on October 23, 1980, was just as suspicious of the reforms as Brezhnev.

By the end of the 1970s, the "perfection" of economic management was replacing economic levers with administrative methods of management, which had already become customary. The Decree of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union of July 12, 1979. "On further improvement of the economic mechanism and tasks of the party and state bodies" emphasized further enhancement of the role of the state plan as "the most important tool of state policy". It was proposed to improve the system of planning indicators "so that they in every possible way encourage labor collectives to fight in increasing labor productivity,

the maximum use of fixed assets, for the economy of material resources."

The number of mandatory planning indicators was increased hundreds of times, their content was specified in the simultaneously adopted decree "On improvement of planning and strengthening the impact of the economic mechanism to improve production efficiency and quality of work". Simultaneously, the sectoral structure of economic management became more complex and differentiated. While in 1974 there were 44 central (all-union and union-republican) branch ministries and departments, by the beginning of the 1980s their number approached 100 (not counting almost 800 republican ones).

Attempts to intensify the economy by means of numerous programs of automation and complex mechanization which were administrative and bureaucratic in nature proved to be ineffective, because they did not affect wages and living standards. Nor were attempts to reanimate labor enthusiasm. Numerous labor beginnings, rotas, counter-commitments, and righyuta based on the no-defect method had little in common with the shock-work of the pre-war years and the labor enthusiasm of the first post-war five-year plan; they were often the "initiative" of the party organs, and not of the masses, and quickly died out. This, of course, does not exclude the fact that there were many wonderful, respected masters of their craft and honest toilers who served as role models in the labor collectives.

Since the late 1970s, the influence of a number of objective factors that hindered the development of the

economy by the usual extensive methods has been increasing. The demographic situation became more complicated. The decline in the birth rate in the 1960s (one of the consequences of the Patriotic War) led to a decrease in the inflow of labor resources. The relocation of the centers of the extractive industry to the eastern regions increased the cost of fuel and energy raw materials. Thus, between 1971 and 1980 the production of fuel in the USSR increased by more than 4 times, l-oil - by more than 8 times, and oil - almost 7 times. Oil and gas were the most important subjects of Soviet exports. The country received about \$16 billion annually from exports of oil and gas alone. The share of fuel and energy in total Soviet exports rose from 1.6% in 1970 to 54.4% in 1984. In 1960, almost all the oil and gas were produced in the European part of the USSR, in the mid-1980s, two-thirds of the total Soviet gas production and more than 60% of oil were produced in Western Siberia. It was becoming increasingly difficult to produce fuel in the northern parts of the country, and in 1984, for the first time during the Soviet period, annual oil production declined.

In 1965-1982. total foreign exchange earnings of the USSR from exports of non-fash and gas was about \$ 170 billion. Oil sales peaked in 1983 at \$91.1 billion. Falling coal and oil prices on the world market became the most important reason for the financial and budgetary fiscal crisis in the mid-1980s. The years of late "developed socialism" became known as the years of "stagnation" primarily because the Soviet leadership did little to restructure the economic mechanisms by absorbing the flows of petrodollars.

In December 1978, the first stage of the enormous

Volgodonsk Heavy Machine Building (Atom mash) plant was commissioned, which started in-line production of various types of nuclear reactors for nuclear power plants. Along with the work to complete this construction, costly, unpromising and environmentally unsound Astrakhan gas condensate plant, the Tengizpolymer gas chemical complex, and the Volga-Chogray canal in Kalmykia were under construction.

The village, which traditionally acted as a donor of extensive industrial development, over the years was increasingly difficult to play its former role despite increasing investment in the village, young people continued to leave for the city. From 1967 to 1985, an average of 700,000 people left the village each year. The average age of rural inhabitants increased steadily. The situation was especially difficult in the Non-Black Soil zone - a vast territory of Russia, covering 29 regions and autonomous republics. Implementation of the 1974 decree "On Measures for Further Development of Agriculture of the Non-Black Soil Zone of the RSFSR" allowed to build a number of large production complexes. An undoubted achievement was the completion of rural electrification. However, funds for the development of the social sphere and infrastructure were allocated much less. The rural life continued to be difficult. Production given to the state by collective farmers of the Non-Black Soil region in 1980 after the shaft of reforms, remained unprofitable. The loss for milk was 9%, for cattle - 13%, for pigs - 20%, for poultry - 11% This was the main reason for the decline of agriculture.

The course towards the enlargement of small settlements actually caused disinterest in the

development of each village because of the high costs of individual housing construction, roads, bridges, gas pipelines. As a result, the number of those "unpromising" settlements was constantly decreasing, the life in the villages distant from the central estates stopped. Schools, hospitals, stores, and household service enterprises were closed. According to the materials of the censuses of 1959 and 1989. The number of the rural population decreased by 10%, and by 42% in the Non-Black Soil Region. A special category of rural settlements with no able-bodied population emerged and showed an upward trend. In the abandoned villages remained mostly old men and old women. The writer Vasily Belov justifiably described the policy of liquidation of small villages as "a crime against the peasantry".

As a result of the reforms, by the end of 1985 there were 26,200 collective farms and 22.7 thousand state farms. They employed 12.7 and 12 million people, respectively, produced approximately equal amounts of agricultural products (73.9 and 75.2 billion rubles).

The search for a way out of the crisis in the village, undertaken in the late 1970s, was largely in the traditional vein. M.S. Gorbachev, who became in 1978 the new Secretary of the Central Committee on Agriculture, headed the development of the next project to improve the agrarian sphere. The project was called "The Food Program of the USSR up to 1990". The document was approved by the resolution of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on May 22, 1982. The gist of the program was the complex use of the whole arsenal of administrative and bureaucratic measures to solve the food problem in the country by 1990.

The program was based on the idea of agro-industrial integration - the establishment of production relations between collective farms, state farms, food industry enterprises, trade, construction and transport organizations. All food production was locked into a single state agro-industrial complex (LPC, Agroprom). At the regional level, the agro-industrial complex united all the enterprises associated with the production and processing of agricultural products, with the production of fertilizers, farm machinery, etc. Corresponding structures of agro-industrial associations (AOA) were created. The highest authority was the USSR Gosagroprom, which took the functions of five union ministries. By the mid 80s there were 4.8 thousand inter-farm enterprises in the agro-industrial economy. However, the agro-industrial integration did not bring the expected effect. Due to additional budget allocations in the eleventh five-year period it was possible to overcome the decline in production in agriculture and even provide some growth compared with the tsyaga. In general, the planned indicators have not been achieved.

Per capita food output did not increase in the country. The Soviet Union was forced to import more and more foodstuffs from abroad. In 1976-1980 imports accounted for 9.9% of the country's agricultural production; in 1980 - 18.1%; in 1981 - 28.4%.

In order to accelerate the development of agriculture in the southern regions of the country, in the early 1980s the USSR developed projects for transferring the clean flow of northern rivers to the south: Siberian rivers to Central Asia and European rivers to the Caspian Sea via the Volga. These projects were widely discussed in the government, finding some support in the southern

regions. Thanks to the harsh criticism of the public, especially Russian writers (V. Belov, Y. Bondarev, V. Rasputin, S. Zalygin) and scientists (academicians D. Likhachev, B. Rybakov, V. Yanin), the implementation of the environmentally dangerous project in 1986 was postponed, until the end of the century. The situation in the agricultural economy and the country as a whole is characterized by the example given in the book of N.P. Fedorenko (2001).

In the second half of the 1980s the USSR came out on the most advanced positions in the world in the production of low-quality machinery. Lagging behind the U.S. in grain production by 1.4 times, it was ahead of them in the production of tractors by 6.4 times; in grain harvesters - by 16 times. To produce as many combine harvesters as there were in our farms for repair in 1987, the American industry would have had to work for 70 years. It was an economy of planned absurdity, requiring an immediate and radical restructuring. The contradictions of the country's industrial modernization were also reflected in the social sphere. The social structure of Soviet society was becoming increasingly urban. The urban population rose from 164 million in 1979 to 180 million in 1985; the rural population decreased during those years from 99 million to 96 million.

The number of workers and employees in the national economy grew from 102 to 118.5 million from 1975 to 1985, the number of collective farmers decreased from 15 to 12.5 million people-urban residents accounted for nearly two-thirds, in some republics and regions - up to three-quarters of the population. However, its overall growth occurred mainly due to high birth rates in the

Central Asian republics. The natural increase of the population in 1980 was 0.49% in Russia, 0.14% to 0.61% in Belarus, Ukraine, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia; 0.8% to 2% in Kazakhstan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Moldova; and from 2% to 2.9% in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan.

Despite the official thesis about the strengthening of the social homogeneity of society, in fact the differentiation in the quality and standard of living of different strata of the population increased. The income of the upper stratum (nomenklatura), which constituted about 2% of the population, exceeded 20-25 times the income of the lower stratum. According to official data of March 1986, 4.8% of workers and employees in the USSR earned less than 80 rubles per month; 32.3% - 80-140; 29.5% - 140-200; 22.7% - 200-300; 9.5% - over 300 rubles. The worker in the USSR had less and less share of the value of the product created by him in the form of wages and salaries. In 1971 the share of wages and salaries in net production was 58%, and in 1985 - 36%. In the mid-1980s there were still more than 50 million people employed in unqualified manual labor.

Equalizing trends led to a decline in the prestige of skilled labor, shifting income above the official wage into the shadows. The layer of doctors, who helped the sick for extra pay, was growing; tutoring services and education were expanding; the housing stock belonging to citizens was becoming a commodity turnover. The shadow economy was also linked to criminal activity, the large scale theft of goods and raw materials, fraudulent accounting, the production at state enterprises and the subsequent sale of unaccounted products through the state-owned enterprises, the state trading network, and

currency transactions.

According to various estimates, 15 million people were employed in the shadow economy by the mid-1980s. Its volume in the early 80's was estimated at many billions of rubles. In cities this economy accounted for 45% of apartment repairs, 40% of cars and 30% of home appliances. In rural areas, the share was as high as 80 percent.

The country had indisputable success in education and science. And 1979 higher and secondary (complete and incomplete) education had 40.5% of the employed population, in 1989 - 92.1%. By the early 1980s, about 40% of urban residents had college degrees. In real life, this meant their inclusion in the category of the intelligentsia. The number of scientific institutions continued to grow (in 1985 there were 2607 research institutes) and the number of researchers (149 thousand). 5% of the national income was allocated to finance science. However, in the early 1980s, the USSR was falling behind the USA in space exploration, applied science and especially in computerization.

The positive shifts in the development of society were evidenced by a multiple increase in spending on culture; an increase in the circulation of books and periodicals; and the strengthening of the material base of the media. In the 1970s, the country entered the era of "television culture". However, on the whole, the share of state funds allocated for social and educational needs in the conditions of late "developed socialism" was decreasing. Under Brezhnev, the share for education in the state budget was lower than even before the war. This happened against the background of increased spending

on the maintenance of bureaucratic and managerial structures.

The 1960s and 1980s were a time of considerable improvement in the well-being of the people. Party Congresses demanded greater attention to the production of consumer goods and a radical shift in the quality and quantity of goods and services for the population. The course of increasing the money incomes of the population was implemented, the guaranteed wages of collective farmers were increased, the salaries of the low-paid strata of the population were brought up to the average-paid ones. This trend led to the fact that often specialists with high qualifications were disadvantaged in wages. Levels of wages of engineering and technical workers and workers were unreasonably close; in engineering and construction engineers received less than pieceworkers. If in the late 50s engineers and technicians received in general 70% more than workers, by the mid-80s the gap was only 10%, which reduced the prestige of the engineering profession and did not contribute to the development of scientific and technological progress.

Real incomes per capita in 1965-1975 grew by 46%, in 1976-1980 by another 18%, and in 1981-1985 by 10%.

Throughout the 1970s the country commissioned more than 100 million square meters of housing each year, which improved housing conditions for more than 107 million people; in the eleventh Five-Year Plan another 50 million people received new housing. In 1976-1980, 527.3 million square meters. m, in 1981 - 1985 - 552.2 million. m. Urban housing stock increased from 1867 million sq. m. in 1975 to 2,561 million in 1985.

Soviet people enjoyed free education, medical care, the state incurred large expenditures for the maintenance of the housing stock. Payments and benefits received by the population from public consumption funds in 1979 amounted to 4.9 billion rubles, and in 1985 - 9.3 billion. By the end of the 70's consumption of non-food products and provision of durable goods increased or was stable. In the early 1980s there were favorable shifts in the dietary structure of the population: the consumption of meat, vegetables, fruits, berries increased; the consumption of bread and potatoes decreased. The production of basic foodstuffs in kilocalories per capita in the USSR in 1976-1980 amounted to almost 3.5 million kilocalories (the highest figure in Russian history). In general, in the second half of the 1960s and first half of the 1980s the USSR maintained welfare at the level of average developed countries, and for some indicators even higher.

From the early 1970s, the country took the path of mass motorization of the population. Despite the fact that it was not in any comparison with its foreign counterparts, its consequences were significant. The family car broke many stereotypes of the "Soviet civilization" and contributed to the individualization of everyday life and leisure. Since the time of Khrushchev's "Novye Cheremushki", a separate apartment for the family as a counterbalance to kommunalkas and the growing acquisition of durable consumer goods: refrigerators, washing machines-radio and video equipment, furniture became the benchmark for the Soviet man's life.

In 1970, 32 out of every 100 families had TV sets; in 1980 this number doubled, and in 1985 it reached 90.

Sufficiently educated Soviet society, first of all engineers, doctors, teachers, workers of science, literature, art, received more and more information not only about their country, but also about real life abroad. And the possibility of comparison was often not in favor of "prosperity" under "developed socialism". With the deficit of many goods and services in the USSR, radio, television, video products, and Western-made goods that appeared in the country gave the impression that the society of "exploitation of man by man" and "decaying capitalism" did not know what deficit meant at all.

Opposition sentiments in society

The unfavorable tendencies of social development and the skeptical attitude of the population toward official propaganda led to the growing alienation of the masses from the creators of politics. Dissatisfaction with the national policy was constantly evident. Inter-ethnic protests occurred in almost all regions of the country. In Kazakhstan and Central Asia, the Baltics and Transcaucasia, the autonomies of Russia. The authorities considered dissidents to be their main enemies.

The complication of foreign policy conditions for the development of the USSR

The straightforwardness of the "gerontocrats" in pursuing a conservative foreign policy course was one of the reasons for a new aggravation of international tensions. The strategic offensive arms limitation agreement

between the USSR and the USA (START II), which set limits for the number of strategic bombers and multiple warheads, was valid from November 1, 1979. However, it did not become legally valid because the USA refused to consider limits for new types of arms, cruise missiles. On June 18, 1979 during the meeting of Leonid Brezhnev and President Carter in Vienna, the START II treaty was signed. It limited the number of nuclear weapons for the period up to 1985 to 2,400. However, the U.S. Congress did not ratify the treaty, and the U.S. administration complied with its conditions "voluntarily" until 1986.

In 1978, the U.S. launched a campaign to deploy neutron munitions in Western Europe. The idea of mass murders while preserving material values aroused the indignation of the European public. On April 7, 1978, the neutron project was suspended. But already on December 12, 1979, at the NATO session it was decided to deploy in Western Europe medium-range nuclear cruise missiles (Pershing II) and Tomahawk cruise missiles capable of reaching the Soviet Union in minutes.

The administration of the new U.S. president R. Reagan (1981-1988) was not at all disposed to seek compromise with the "communists". In June 1982, Reagan launched a new propaganda offensive against the USSR, proclaiming a "world democratic revolution" that would "sweep the Marxist-Leninist regimes to the dustbin of history, as it had already happened to other tyrannies who suppressed the freedom of peoples and their right to self-expression. In November 1982, Reagan's National Security Directive came out, proclaiming that the goal of U.S. policy was to undermine the raw

materials complex of the USSR.

Another directive, from January 1983, provided additional funding of \$108 million for the opposition movement in the Eastern bloc countries. According to one of its authors, R. Pipes, it clearly articulated that the American goal was "not coexistence with the USSR, but to change the Soviet system".

In 1983-1984 the new missiles were deployed in the territory of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. In turn, in 1984, in agreement with the governments of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, the Soviet Union deployed in these countries new intermediate-range RSD-20 (in the West these were referred to as "SS-20") missiles instead of the obsolete RSD-4 and RSD-5 nuclear missiles.

Thus, the European détente was broken, the arms race accelerated, and the world was once again approaching a dangerous line. The race was a heavy burden on the Soviet economy, exacerbating negative trends in its development. The pace of the race proved to be unbearable for the USSR. From the late 1970s, it gradually began to lag behind the United States in certain types of weapons. This became evident with the appearance of U.S. cruise missiles and became even more obvious after the publication in March 1983 of the US Strategic Missile Defense Treaty, in violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty.

Another "source of ruin" for the USSR was aid to developing countries. In the late 1970s the USSR was diplomatically linked with more than 130 countries, almost half of which were developing countries. Seeking

to expand its influence, the Soviet Union sent military and civilian experts to work in the "third world", allocated huge preferential long-term loans, and supplied cheap arms and raw materials. In 1955-1968, arms sales to "brotherly regimes" amounted to \$4.5 billion, in 1966-1975 - 9.2 billion, and in 1978-1982 they were already measured in the amount of \$35.4 billion. The USSR bore large expenses for education of numerous foreign students and graduate students. However, the effectiveness of the aid was low, and the loans were mostly not returned.

In the late 70's - early 80's the contradictions in relations between the Soviet Union and its allies in the Warsaw Treaty Organization increased. The desire to be free from trusteeship from the part of the Soviet Union, to achieve independence in conducting domestic and foreign policy.

The socio-economic and political crisis which broke out in Poland at the end of the 1970s became particularly acute. The expansion of economic aid, advice to S. Kane, first secretary of the Central Committee of the P U W P, and other Polish leaders were not successful. The crisis was escalating. In 1980, the workers' union "Solidarity" organized a series of large anti-government demonstrations, demanding economic and political reforms. The government was forced to take action. At a meeting with the leadership of our country in April 1981, S. Kania admitted that "the counter-revolution is stronger than the government". However, "fraternal aid to Poland according to the Czechoslovak version was ruled out, the "tokrat heroes" were afraid of the emergence of a "second Afghanistan". They welcomed with relief the resignation of S. Kani and the election of General W.

Jaruzelski as the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, who introduced martial law in the country on December 13. Leonid Brezhnev assured the Polish leader. that he could count on "our firm political and monetary support, as much economic aid as possible." The USSR supported Jaruzelski with 3 to 4 billion dollars a year, in the mid 80's this expenditure was reduced to 1-2 billion. "Solidarity" was banned, anti-government forces went underground, but the crisis could not be overcome, in 1989, the union leaders came to power. The defeat of socialism in Poland was the beginning of the collapse of the socialist system in Europe.

The crisis of the socialist system also manifested itself in the 1979 military clash between China and Vietnam, in which the Soviet Union supported Vietnam. In the late 1970s, China began economic reforms based on the principles of the New Economic Policy. Soviet leaders failed to benefit from this experience, seeing the reforms as the beginning of the restoration of capitalism in China.

The First Socialist War

On February 17, 1979, the Chinese Armed Forces attacked Vietnam along the entire border between the two countries. For exactly one month, the Chinese side was supported by 250,000 troops, while the Vietnamese side was confronted by Vietnamese troops of up to 100,000. On the Vietnamese side, these were border guard units, regional troops and militia.

The peculiarity of this conflict was that the battles were fought entirely on land. Neither the Navy nor combat aviation of either side took part in the conflict. The

month-long armed conflict went down as the "first socialist war. As a result, the world was still puzzled - why was this, at first glance, senseless war necessary? And what was the explanation for its abrupt termination by China?

The course of military operations

Around 4:30 a.m. on February 17, 1979, units of the People's Liberation Army of China (PLA) received orders to launch an offensive into the territory of Vietnam. After an artillery bombardment of the border areas, Chinese troops invaded Vietnam in several directions.

After two weeks of fighting, the advancing Chinese army units met with stubborn resistance from the Vietnamese border guards on the first line of defense, regional forces and people's militia units. They succeeded in advancing up to 45-50 kilometers into the interior of Vietnam on three main directions. It should be noted that by the time of the offensive on the territory of Vietnam the PRC has concentrated 44 divisions with a total number of 600 thousand soldiers on its borders. But directly on the territory of Vietnam there are 250 thousand Chinese soldiers.

At the beginning that number was enough - the Chinese were confronted by Vietnamese troops numbering 100 thousand people. The first line of defense, as has already been mentioned, was held by the insufficiently armed border guards and people's militia units. The actual units of the regular Vietnam People's Army (VPA) were in the second line of defense, protecting Hanoi and Haiphong.

After fierce battles, the Chinese managed to capture the

provincial centers of Laocai and Caobang. March 4, 1979. With heavy losses and after 17 attacks they captured the strategic town of Lang Son, 141 km away from Hanoi. But further attempts by Chinese troops to advance further by taking the offensive in the Lok Bin direction southwest of Lang Son were thwarted.

On March 5, Vietnam announced a general mobilization and speeded up the transfer of the VNA army corps from Cambodia to protect the capital and other strategic facilities. But China soon formally announced the end of a "limited military operation" and began an "orderly" withdrawal of its troops. It was completed by March 17, (although fighting continued until that last day). China stated that the military conflict was over because China had "taught Vietnam a good lesson.

Underestimating enemy combat experience

Among the whole range of reasons that contributed to the cessation of hostilities and withdrawal of Chinese troops from the territory of Vietnam the author mentioned that the PLA underestimated the combat effectiveness of Vietnam's border guard units and militia and seriously miscalculated the preparation and conduct of offensive operations with heavy weapons. As a result, the Chinese leadership quickly realized the risk of being drawn into a large-scale protracted war with the main regular units of the PLA, which had gained combat experience during the recently ended war with the Americans and South Vietnamese forces.

A considerable influence on China's decision to halt the offensive and withdraw its troops had been made at that time by the position of the Soviet Union and the United

States, which at that moment were in an active dialogue aimed at settling the unsolved problems of the Soviet-American relations. Just in the days of the conflict, the Soviet and U.S. delegations were meeting in Geneva for another round of talks on limiting strategic offensive arms.

Immediately after the Chinese invasion, the Soviet Union declared its support for the Vietnamese people and its readiness to fulfill its treaty obligations.

"The heroic Vietnamese people, the victim of a new aggression, are capable of standing up for themselves this time too, especially since they have reliable friends. The Soviet Union will fulfill the obligations assumed under the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and SRV. The Soviet Union firmly demands cessation of aggression and immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from SRV territory", the Pravda newspaper wrote on February 19, 1979.

If one of the parties is attacked

The Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and SRV, signed in Moscow on November 3, 1978, provided for "in the event of either party being the object of attack or threat of attack, to immediately begin mutual consultations with a view to eliminating such threat and taking effective measures to ensure peace and security of both States".

China associated its decision to send its 120,000 "limited military contingent" to Cambodia on December 25, 1978. This Vietnamese/Russian treaty helped to overthrow the "Khmer Rouge" regime supported by Beijing, Pol Pot-

Yeng Sary, and to establish the People's Republic of Cambodia (PRC) in January 1979.

On March 2, 1979, the Soviet government issued a new statement - "At this time, when the Chinese policy of expanding aggression is becoming increasingly obvious, the Soviet Union believes it necessary to state with certainty: the actions of China cannot leave indifferent those who are truly interested in ensuring the safety of peoples and preserving peace. Chinese troops must be withdrawn immediately from the borders of Vietnam, the military demonstration on the borders of Laos and preparations for an invasion of that country must cease. The Chinese aggressors must know that the more crimes they commit, the more severely they will be punished.

Condemnation of Chinese aggression in the statements of the Soviet government was also backed up by concrete steps. With the beginning of the armed conflict the missile units and divisions of the Soviet Army, standing on the border with China, were put on full alert. Motorized infantry units with aviation support numbering 250,000 men began to concentrate along the Manchurian border.

Shortly before the conflict began, a large naval group was concentrated in the area of the South and East China Seas to form a cordon barrier in front of the entrance to the Bakbo Bay (Tonkin Gulf). In the period from 12 to 26 March 1979, to put military pressure on China, the Soviet Union held large-scale military and naval exercises in the east of the country, in Mongolia and the Pacific Fleet, which involved more than 200,000 troops, about 900 aircraft and 80 ships.

A group of 20 Soviet military advisers and specialists in the main types of troops, headed by Army General G.I. Obaturov was sent to Vietnam. At the head of the task force Obaturov quickly reached the war zone and, according to witnesses to the events, played an important role in the decisions of the Vietnamese military command and the political leadership to conduct field operations to stop the Chinese offensive in the border area and causing them significant losses.

Soviet air transport pilots on An-12 began rapid transfer of the VNA army corps from Cambodia to the Lang Son area. An anti-aircraft missile division formed on the basis of Soviet supplies was also moved there.

Consultations with the United States

Making the decision to halt the military operation, China also took into account the position of Washington where Deng Xiaoping had visited on the eve of the PLA offensive. Throughout the conflict, the U.S., fearful of being drawn into a conflict with the USSR because of China, limited its call in a speech by President Jimmy Carter to "exercise restraint and seek to prevent a broader war."

The political and military goals set by the initiators of the "limited military operation" were only partially achieved. Although Deng Xiaoping announced that "China is going to teach Vietnam a lesson". Chinese strategists planned to destroy the main regular army units of the PLA, figuratively speaking, by luring them out of Cambodia. That was the solution to seriously weaken the military pressure of Vietnam on the armed units of

the Khmer Rouge - the Pol Pot.

Nor did it succeed in inflicting serious economic damage - to undermine the economy and defense capabilities of Vietnam. In a short time, with the help of the USSR and other socialist countries, the destroyed enterprises were restored.

Over the period of combat operations, PLA losses far exceeded expected projections. In spite of its overwhelming numerical superiority over Vietnamese units, especially in tanks and ACP, PLA losses, according to the PLA General Staff, totaled 62,500 men. However, Chinese sources modestly referred to losses ranging from 6,900 to 18,000.

Three regiments and 18 battalions were completely defeated, and 550 military vehicles were destroyed. It is interesting that only 67 out of 280 T-59 tanks lost by China in Vietnam were burnt. And 213 tanks were captured and put into service of the PLA! As well as 118 guns and mortars.

Vietnam's casualties, including civilian casualties, are estimated at 30,000 people. The economy of the northern provinces of Vietnam was severely damaged. During the warfare, more than 45,000 farmhouses, 900 schools, 428 hospitals, 25 mines and 55 industrial plants were destroyed. At the same time, the Chinese in the captured areas and cities of Vietnam took out everything. And what they could not take away - they destroyed.

What was the reason?

Military historians are still unable to name with complete certainty all the causes of the rapid war. They are

connected with the introduction of Vietnamese troops into Kampuchea, the eventual crushing defeat of the Khmer Rouge regime and Deng Xiaoping's desire to test the military might and resolve of the USSR - the closest ally of Vietnam at the time. By the way - at the time, relations between the USSR and China were still quite tense. Only 10 years had passed by then after the events on Damansky Island on the Ussuri River.

And also, China was laying claims to Vietnam in relation to the Chinese diaspora. After the end of the war with the United States, by the end of 1978, almost the entire Chinese diaspora living in northern and southern Vietnam had been expelled from Vietnam. In all, some 300,000 ethnic Chinese were expelled from the country.

And, as is usually the case in conflicts of this kind, the Chinese leadership held the Vietnamese side responsible for the constant border conflicts, shelling of territory and attacks on Chinese civilians.

Preparations for the invasion of Vietnam had been underway since late 1978. On February 14, 1979, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China issued a decree to start the war.

End of the conflict

On March 5, 1979, when Vietnam announced it was mobilizing in the country, China suddenly offered the Vietnamese government to negotiate an end to hostilities, hoping to resolve the conflict on its own terms. But the Vietnamese leadership flatly refused to do so and continued mobilization. That is when Deng Xiaoping announced the withdrawal of Chinese troops

from Vietnam.

The war ended on March 17, lasting exactly one month. The fighting continued until the very last day.

Thereafter, minor skirmishes and firing continued on the border between the two countries. Gradual normalization of relations began to occur in the 1990's after numerous negotiations. Economic interests outweighed centuries of mutual animosity.

Today, the Chinese are among the most of mass tourists in Vietnam. At the same time, it would be a great luxury for the Vietnamese tourism industry to refuse them - the Chinese are not stingy on spending and bring in a substantial income. The volume of mutual trade is growing.

The military conflict has gone into History.

Foreign Policy Failures and technological boycotts

The weakening foreign policy failures of the USSR, and especially its involvement in the Afghan war, were the causes of its declining authority and growing isolation in the international arena. The leading capitalist countries declared a scientific and technological boycott of the Soviet Union and its allies. The Coordinating Committee on Export Control (COCOM, established at the U.S. initiative in 1949) imposed a ban on imports of a wide range of science-intensive products and technologies to the USSR. As a consequence of an extensive anti-Soviet campaign deployed in the West, the U.S. Senate refused to ratify the treaty on further limiting the nuclear arms

race (START II) signed with the Soviet Union in 1979, boycotted the XXII Olympic Games in Moscow and was responded by boycotting the XXIII Olympic Games in the United States in 1984. (The boycott was initiated by Czechoslovakia to protest the deployment of American missiles in Europe and the military presence in Nicaragua.) The anti-Soviet campaign was particularly intensified by the shooting down of a South Korean Boeing over Sakhalin, mistaken for an American reconnaissance plane, and the death of 269 passengers on the night of September 1, 1983. The tone of the campaign was set by U.S. President Reagan, who called the Soviet Union an "evil empire" and intoxicated the start of work on the SOI program, also called the "Star Wars" program.

Calls for the destruction of the "Soviet empire" in the U.S. were heard with particular force every year during the third week of July, marked as Enslaved Nations Week in the Soviet Union. A resolution on them was adopted by the U.S. Congress in July 1959. It asserted that "since 1918, the imperialist aggressive policy of Russian communism has led to the creation of a vast empire which poses an ominous threat to the security of the United States and the free peoples of the world." The resolution demanded the liberation and restoration of independence of a number of countries and peoples, including Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, Ukraine, Czechoslovakia, Latvia, Estonia, Belarus, Romania, East Germany, Bulgaria, Continental-China, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, North Korea, Albania, Idel-Ural, Tibet, Kozakia, Turkestan, North Vietnam, etc. It was decided to observe the third week of July annually in the United States as the week of enslaved nations until "freedom and independence have been achieved for all

the captive nations of the world."

The inappropriateness of identifying the USSR with the empire contradicts the data of historical science. It is well known that the systemic feature of an empire is the presence of a metropolis and colonies - a political-military system which puts the oppressed peoples of the colonies in a dependent position on the privileged nation of the metropolis.

This was the case in the Roman, Ottoman, Austro-Hungarian, British, French, and other colonial empires. The Russian nation, which bore the brunt of the "brotherly aid" to other nations in Soviet times, had nothing in common with imperial nations. In this sense, the Soviet Union was more like an anti-imperial empire. The strict centralization of the management of the state and the economy, the repression of some nations, the intolerance of "nationalism" that existed were not manifestations of the imperial, but of the dictatorial nature of the Soviet state. Here, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the party was presented as a historically productive "democracy of the highest type".

Afghan War

The Politburo's decision to support the revolutionary movement in Afghanistan, which in practice had come to power as a result of the April 1978 revolution and declared its commitment to Marxism and socialism, proved particularly negative in its consequences. Seeing Afghanistan as a "second Mongolia," jumping from feudalism to socialism, the Soviet leaders decided not to miss the opportunity to expand the socialist

commonwealth. Assistance was provided to the government of Noor Muhammad Taraki, since September 1979 to the government of Hafizullah Amin, who had overthrown Taraki. At his request, on December 25 1979, Soviet troops entered Afghanistan. On December 27, with the help of Soviet "special forces", a coup was staged in Kabul; another PDPA leader, Babrak Karmal, came to power. On the latter's side, Soviet troops were drawn into the civil war. After Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, the U.S. announced trade sanctions against the USSR, and NATO countries announced a boycott of the upcoming Olympic Games in Moscow in 1980.

The "international aid" to the Afghan people stretched for 10 years and resulted in an annual cost to the USSR of 3-4 billion dollars over 14.5 thousand dead Soviet soldiers. In those years, 620,000 Soviet soldiers passed through Afghanistan. 35,000 of them returned home injured, and more than 100,000 were sick with hepatitis. Withdrawal of Soviet troops in February 1989 did not stop the civil war. After the collapse of the USSR, there was a danger that it spread to Tajikistan and other former Soviet republics. The complication of foreign policy conditions and unfavorable situation in the world economic market for the USSR accelerated the crisis phenomena in the country.

§ 3. Culture, Official Ideology, and Dissent

There were contradictions of social life and culture, in that the conditions of scientific and technical progress in the USSR and the special significance given to public education and the whole system of training of qualified

personnel. In the 1970s the transition to universal secondary education was made; every year up to ten new high schools were opened in the country; the number of students in them reached almost 5 million people by 1977.

In terms of the number of specialists with higher education, our country was one of the leaders in the world. Soviet scientists were at the forefront in many areas of mathematics, physics, and natural sciences. The USSR carried out many launches of manned spaceships, 24 flights of automatic interplanetary stations for the exploration of the Moon and outer space in 1959-1976, in 1970 the world's first automatic lunar station - "Lunokhod-1" was delivered to the Moon. At the same time in the humanities there was felt the harsh ideological pressure that led to the stagnation of social thought.

The conservative political course established in the country after October 1964 was accompanied by a rollback of Khrushchev's democratic undertakings. Initially, this was explained by the need to overcome Khrushchev's voluntarism and subjectivism. Later, the ideological struggle between the socialist and capitalist systems and the need to struggle against the Western "agents of influence" were the main points of contention. The cultural policy of the Brezhnev leadership also set the principle of the fight against "denigration" and "varnishing" of reality in artistic works, with the "falsification of history", which was understood to be a sweeping criticism of Stalinism.

Objective opposition to the Brezhnev leadership in the cultural sphere was represented by all-Russian

organizations and movements expressing Russia's national interests. One of such centers of Russian national forces was the *All-Russian Society for the Protection of Monuments of History and Culture (VOOPIK)*, founded in 1966. The necessity of its creation was mentioned by the well-known archaeologist and architect N.N. Voronin, the sculptor S. T. Konenkov, the literary critic V. A. Kolesnikov in 1961, and Д. S. Likhachev.

The spiritual leaders of the movement were remarkable patriots: archaeologist and historian B. A. Rybakov; physicochemist, I.V. Petrianov-Sokolov (author of inventions used by the whole world, in particular the Petrianov filter, the basis of modern respirators); artists P. D. Korin, I. S. Glazunov; writers L. M. Leonov, V. A. Soloukhin, V. D. Ivanov; head of the Moscow Kremlin Museums V. N. Ivanov (the first actual chairman of the central council of the society). Architect-restorer P. D. Baranovsky in collaboration with his colleagues of the Russian patriotic club of historical and cultural monuments "Motherland" (1962-1968). L. I. Antropov, G. I. Gunkin and V. A. Desyatnikov, conducted all the preparatory and organizational work for the creation of this society, in 1966.

In 1968-1969, on the basis of the Section for the Integrated Study of Russian History and Culture, the "Russian Club", a tacit association of Russian intellectuals, operated within the Society. For the first time in many years it began to discuss burning questions of formation of Russian culture and spirituality.

Among the national values, the names and legacy of prominent Russian figures and thinkers: N. Ya.

Danilevsky (1822-1885), M. N. Katkov (1818-1887), John of Kronstadt (1829-1908), Konstantin Leontiev (1831-1891), Konstantin Pobedonostsev (1827-1907), Sergii Radonezhsky (1314-1392), Vladimir Rozanov (1856-1919), Serafim Sarovsky (1753-1833), and others. The club was headed by a writer, an expert on Yugoslavia, D.A. Zhukov; historian, director of the series "Lives of remarkable people" in the publishing house "Young Guard", SN Semanov; literary critic PV Palievsky.

Meetings of the club were held at the High-Petrovsky Monastery in Moscow. "Organizationally," wrote the novelist A. I. Baigushev, one of the club members, "we adopted the church structure. The monastery, Petrovka, 28, was our purgatory". It was like an open temple, and people could freely come in here, any day, any hour, for any event, any creative evening, Russian laymen.

Here we looked for new faces, selected whom we wanted to attract with what interests. The regular and proven fell under the unspoken status of the voiceless. Of the acolytes, the best were admitted to the faithful and were able to attend our "Russian Tuesdays," where the main work of spiritual construction took place. Here, one by one, each of the most active members of the "Russian Club" would present a report on a Russian theme of his own choosing. The spiritual banners of our "Russian Club" were at once silent (isikhasm) and noble "vizam-tism"; and Valentin Dmitrievich Ivanov, the famous historical writer and author of "Rus' primordial" and "Rus' great", became a priest in the very first steps of the "BeLikorussian monastery". After many years of persecution and harassment, he gave himself to the club with particular fervor, finding here the noblest,

breathlessly listening audience. And the same could be said of Oleg Vasilievich Volkov, a publicist and nobleman of the highest blood, unbroken by years of the Gulag, who suddenly saw with joy that Russia was still alive and that there was a young healthy generation in whom the Orthodox Russian spirit had not been killed by Masonic internationalism.

Members of the "Russian Club" eventually became widely known not only among specialists P. G. Palamarchuk, literary critic and historian, author of the classic work "Forty Forty" about Moscow Orthodox churches; O. N. Mikhailov, literary scholar and author of historical novels; V. V. Kozhinov, literary scholar, literary critic and historian; A. P. Lanshikov, journalist and literary scholar; A. M. Ivanov (Skuratov), author of samizdat articles; Boris Karpov, film director; S.I. Sheshukov, historian of the Rappov movement in literature. Active members of the club were writers A. I. Baigushev, V. A. Chivilikhin; poets I. I. Kobzev, S. Yu. Kuniaev, G. V. Serebryakov, B. V. Sorokin (chief editor of the Sovremennik Publishing House); critics and literary critics V. A. Chalmaev, Y. L. Prokushev; journalists V. D. Zakhar-Cheiko (editor-in-chief of Tehnika-Young), A. V. Nikonov (editor-in-chief of Molodaya Gvardiya), E. I. Osetrov (literary scholar, editor-in-chief of Almanakh Bibliophile); translator C. G. Kotenko; artist I. S. Glazunov; architects-restorers V. A. Vinogradov, O. I. Zhurin; art historian M. P. Kudriavtsev.

A notable milestone in the revival of national self-consciousness was the conference "Thousand-Year Roots of Russian Culture" organized by the Novgorod All-Russian Society of Culture. At the conference (May 1968) dozens of prominent people of Russian culture

spoke. In 1969, members of the "Russian Club" took part in discussions of the place and role of the Slavophiles in history in the journal "Questions of Literature". In the journal, A. M. Ivanov (Skuratov) and V. V. Kozhinov rehabilitated the Slavophiles, who had been branded as extreme reactionaries in Soviet historiography before. V. V. Kozhinov.

"The main trait the Slavophiles valued in the Russian people would not be humility at all, but a communal spirit, as we would put it now, a sense of collectivism, opposed to the individualism and egoism of the bourgeois West" - this provision of Ivanov's article corrected the earlier negative assessments of Slavophilism.

Some scholars believe it is possible to characterize the formation of the VOOPK as a "Russian Party". In the opinion of N. A. Kutsenko, its organizational form can be dated back to 1966. B. O.V. Volkov, P.V. Pali-O. Volkov, P. Palinikov, V. V. Kozhinov, A. P. Lanshchikov, S. N. Semanov, D. A. Zhukov, I. V. Petrianov-Sokolov, and M. N. Lyubomudrov. The Russian Party in the USSR in the years 1966 -1980. reviving a long tradition of patriotism, was on the verge of growing into a broad national movement. However, the because of society's purge of nationally-minded figures, this did not happen.

From the second half of the 1960s, ideological control over the mass media and cultural institutions was considerably strengthened. This was based on the resolution of the CPSU Central Committee "On Increasing the Responsibility of the Heads of the Press, Radio, Television, Cinematography, Cultural and Art

Institutions for the Ideological and Political Level of the Published Materials and Repertoire" issued in January 1969. Censorship often prohibited the publication of artistic and journalistic works, films, and art exhibitions. Priority was given to historical revolutionary, military-patriotic, and production themes.

The pluralism of the literary and socio-political process was reflected in the tendencies indicated by the activity of several magazines. The liberals had their own magazine, the New World; the Stalinists had October and Ogonyok; the Neo-Pentecentists had Molodaya Gvardiya and Nash Zavremennik. In 1970, in an effort to prevent their radicalization, the authorities attacked both the liberals and the Russophiles.

In February 1970, at a meeting of the secretariat of the Union of Writers, the editorial board of Novyi Mir was severely criticized. The reason was the publication abroad of A. T. Tvardovsky's poem "By the Right to Memory". Attempts by the literary community to defend the editor-in-chief led to nothing. Tvardovsky resigned from his post, and in the XXth to XXIIth Party Congresses the line that magazine pursued was cut short. However, the ideology of neo-Stalinism and "stagnation" were objectively opposed by the "redneck" writers: F. A. Abramov, V. I. Belov, B. A. Mozhayev, V. G. Rasputin, V. F. Tendryakov, who showed in their works the negative consequences of collectivization on the fate of the Russian village. This line was also pursued by Nash Sovremennik (S. V. Vikulov, editor-in-chief in 1968-1989) and Moskva magazine of Russian culture (M. N. Alekseev, editor-in-chief in 1968-1990).

On November 5, 1970 a meeting of the Secretariat of the

Central Committee of the Party was held. Secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee B. N. Pastukhov was invited to it. The editor of Young Guard, former fighter pilot A. V. Nikonov, was removed from his post for publishing articles by Chalmayev and Semanov. The formal reason for the dismissal was the appeal of a group of prominent writers (Ch. Aitmatov, V. I. Amlinsky, V. D. Tsybin and others). In addition, in 1970 the magazine was criticized for publishing the "anti-Soviet" novel Bull Hour, by I. A. Efremov. Instead of Nikonov, F. Ovcharenko, instructor of the Central Committee, was appointed editor of the magazine. After his death in 1972, the post was given to A. S. Ivanov, the author of the famous novel Shadows Fade at Noon (1963) and the trilogy Vechatnikov Vechernya (1963). (1963) and the trilogy Eternal Call (1970-1976).

The editors of Oktyabr, who were in charge of the acclaimed Alexander Pushkin until 1973, also faced opposition from the authorities and liberal critics M.K Kochetov, until 1973. The public was long agitated by the editor-in-chief's novels Angle of Falling (1967), What Do You Want (1969) and the unfinished novel Lightning Strikes the Peaks (1979), published after his death. Equally ambiguous were the novels of I. M. Shevtsov "Love and Hate" (1969), "In the name of the father and son" (1970) and later published "The strike" (1979). The novels that portrayed liberal Soviet intellectuals as imperialist agents, despite their fundamentally anti-liberal cultural and political course, were considered inappropriate by the authorities as too explicit. The novel What Do You Want was full of rejection of the revelations of the past made at party congresses and a deep conviction of the harmfulness of Western influence on the country. It was directed not only against the liberal

intelligentsia, but also against the "Slavophile nationalists". Shevtsov's novels depicted the activities of Western secret services and the Zionist underground in our country. Under the transparent masks of the characters, informed readers could easily guess the well-known people in the country - M.A. Suslov and his wife, I.G. Ehrenburg, A.I. Adjubey.

The press rarely talked about Shevtsov, but in general his works were criticized as "ideologically erroneous" and distorting the political and cultural life of the country. Especially sharply un-MIMIO and mockery of the novels were exposed in the liberal Samizdat press. The functionaries of the Agitprop of the CPSU Central Committee tried to prevent the publication of Shevtsov's novels, and when that failed, they supported a campaign to condemn them. The publication of an article by A.I. Kobzev in Sovetskaya Rossiya newspaper in support of Shevtsov's novels; caused the dismissal, on instructions from Suslov and Yakovlev, of the newspaper's gentle editor and his deputy, as well as that of A. N. Dmitriuk, a Central Committee executive who held a patriotic orientation.

The publication of I. Shevtsov's novel "Ha Ni" also ended in repression. It is critical of the Jewish underground and its patrons in the Central Committee of the Party. The novel features Miron Andreyevich Serov, referred to as "a major statesman" (coding the name of M. Suslov). Then his wife (with the name of Suslov's wife), the director of the Ch-Schinsky institution, who patronized the "Zionists", appeared in the pmnemonic. ('strong Suslov's wife headed a dental institute for many years.) V. Sorokin, editor-in-chief of the publishing house, who had published the iman, was dismissed from his job and

a campaign was unleashed against him; for a time, the publication of books by Russian-Mix. authors were actually banned. However, despite the strict censorship, from time to time works reflecting the search and movement of Russian thought appeared. Nesterov's book "The Link of Times" is filled with the spirit of cryioticism.

1978 - 1980, which became, according to Metropolitan John of St. Petersburg and Ladoga, a kind of Nalmonal-Bolshevik manifesto aimed at emphasizing the national-historical characteristics of Russia, fighting Russophobia and debunking nihilistic concepts of Russian history.

Around I.M. Shevtsov formed a kind of alliance of like-minded people, united by common spiritual aspirations. Outwardly, this manifested itself in the fact that since 1964 in the vicinity of the Trinity-Sergius Lavra in Radonezh, primarily near the station Semkhoz, began to settle Russian writers-patriots: A. Ivanov, S. Kuniaev, V. Firsov, I. Kobzev, G. Serebryakov, F. Chuyev, V. Sorokin, I. Akulov, N. Kambilov, S. Vysotsky, B. Orlov, V. Chalmayev, V. Sugaev, etc. The BBC reported in one of its radio broadcasts: "The Black Hundred Shevtsov created an anti-Peredelkino near Zagorsk in the village of Semkhoz."

On November 8, 1971, the secretariat of the RSFSR Writers' Union at its meeting criticized the editorial board of Oktyabr magazine for "false and confusing" social and political statements of magazine publications. The resolution noted: the secretariat had already repeatedly pointed out the "unfavorable situation" in the editorial board, which prevented "the creation of a normal atmosphere in literary circles," and demanded personnel

changes in the magazine's management. With the appointment of A. A. Ananyev as editor-in-chief in 1973, October returned to a relatively liberal line.

Curators of Soviet writers from the Central Committee of the Party and literary critics who expressed their sentiments in the 1960s and 1970s tried to prevent the transfer of the center of literary life from Novyi Mir and Oktyabr to the magazine and publishing house Molodaya Gvardiya, later to the magazines Nash Sovremennik and Moskva and the Sovremennik publishing house. However, it was not possible to do so.

Revelations and shocks for many Russian people were "Letters from the Russian Museum" and "Black Planks" by Vladimir Soloukhin; "Farewell to Mother" by Rasputin; "Habitual Business" by Belov; "Matrenin Yard" by Solzhenitsyn; "Brawlers" by Mikhail Alekseev; "Muzhiki i baba" by Boris Mozhaev; historical novels about Russia's great past by Dmitry Balashov, Vladimir Chivilikhin, Valentin Pikul; artistic biographies of Suvorov, Makarov, Dostoevsky, Goncharov, Aksakov, Derzhavin, published in the ZhZL series. All this aroused great interest in society and caused special measures by the CPSU Central Committee and the KGB.

The efforts to reverse the literary process and stop the "Russification" of public consciousness were dictated by the article "Against Anti-Historicism" in the "Literaturnaya Gazeta" of November 13, 1972. It was prepared by a group of instructors of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee and published under the signature of Doctor of History A. N. Yakovlev, who held the post of deputy head of department at that time. He was one of the active opponents of the movement to

preserve the Russian cultural heritage and the creation of the All-Russian Society for the Protection of Monuments of History and Culture. According to the testimony of I. A. Desyatnikov, when discussing the establishment of the VOOPK with officials of the Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee for the RSFSR, Yakovlev resented his report on the plight of monuments in Russia, shouting out: "What does he say, he should be kicked out of the CPSU Central Committee!"

The article "Against Anti-Historicism" spoke with hatred of all Russians. According to Yakovlev, the Russian man (according to the text of the article: a good peasant) stands "against humanity and freedom". The destruction of his way of life was fully approved: "And the fact that his life, his way of life was destroyed along with the sacred things dear to his heart in the revolutionary years, so it was not from malice and ignorance, but quite consciously" ... "It was necessary to destroy the 'good man'. Attacking the Russian writers and critics M. Lobanov, V. Petelin, V. Chalmayev, V. Yakovlev, in unison with the authors of the projects of resettlement of "unpromising" villages, declared: "Today's zealots of patriprkhalydin, admiring the illusory world created by themselves, defend the past in the life of the peasantry, which the modern collective farmer has parted with without any regret.

The article and the accusations in it were so clumsily worded that they in essence challenged the entire Russian intelligentsia. A large and influential group of Russian writers, supported by M. A. Sholokhov. Their letter was sent to the leadership of the UK CPSU. The cautious Brezhnev did not like the article either. After reading it, he irritably declared: This man wants to

quarrel with the Russian intelligentsia. As a result, Yakovlev was sent as ambassador to Canada.

At the turn of the 70-80s, the mass media was purged of "Russian elements". The directors and editors-in-chief of publishing houses, magazines, and *ter* Moskovsky Rabochiy (N. Esilev), *Molodaya Gvardiya* (A. V. Nikonov), *Komsomolskaya Pravda* (V. N. Ganichev), "Man and Law" (S. N. Semanov), "Contemporary" (Y. L. Prokushev, V. V. Sorokin), "Our Contemporary" (Yu. Seleznev), "Volga" (N. E. Palkin), "Tehnika - youth" (D. V. D. Zakharchenko). Censorship, the agitprop of the CPSU Central Committee, and the KGB saw then, as in the 20s-30s, the main danger in manifestations of Russian chauvinism and through the liberal-democratic *Novy Mir*, *Znamya*, and *October*, branded these "manifestations" in every way.

In this respect, the reaction of the party leadership to the letter of M. A. Sholokhov, addressed in 1978 to Leonid Brezhnev. The great writer found the courage to draw the attention of the general government to the unacceptability of a situation in which anti-Russian ideas that denigrate our history and culture and oppose the Russian to the socialist are rammed through cinema, television, and the press.

"Until now, many topics devoted to our national past remain taboo," Sholokhov wrote. - It is extremely difficult, and often impossible, to arrange an exhibition of a Russian patriotic artist working in the traditions of the Russian realist school. Despite governmental decrees, the destruction of Russian architectural monuments continues. The writer believed that in the light of the facts and arguments cited in his message, "it becomes

obvious the need to raise once again the question of a more active protection of Russian national culture from anti-patriotic, anti-socialist forces, the proper coverage of its history in print, film and television, disclosure of its progressive character, the historical role in the creation, consolidation and development of the Russian state.

On March 14, 1978, Leonid Brezhnev put a resolution on the letter: "To the Secretariat of the Central Committee. I request you to review it and then it will be considered by the PB". However, the "internationalists" of the Politburo ignored this acute problem, regarding it not as a "deviation", as in the well-known times, but as "an ideological and political mistake". The main thing in the decision was not to allow a broad discussion of the problem, put forward by the writer. The resolution was secret. It read: "To make clear to Mr. Sholokhov the real state of affairs in the development of culture in the country and in the Russian Federation and the necessity for a more thorough and more precise approach to the questions he has raised in the supreme interests of the Russian and the Soviet people. Do not openly discuss the question he raised about Russian culture."

The Russophobia of the ruling regime is expressed in a "winged phrase" by Yu.V. Andropov: "The main concern for us is Russian nationalism; dissidents later - we will take them overnight. In his memo to the Party Central Committee in 1981, Andropov qualified "Russism" as a "nationalism". The party leadership was led to believe that "Russism" was a dangerous tendency among the intelligentsia that advocated the protection of Russian national traditions. The Party leadership was led to believe that "the demagoguery about the need to fight for the preservation of Russian culture, monuments of the

past, and for the salvation of the Russian nation is a cover for the activities of the open enemies of the Soviet system". According to the logic of this note, these enemies include many excellent Russian writers who raise questions about: the eternal values of Russia; the spiritual nature of the Russian person; the need to honor Orthodoxy; and the great achievements of the ancestors. Among the writers whose work has become a true decoration of Russian literature, in addition to the classics Leonov and Sholokhov, stand out: The powerful, stern, epic Fyodor Abramov. Sublime and poetic Vasily Belov. Poignant, pinching Viktor Astafyev. Dramatic Valentin Rasputin. Soft, lyrical Yevgeny Nosov. Sergey Zalygin - subtle and clever. The brilliant essayist Vladimir Soloukhin". Nikolai Rubtsov, whose poetry "we must cherish sacredly! he is the only one. There is no other!" (Sviridov G. V. Music as Destiny. M., 2002).

Contrary to the official ideological line and with a certain bias toward liberalism in the period under review were conducted by directors M. Zakharov, O. Efremov, G. Tovstonogov and other cultural figures who offered their own view of the meaning of life and the role of the intellectual in it. Ideological confrontation in literature and artistic life in the 60-80s was manifested in other forms, in particular - in the dissident movements of conservative and protective and liberal-destructive properties.

Dissident movements

Ideological and organizational opposition to the government in the conditions of "developed socialism" consisted of ideologically diverse dissident movements.

The majority of them revealed their ideological kinship with the Slavophiles, Westerners and socialists known since the middle of the 19th century. Taking into account the realities of the second half of the 20th century, these were the Russophile (pozvenniki) currents in their conservative and liberal versions, and the new Westerners. Varieties of the latter currents were liberal-democratic, social-democratic and Euro-communist streams. Nationalist, religious, ecological and other currents were also differentiated in dissidence.

The movement as a whole was given a certain unity by the active rejection of the established order in the country by the people captured by the movement, the desire for freedom and human rights. Over time, the movement acquired more and more pronounced features of anti-communism and anti-sovietism. A large part of the party and Soviet elite united with this most radicalized part of the dissident movement in the late 1980s. The program slogans of the dissidents essentially became official. The regime itself took the path of exposing its own vices. Its alliance with the "general public" in a common desire to radically "correct" the evils of the socialist system became the main reason for the liquidation of the system and the destruction of the USSR.

In 1994 the Presidential Administration of the Russian Federation published the materials of a scientific conference dedicated to the 73rd anniversary of Sakharov (1921-1989). The book "The word about Sakharov" contains the address of Boris Yeltsin.

Speaking at the conference, S. Filatov, head of the administration, identified the current regime with

members of the Sakharov-led branch of dissidence and those of his disciples "who have taken upon themselves the heavy responsibility of implementing much of what Andrei Dmitrievich dreamed of." The greater responsibility," Filatov said, "rests on us, on the people who are entrusted today to carry out what Andrei D. Sakharov dreamed of. May we be helped to accomplish this difficult mission.

"Sakharov's experience, Sakharov's thoughts, Sakharov's ideas and Sakharov's feelings".

Such cult-like speeches eloquently characterize the official assessment of the historical role of one of the dissident movements. The most famous of the dissidents of the social-democratic trend, which converged with the liberal currents in rejection of the national-patriotic perspective of the country's development, were the brothers - the historian and biologist R. A. and J. A. Medvedev. Under their influence, Sakharov's freethinking was born.

Of the national-liberal, pseudo-evangelical currents of social thought and dissidence, A.I. Solzhenitsyn and I.R. Shafarevich were the most anti-Soviet. Less radical were the scattered national-patriotic currents of a conservative-statist and sociocultural nature, whose leaders were I. V. Ogurtsov, V. N. Osipov, L. I. Borodin, and others. They saw little or nothing of value in "real socialism," but they also did not support the dissidents who "aimed at communism but shot at Russia.

Beginning in the mid-1960s, there are several stages in the dissident movement: its emergence (1964-1972); crisis (1973-1974); international recognition and

expansion of activities (1974-1979); and narrowing of the movement under the blows of repression (1980-1985). P.A. Medvedev from 1964 to 1970 published monthly 20-40 copies of tamizdat materials, published in 1972 in Amsterdam under the title "Political Diary". K. 1968 he finished his book "To the Judgment of History" in which he addressed the crimes of Stalin. In 1969 he was expelled from the CPSU for it. In 1971 the book was published abroad. In 1972, his book, Socialism and Democracy, was published abroad. These books and the diary earned the author a wide reputation as an "independent expert" on domestic and foreign policy of the USSR.

Liberal Westernism was evident in the 1965 issue of the journal Sphinxes in Moscow (edited by V. Tarsis), and in the publication and distribution abroad of grotesque satirical stories about the social and psychological phenomena of totalitarianism by A. D. Sinyavsky (Court is Coming, 1959; Lubimov, 1963) and Yu.M. Daniel (Moscow Says, 1962; Redemption, 1964). "Literaturnaya Gazeta called these works, published under the pseudonyms A. Tertz and N. Arzhak, the very real anti-Soviet, inspired by hatred for the socialist system. The KGB classified them as "especially dangerous crimes against the state". In September 1965 the writers were arrested.

On December 5, 1965, the first unsanctioned demonstration on Pushkin Square in Moscow for many decades was held with human rights slogans: "We demand publicity for the trial of Sinyavsky and Daniel!", "Respect the Soviet Constitution - our Basic 'Law!'" One of the organizers of the demonstration was the mathematician and poet A. S. Yesenin-Volpin (son of the

poet S. A. Yesenin). This day is considered the beginning of the human rights movement in the USSR.

In February 1966, Tarsis, who left for England, was deprived of his Soviet citizenship; in Moscow, Daniel and Sinyavsky were tried on charges under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda aimed at undermining or weakening the Soviet power". There were 22 letters from "the public" in defense of the accused. They were signed by 80 people, mostly members of the Writers' Union (over 60). V. Aksenov, G. Vladimov, A. Voznesensky, V. Voinovich, A. Gladilin and others were among the first to offer their defense. Leonid Ginzburg, editor of *Syntax* (1959-1961), and the poet Yury Galanskov (the former wrote a collection of documents about the disgraced writers, the latter included Sinyavsky's article (What is socialist realism?) in his *Samizdat* almanac *Phoenix-66*), they were in turn arrested. Their condemnation prompted a new petition campaign in early 1968.

The most famous events in the history of the liberal dissident movement were the trials of twenty-one members of the All-Russian Social Christian Union for the Liberation of the People, the largest underground organization in the movement's history, led by I. V. Ogurtsov (February-December 1967), and the beginning (April 1968) of issues of the *Samizdat* human rights bulletin "Current Events Chronicle". The journal appeared 15 years ago (its 64th issue was published in 1983). Its compilers (among them was the Moscow poet and translator N. Gorbanevskaya and others), tried to register all the cases of human rights violations in the USSR, as well as speeches in their defense. The "Chronicle" contained information about national

movements (Crimean Tatars, Meskhetians, Baltic republics), religious (Orthodox Christians and Baptists) and other movements.

In December 1974, S. A. Kovalyov, a candidate of biological sciences and a senior researcher at the Moscow fish-breeding and reclamation research station, was arrested for publishing and distributing The Chronicle and sentenced to seven years in a maximum security camp and three years in exile. Later he became a deputy of the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, in 1993-1996 was a member of the Presidential Council, the Commissioner of the State Duma on human rights (January 1994 - March 1995) and a Knight of Honor of Ichkeria for his condemnation of the introduction of Russian troops to impose "constitutional order" in Chechnya in December 1994.

The publication of Sakharov's June 1968 work "Reflections on Progress, Peaceful Coexistence, and Intellectual Freedom" (the movement's liberal-westernist program and, in fact, the blueprint for the first phase of Gorbachev's "perestroika"); the demonstration of pro-A. Solzhenitsyn, who was expelled from the USSR Union of Writers in November 1969 for publishing his novels "In the First Circle" and "Cancer Ward" in the West, he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature (1970).

Solzhenitsyn's "Nobel Lecture" was an expression of the liberal, post-primitive trend in the movement. In this regard he wrote: "When in the Nobel lecture I said in the most general terms: "Nations are the wealth of mankind" - it was received universally..... But as soon as I concluded that this also applies to the Russian people, that they also have the right to a national consciousness,

to a national rebirth after the most severe disease - it was fiercely declared great-power nationalism. "Russians are not supposed to be able to love their people without hating others". The writer repeatedly defined his ideology not as nationalism, but as national patriotism.

In the summer of 1970, 12 people were arrested at the boarding ramp of a passenger plane flying from Leningrad to Priozersk, intending to hijack the plane and use it for a flight to Israel. The trial of the "planesmen", who unsuccessfully sought permission to emigrate, ended with harsh sentences for the instigators of this terrorist action and arrests among the Zionist youth in several cities of the country. However, instead of stopping the emigration, this entire affair drew international attention to the problem of freedom to leave the USSR. The authorities had to make concessions and increase the number of exit permits each year. In total more than 255,000 adults emigrated from USSR between 1971-1986 years and over 360,000 children (under 18 years old) were taken into account. 80% of all emigrants were Jews who automatically received refugee status when entering USA and Canada. According to censuses, the number of Jews in the Soviet Union decreased from 2,151,000 in 1970 to 1,762,000 in 1979, and to 1,154,000 in 1989.

The loud "airplane process" could not but draw the attention of the authorities and the public to the problem of Jewish nationalism and Zionism as one of its forms of expression. When the international convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination was drafted in 1973, representatives of some states in the UN tried to condemn anti-Semitism, but objected to the

Soviet delegation's proposal to classify both anti-Semitism and Zionism as racial discrimination. At the XXVIIIth session of the UN General Assembly, in a resolution of December 14, 1973, an analogy was first made between South African racism and Zionism. Representatives of developing countries at the XXX session of the General Assembly widely discussed these problems. The most vivid of these criticisms were the conclusions of the Commission on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination.

Sudan and Uganda were particularly acute. The President of Uganda, I. Amin Lada, denouncing the constant support of the United States for Israel, attributed it to the fact that "such a powerful nation as the United States of America is at the mercy of the Zionists".

The Soviet Union promoted the adoption of a draft resolution at the United Nations condemning Zionism. On November 10, 1975 resolution 3379 was adopted despite attempts by the representatives of Israel and the United States to prevent it. It defined that "Zionism is a form of racism and racial discrimination". After the abolition of the USSR, the resolution was abolished.

The trial of the airplane hijackers showed that many "human rights activists" used the idea of human rights to cover up militant nationalism and other ideas far removed from human rights. Novodvorskaya later candidly spoke about this: "I personally have had my fill of human rights. We, the CIA and the United States once used this idea as a battering ram to destroy the communist regime and bring down the USSR. The idea has served its time, and enough lies about human rights and human rights activists" (Pravda, Nov. 30, 1994).

However, it was in the 1970s that the human rights movement became one of the main components of the dissident movement in the USSR. In November 1970, V.N.Chalidze founded the Committee for Human Rights Protection, which included Academician A.D.Sakharov and Corresponding Member of the USSR Academy of Sciences I.R.Shafarevich. The Committee functioned until 1973. In 1973 the Russian section of Amnesty International arose. Its chairman was V. F. Turchin, a doctor of physics and mathematics, and its secretary was a young physicist from the Academic Institute of Information, A. N. Tverdokhlebov.

In the dissident movement, a large share of the Jewish problematic took place, mostly related to the revival of Zionism in the Soviet Union. The proportion of Jews among the participants in the dissident movement was also significant. "All Jews are dissidents, all dissidents are Jews," these words were a common proverb in intelligentsia circles. The most essential thing in this dissidence was that it was mostly contrary to the Russian nachala. According to the publicist T. Glushkova, "here there was never any reliance on national tradition (and thus culture), but only "Helsinki" and similar agreements. We will see the struggle from the standpoint of Western values, not less, but more alien and hostile to the Russian spirit than even the local communist internationalism or atheism. Dissent, accompanied by a revival of Zionism in the Soviet Union, was additional fodder for the anti-Semitism that had also revived by the 1970s,

In the summer of 1972, the well-known dissident activists I.I. Yakir (son of Commander I.E. Yakir, who

was repressed in 1937) and I. Krasin (grandson of the well-known political figure L.B. Krasin) were arrested. During the investigation, the arrested persons agreed to cooperate with the KGB. The result of new arrests was a noticeable fading of the dissident movement. Its new rise is largely connected with the emergence in the West in 1973. The Gulag Archipelago, and later, in Samizdat, Solzhenitsyn's experience of an artistic investigation of the state repressive system and his article 'To Live Not According to Lies'.

On September 5, 1973, A. I. Solzhenitsyn wrote his "Letter to the Leaders of the Soviet Union," in which he proposed a way out of the two main dangers threatening us in the next 10-30 years: war with China and a common death in ecological disaster with Western civilization. It proposed nothing less than giving up Marxist ideology, "giving it to China". The "dark vortex" of this ideology, according to the writer, "swooped down on us from the West. And if now he is dragging himself further to the East - so let him be dragged away, do not interfere." We ourselves were offered, sensibly, by Stalin's experience from the first days of the Patriotic War, to deploy "the old Russian banner, partly even the Orthodox banner", and not repeat the mistakes of the end of the war, when we "again pulled the advanced teachings out of mothballs". It was also proposed to shift all the efforts of the state from external to internal tasks: to refuse vodka as the most important item of state income, and many types of industrial production with toxic waste; to free the Russian youth from the mandatory universal conscription; to focus on the construction of scattered cities, soft for man, to recognize for the foreseeable future a necessary for Russia not democratic, but authoritarian system, to

abandon the unrealistic and unnecessary for us tasks of world domination. All this the writer thought possible to implement in 3-10 years.

After studying the letter, in January 1974 the "chiefs" decided to prosecute the writer for "malicious anti-Soviet activities," and then to deprive him of his citizenship and expel him from the country. The writer was arrested, thrown into Lefortovo prison, and deported abroad on February 13. In Switzerland, he founded the Russian Prisoners' Aid Foundation, the first manager of which was A. Ginzburg, who had been released from prison. There was someone to help. "In 1967-1974, 729 dissidents were prosecuted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda".

In 1974 Sakharov wrote his work "Anxiety and Hope," which presented to the country and the world the academician's vision of the future of world civilization, possible only if world nuclear confrontation is avoided. He believed that the best way to avoid this was through the convergence of the two systems. I believe, he wrote, that it is especially important to overcome the disintegration of the world into antagonistic groups of states, the process of convergence of the socialist and capitalist systems, accompanied by demilitarization, strengthening of international trust, protection of human rights, law and freedom, profound social progress in democratization, the strengthening of the moral, spiritual personal element in man. I suggest that the economic order resulting from this process of rapprochement should be a mixed-economy, combining a maximum of flexibility, freedom, social achievements and the possibilities of world-wide regulation.

His subsequent works show the great peculiarity of Sakharov's views on the ability of the USSR to make any contribution to convergence. About the history of his country the academician wrote that it was "watered down with terrible violence, monstrous crimes," "fifty years ago next to Europe was Stalin's empire - now Soviet totalitarianism." He opposed raising the subject of the suffering and sacrifice of the Russian people that had fallen to their lot in history. Sakharov believed that the horrors of the Civil War and the de-kulakization, famine and repression equally affected both Russian and non-Russian peoples, and that such actions as forced deportations, genocide and the suppression of national culture were "the privilege of non-Russians".

He disagreed with Solzhenitsyn's assertions that pre-revolutionary Russia had lived, "preserving its national health for centuries. He did notice the Russophobes, he repeated: "I consider the servile, serf spirit that has existed in Russia for centuries, combined with contempt for foreigners and non-Russians, not health, but the greatest misfortune". Sakharov's attitude to the country was distinguished by his putting Iran in the foreground of emigration. He considered free exit from the country to be the most important democratic right of its citizens.

In his 1976 telegram to U.S. President J. Carter he expressed confidence that "full of courage and determination... The first country of the West, the United States, will bear the burden imposed on its citizens and leaders by history". In an interview with the Associated Press in the same year, he said, "The Western world bears an enormous responsibility in confronting the totalitarian world of the socialist countries. In the draft Constitution of the Union of Soviet Republics of Europe

and Asia (December 1989), Sakharov proposed to constitutionally enshrine the provision that the Union being created "in the long term" seeks "a counter pluralistic rapprochement (convergence) of the socialist and capitalist systems as the only solution to global and domestic problems". The political expression of this rapprochement should be the establishment of a World Government in the future. In the light of his statements, it is clear which government was capable of carrying the burden of leading the world with honor.

The judgments of the "father of the hydrogen bomb" made a great impression in the country and the world. However, Gorbachev alone, over time, put them at the heart of the state's domestic and foreign policies, believing it possible to begin convergence unilaterally.

In December 1975, A.D. Sakharov became the third Soviet dissident to be awarded the Nobel Prize. This act, along with the expulsion from the country of Nobel laureate A. I. Solzhenitsyn (February 1974), brought the dissident movement in the USSR widespread international notoriety and consequently influence on the masses in their own country. Later, the Nobel Prize winner was the dissident poet Ivan Brodsky, who was convicted in Leningrad in February 1964 for "malignant parasitism". In 1972, he emigrated to the United States, where he continued to write the poetry (in Russian and English) that won him the prize (1987).

The activities of R. A. Medvedev contributed to the growing prominence of the dissident movement. In 1975-1976 he edited the self-published journal XX Century, of which ten issues were published in the USSR, two of which were reprinted in London.

After the Helsinki Accords (August 1975), the Moscow Group for Assistance to the Implementation of Humanitarian Articles of these Accords was established (May 1976). It consists of Yu. F. Orlov, corresponding member of the Armenian Academy of Sciences (head), and 10 more people: L. Alexeeva, M. Bernshtam, E. Bonner, A. Ginzburg, P. Grigorenko, A. Korchak, M. Landau, A. Marchenko, V. Rubin, and A. Sharansky. Soon similar groups arose in Ukraine, Georgia, Lithuania and Armenia. In January 1977, the Moscow Helsinki Group formed a working commission, with A. Podrabinek as one of its founders, to investigate the use of psychiatry for political purposes. In February 1977, Podrabinek was one of its founders. Faced with the prospect of expanding the opposition, the authorities turned to repressions against members of the Helsinki groups.

Unfavorable tendencies of social development and skeptical attitude of the population to the official propaganda resulted in the growing alienation of the masses from the policy makers. "Stagnation" strengthened oppositional and dissident sentiments in society. Dissatisfaction with national policy was constant. Interethnic riots occurred in almost all regions of the country: Kazakhstan, Central Asia, the Baltic states, Transcaucasia, and the autonomous republics of Russia.

The official authorities believed that one of the main dangers to the state came from dissidence. The authorities stiffened repressions against dissidents in order to ease the tensions that rose with the beginning of the Soviet troops' participation in the Civil War and in Afghanistan. At the end of 1979-beginning of 1980,

almost all leaders and active members of national and religious organizations not only those who were human rights activists, but also those who opposed the regime were arrested and exiled. A. Sakharov was deprived of all government decorations and sent to Gorky for his protest against the war in Afghanistan in January of 1980.

A year and a half later, the deputy chairman of the State Security Committee, S. K. K. Tsvigun announced from the pages of the party newspaper that the anti-social elements disguised as champions of democracy were neutralized and the human rights movement had ceased to exist (Kommunist. 1981. No. 14). According to the KGB, in 1957 - 1985 1124? persons were convicted for anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and for distribution of deliberately false information denigrating the Soviet state and social system. The names of those convicted are given in book J-10. Supervisory proceedings of the USSR Prosecutor's Office in cases of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda. March 1953-1991. M., 1999. Here is the most representative information about dissidents and victories over them by repressive state agencies. However, as the events that followed 1985 have shown, the victory over dissidence turned out to be ephemeral.

Gorbachev's "perestroika" exposed the movement's full significance. It turned out that the open struggle of a few hundred dissidents against the evils of the regime aroused the sympathy of an immeasurably wider circle of citizens. The confrontation demonstrated the deepest contradictions in society and the chasm separating it from the state. The ideas of the dissidents were widely popularized by the world media. In 1972-1979, Sakharov

alone, according to KGB data, led a tour of the Soviet Union. According to KGB data, he held 150 press conferences and made 1,200 broadcasts for foreign radio. Together with the Voice of America and other media, the dissidents constituted a "system with the strongest cooperative effect" (S. G. KaraMurm).

Dissidents in the Soviet Union were actively assisted by the U.S. CIA. It is known, for example, that by 1975 the CIA was involved in various ways in publishing more than 1,500 books by Russian and Soviet authors in Russian. All of this increased the power of the dissident component itself by several orders of magnitude.

The process of "pardoning" participants in the dissident movement began on the eve of the Reykjavik meeting between M. Gorbachev and R. Reischna. On October 9, 1986, poet I. Ratushinskaya was "pardoned". On October 6, after negotiations between Gorbachev and F. Mitterrand, the educator and collector G. Mikhailov was released at the request of the French side. At the end of 1986 E. Ligachev, V. Chebrikov and G. Marchuk sent a proposal to Gorbachev which said that "the preventive measures against Sakharov justified themselves to a certain extent - he returned to scientific activity", nor "it seems possible now to solve the question of Sakharov's return to Moscow", because it "will cost less than continuing his isolation in Gorky". The case of A. Patatskas, prosecuted in 1983 for publishing two illegal anthologies under the name "Sakharov," was dismissed in 1987.

In this respect, the prosecutor's office took a characteristic ruling. It said that the case was stopped because "in the light of the changes in the life of the

Soviet society" Patatskas' personality "ceased to be socially dangerous and it is inexpedient to apply criminal law measures to him". According to V. I. Andreev, a member of the board of the USSR Prosecutor's Office, at the end of 1988 the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet pardoned all persons convicted of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda, distribution of knowingly false fabrications denigrating the state and the social system", "violation of laws on separation of church from state and school from church and encroachment on the personality and rights of citizens under the guise of performing religious rites". On August 15, 1990 A. I. Solzhenitsyn was restored in the Soviet citizenship. Famous former members of the dissident movement A. D. Sakharov, R. I. Pimenov (convicted in 1970 for spreading "knowingly false fabrications denigrating the Soviet state and social system"), M. M. Molostov (convicted in 1958 by the Leningrad Court under Article 58 of the Criminal Code) and many others were elected people's deputies. In 1990, in memory of the victims of totalitarianism, at the initiative of "Memorial" and with the support of the Mossovet, the famous Solovetsky stone was set in the square on Lubyanka.

On December 25, 1991, the Soviet flag was lowered from the flagpole over the domes of the Kremlin. If we look at this event through the prism of anti-Soviet dissidence, *it means that the main forces of the former party and state leadership essentially moved to the positions of the movement.* They became the driving force behind the nomenklatura revolution of 1991- 1993. It instantly (by historical standards) chopped up the foundations of "developed socialism" and brought down the edifice of the "indestructible Union". The phenomenon of intraparty liberal dissidence and its

method are well described in A. N. Yakovlev's article "Bolshevism - the social disease of the 20th century" (1999).

The author argues that during the period of "developed socialism," a group of "true reformers" unrolled a new round of exposing the "personality cult of Stalin" "with the following implication: not only Stalin, but the system itself is a criminal". Party dissidents proceeded from the conviction that "the Soviet totalitarian regime could only be destroyed through glasnost and totalitarian party discipline, while hiding behind the interests of improving socialism. In the last phase of "perestroika" they "improved socialism" without any reference to Lenin. By tightening the anti-Stalinist discourse, the "true reformers" were completing their ideological counterrevolution under the motto "Facts over Principle", disassembling, as Yakovlev defined it, Lenin's own "mega-crime".

The liberal dissidents rejected the "real socialism" of the Smínský and subsequent models, believing that life there had turned out to be arranged quite differently from the way it had once been conceived. There the flag is decorated with a hammer and sickle, / But the nail is not hammered into the wall, and the vegetable garden is not sheltered. / There, roughly speaking, the great plan is blown.) This means that, in some stages of its implementation since 1917, the "great plan" of socialist construction had been distorted to the point of total rejection by the liberal intelligentsia. However, its representatives in the dissident movements (with the exception of R.A. Medvedev and his supporters) never proposed to build life according to the true "great plan", because it would still remain socialist.

They were inspired by quite different plans and models, but they could not talk about them openly. Therefore, they had no choice but to disagree with the power which distorted the "great plan" on every convenient occasion and constantly appeal to the "progressive" world-value, which certainly could not be the judge in disputes about deviations of the Soviet power from some truly "great plan".

The hope that "abroad will help us" gave rise to "oriental" projects to join the Soviet Union to the "civilized world community". After the events of August 1991, Professor I. Korepanov suggested "colonizing our country for a certain period of time by developed countries". For the West, he believed, "we are of interest as a market rich in raw materials and human resources, it is necessary to ask the West to attach certain republics and regions to developed countries. For example, Russia - to the United States and Japan, Ukraine - to England, Belarus - to France. It would be necessary to create a mixed administration to manage the colonies."

When assessing the historical significance of liberal dissidence, historians with a liberal ideological orientation have a lot of difficulty. They cannot yet call a spade a spade and openly whitewash the column that acted in alliance with the "progressive West" against their own country and its people in the 1960s.

But logic requires consistency. Therefore, we have to ignore the maxims that the "reformers", starting with N.S. Khrushchev, "due to their outlook, saw in the liberal intelligentsia a potential opponent rather than an adviser and helper." Conservative and protective sentiments

were strong in the intelligentsia. It was on them that the authorities relied (M.R. Zezia; 2002). In essence, the authorities are accused of not leading or relying on liberal dissidents to reform their country in a capitalist spirit, since no other "great inertia" liberal dissidence could have by definition.

In our view, what is most significant for Russia's historical fate is that the national-patriotic currents never gained strength in the period under review, and were unable to significantly influence power and the development of society. "Russophiles" to a large extent, remained dissidents in relation to the capitalist revolution of 1991 - 1993, and to the new ruling elite that rallied to power on its wave.

Subsequently, the position of the national patriots in a number of points converges with the Russian Orthodox Church and the opposition to the current authorities of the CPRF. According to the conviction of V. N. Ganichev, expressed in June 2002. In Russia's past history "only Slavophiles created a brilliant theory of Russia's independence. The Tsarist authorities did not use this theory, "and this led to their collapse," the Soviet authorities also failed to benefit from it, "did not want to change it and apply it in modern conditions, and we see the current outcome. A veteran of the movement lives in hope that someday our authorities will adopt it. Some of the most influential former dissident figures (the philosopher A.A. Zinoviev, the writer A.D. Sinyavsky, partly A.I. Solzhenitsyn), having seen the fruits of dissidence in the post-Soviet realities of life in Russia, radically overestimated both their participation in the movement and the historical role of the movement as a whole.

In the 1960s and 1980s, the current of Russian liberal national-patriotic thought became more prominent in dissidence, manifesting itself mainly in Samizdat journalism, which was a kind of response to "samizdat" of a liberal cosmopolitan and Russophobic nature. According to information provided by N. A. Mitrokhin and used in this section, the first text by Russian "nationalists" that became known to the general public was a document titled "Word of the Nation" and dated December 31, 1970. N. Osipov, I. V. Avdeev, V. V. Ilyakov, the priest D. Dudko, and the former "Fetisov" V. Vinogradov. It was a response to the anonymous Program of the Democratic Movement of the Soviet Union, which appeared in "samizdat" in 1969.

Despite the contradictions and utopianism, the Word of the Nation is interesting both as a historical document and as a document that is in tune with the current political situation in Russia. According to it, the Western world is biologically degenerate. The biological is more primal than the social, so democracy and human rights are meaningless. Only a strong government based on national traditions can oppose the process of degeneration. All attempts to remake Russia along Western lines have failed because of the political preferences of the people, who want a strong government to protect them from external threats. The nation is primary, and everything else is a derivative of it. The nation is also a special spiritual community, whose peculiarity has a deep mystical meaning. The main attributes of a nation are its racial type (psychological makeup), language (way of thinking), and ideology.

The national question in "The Word of the Nation" seems

to be the main issue for Russia, as the Russians play a disproportionately small role in the life of the country, and the Jews claim to be the oppressed Russian minority, almost monopolizing science and culture in the meantime. There must be a national revolution under the slogan: One Indivisible Russia. Russian people must become the dominant nation. In the nation-state, which was to be built, the traditional Russian religion would take its rightful place. On top of this it was proposed to abolish the UN as a powerless organization, replacing it with the Union of Civilized Countries headed by Russia and the United States.

An important event in the Russian liberal-patriotic movement was the appearance of the magazine *Veche*, which was also a kind of response to the dissident liberal and national publications. This journal was founded by the former political prisoner V.N. Osipov, who was imprisoned for seven years under strict regime for organizing anti-Soviet "lawyers" on Mayakovskaya Square in Moscow in 1960-1961 and settled in Alexandrovo (outside the 100 km zone around Moscow) in 1970. He began publishing a Russian patriotic journal while in a political prison in Mordovia, where he changed from an anarcho-syndicalist as he had considered himself before his arrest to an Orthodox monarchist. Upon his release, he resumed his acquaintances, especially among the old Mayakovsky Square activists. The final decision to publish the journal was made after conversations with Dmitry Dudko, A. M. Ivanov (Skuratov), a friend from their days together at the history department of Moscow State University and an accomplice in their first case, and M. P. Kudryavtsev, an architect and restorer. The journal was conceived as being loyal to the government. The proof was the editor's

name and address printed on the cover.

The first issue of the journal appeared on January 19, 1971. The radio station "Boboda" presented it to its listeners in the USSR as a chauvinistic antisemitic publication. In this regard, the editorial board issued a statement on March 1 stating: "We strongly reject the definition of the magazine as "extremely chauvinistic". We do not intend to belittle the dignity of other nations. All we want is the strengthening of Russian national culture and patriotic traditions in the spirit of the Slavophiles and Dostoyevsky, and the affirmation of Russia's uniqueness and greatness. As for political problems, they are not in the scope of our magazine.

This issue includes articles by Ivanov (Skuratov) "At the Origin of Russian Self-Consciousness"; M. Antonov "The Doctrine of the Slavophiles - the Shining Rise of Popular Self-Consciousness in Russia in the Long-Term Period"; a large anonymous article "The Fate of the Russian Capital" (about the destruction of Moscow by architects with Jewish surnames, written by M. Kudryavtsev); anonymous "Notes of the Russian Christian Osipov", "On the Question of the Sphinx" (in relation to L. Rendel's Samizdat-historical work, On the Specific Features of Russian History); poems by I. Avdeev, M. Voloshin and O. Bulatov; a review by G. Shimanov of Y. Belov's Samizdat (1967) work Religion and Modern Consciousness; a review of Novyi Mir over the past two years; and a Chronicle section, which reported on the death of the patriarch and the mixing of the editor-in-chief of Molodaya Gvardiya.

The selection of materials in the first issue of the journal is also characteristic of the subsequent nine issues. The

main authors of the publications were Osipov himself; A. Ivanov (Skuratov), who was the author of about a third of all materials published; and Father Dmitry Dudko. From the third issue on, physics teacher S. A. Melnikova, an acquaintance of Ivanov and Osipov from Mayakovsky Square, joined the publication. She, who became the actual co-editor of the publication, was acquainted with V. Shukshin, L. Annensky, V. Erofeev, L. Ruslanova, the poet A. Markov, the artist K. Vasiliev. Melnikova introduced Osipov to I. Glazunov (the artist gave money for the magazine, and after Osipov's arrest he helped his wife), A. Solzhenitsyn, L. Gumilev. Melnikova had good relations with L. Borodin, a former member of the All-Union Union of Artists, (he appeared in Moscow in early 1973 as an established writer, his article on the Russian intelligentsia was published in the eighth issue of the journal), and G. Shimanov. Melnikova prepared the layouts for the journal issues of Veche in her apartment in Moscow, editing the materials provided, supervised the printing and distribution of about half of the number of copies (20-30 copies, their number decreased towards the end of 1973). A part of the circulation was sold to wealthy patriots for 5 rubles per issue.

The second circle of Veche was formed in Alexandrov, mainly among former political prisoners. They rarely contributed material to the magazine, but they were active readers and shaped "public opinion". According to Osipov, "the magazine was sent to Russian patriots, preferably Orthodox, preferably monarchists. Mostly just Russian patriots." The number of regular readers of the magazine was approximately 200-300 people. It was sent to 14 cities in Russia, as well as in Kiev and Nikolaev. The third circle of the Veche was the "Young Guard", members of the Russian Club, with whom

Osipov was introduced by A. Ivanov. The extent of their involvement in publishing the magazine was limited to the topic of the protection of historical and cultural monuments, and some financial support. The latter cost Semanov in his position as editor-in-chief of the journal People and Law, and Zhukov on his daughter's baptism.

The most vivid and consistent exponent of Russian ideology as applied to the new conditions was G. M. Shimanov, who published his book Notes from the Red House in the West in 1971. He saw it in the catastrophic dead end of the Western civilization, which in essence had refused to accept the true meaning of the word from Christianity and replaced the fullness of spiritual life with a false brilliance of material well-being. "I will say," Shimanov wrote, "that now, after an experience of a thousand years that has driven humanity into an intolerable dead end, is it not clear that only an authentic, regenerated Christianity can be the way out of the dead end? That another, new, not pagan-bourgeois, but ascetic and spiritual civilization is necessary?"

Such a civilization can arise on a Russian spiritual basis. The fate of Russia is not only its fate, but the fate of all humanity, which will be able to get out of the impasse, relying on the traditional spiritual values of the Russian people. Russians need to unite on their spiritual foundations to fulfill their mission before the Fatherland and the world. And in this unification, atheistic Soviet power is not an obstacle, because it can be transformed from within into a completely different quality, the main thing is to revive the indigenous Russian self-consciousness. We should remember", declared Shimanov, "that we are Russians, remember not in order to forget about it in a minute, but in order to unite our

heart with the heart of the people, unite our destiny with the destiny of the Fatherland, unite our hopes with the hopes of the best Russian people for religious and national revival of Russia." We are obliged to be sober, we are obliged to look at things with Orthodox eyes. The greatest evil is not to seek God's truth and not to build our lives according to that truth. If you seek it, you will build it, and no power will be able to prevent you from doing so. Soviet power is not only godlessness and the world's greatest storm, it is also a mystery and an instrument of God's Providence. The process of the return of the Russian spirit in itself, the process of the return of Russian consciousness is already on the rise, and nothing can stop it.

The journal did not exist for long. In February 1974, according to outside observers, there was a split in the editorial board. S. Melnikova and I. Ovchinnikov, a former political prisoner, published the 10th issue of *Veche* in April, and closed the journal on July 1974. In the editorial board's announcement of its closure, they wrote: "The initiation of criminal proceedings against the Russian patriots' magazine can only be the result of the efforts of secret Russophobes who hope to destroy the great nation and great culture in this country. Osipov, along with former political prisoner V.S. Rodionov, published an issue of the new samizdat magazine *Zemlya*, thus declaring that the banner of the Russian revival is still in his hands.

Meanwhile, the KGB launched an investigation into the publication of the journals. The case against V.N. Osipov was initiated on Andropov's personal instruction. On November 28, 1974 he was arrested, and while he was under investigation Rodionov and Mashkova published

the second issue, B-mli (November 1974). That was the end of the magazine's story. In the accusation Osipov's indictment stated, inter alia: "Acting from so-called legal positions, hiding behind false declarations of his loyalty to the Soviet state and the allegedly patriotic nature of his aspirations, Osipov, relying on persons formerly tried for particularly dangerous state crimes (meaning L. Borodin, O. Volkov and the priest D. Dudko. -Avt.), the support of foreign anti-Soviet organizations and the organs of bourgeois propaganda, in 1970-1974 with the purpose of undermining Soviet power. With the purpose of undermining the Soviet government and to consolidate the anti-Soviet elements, he was engaged in criminal activity to publish, reproduce and distribute in the Soviet Union and beyond the borders of the illegal magazines "Veche" and "Earth", some articles of which contain slanderous fabrications that denigrate the Soviet state and social order, and reactionary, chauvinist and Slavophile views. On September 26, 1975, V. N. Osipov was sentenced by the Vladimir Regional Court under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR to 8 years in minimum security. In all, from 1961 to 1983 Osipov spent 15 years in prison and exile. This term reflected the extent to which the international cosmopolitan regime feared the open propaganda of "reactionary" Slavophile views.

In 1974 L. I. Borodin, a former member of the VSKhSON, began publishing a journal, Moscow Collection, devoted to the problems of nation and religion. He relied on the help of young Christians who clustered around G. M. Shimanov (foreman V. V. Burdyug, poet S. Budarov, and others), belonged to Father Dmitry Dudko's flock, and maintained good relations with other dissidents of liberal-patriotic

orientation - Osipov, Yakunin, Shafarevich, Ogorodi et al, Kapitanchuk.

It included the memoirs of the journal's son, Nikolai Berdyaev, about his father; an article by the philosopher Renata Gal'tseva; a sequel to Ivanov's (Skuratov) work, *The Triumph of Suicide*, about the years of the "Great Terror" (the beginning was published in *Veche*); articles by Borodin - his polemic with the church historian A. Krasnov-Levitin, an article on national problems, and part of the novel *Swan Song*. In addition to Borodin's two articles, the second issue contains the work of Glebov (pseudonym of the philosopher S. Khoruzhego), "Karsavin. A Biographical Sketch." The third issue contains an unsigned article by Vagin on the philosopher Fyodorov, an article on psychiatry by Chernyshov, and an article on literature by Budarov. Shimanov was also published in the journal. The journal had a circulation of 20-25 copies.

After the arrest in April 1975 in the apartment of S. Budarov layout of the third issue Borodin was taken to the prosecutor's office and received a "Warning according to the Decree of the PES of the USSR of 1972". He immediately withdrew from the publication, leaving it in the hands of his assistants, and he returned to Siberia and engaged in literary activities. And in 1982 he was arrested and convicted for the publication of his works in the West under Article 70 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR to 10 years of camps and 5 years of exile. Burdyug, Rozanov and Budarov prepared the fourth issue of the *Moscow Collection*, but did not receive Father Dmitry Dudko's blessing for its publication. The publication ceased.

In the mid-1970s there was an ideological reorientation of the major mathematician and dissident, a member of Sakharov's Human Rights Committee from 1971 to 1973. I. R. Shafarevich (corresponding member of the USSR Academy of Sciences since 1958, member of the Russian Academy of Sciences since 1991, president of the Moscow Mathematical Society). He wrote a number of works criticizing the totalitarian system. His articles "Isolation or rapprochement?", "Does Russia have a future?", included in the collection "From under the boulders" (compiled by A. I. Solzhenitsyn, published in 1974 in Paris). The books also included Socialism as a World History Phenomenon (first published in Paris in 1977) and Russophobia (written in 1980 and disseminated in samizdat and republished many times beginning in 1989). These works gave the author a reputation as an ideologist of the national-orthodox movement, immediately causing criticism in circles of democratically minded intellectuals, professional historians and ethnographers, who found in them all sorts of drawbacks and inaccuracies. However, the theory of "little people" developed by Shafarevich followed by the French historian O. Koshen, was widely accepted in patriotic circles. According to this theory, it condemns the stratum of people who are in opposition to all other people, treat their traditions with contempt, and thereby assert their right to dispose of them as material for their own *tsorchestvo*. In Russia, the core of the "little people" is Jewry. With the publication of this theory its author was accused of anti-Semitism.

In the second half of the 70s, a trend appeared in Samizdat, later called "national-communist". It claimed to fight together with the authorities against Zionism for an original Russian state. There were two groups of such

"communists": the Orthodox, led by G. M. Shimanov and F. V. Karelin; the pagans, led by A. M. Ivanov (Skuratov), V. N. Karelin, V. I. Skurlatov. Both groups actively dissociated themselves from dissidence in its liberal guise, and criticized the activities of the Moscow Art Theater, the Workers ' Commission, the Christian Defense Committee, and the Solzhenitsyn Foundation.

The leader of the first group of Shimanov since 1962 was in the flock of shchishchennik D. Dudko and became famous in dissident circles in the late 60s. At that time, he was an ordinary active Orthodox Neophyte, wrote articles on legal topics, distributed the works of other authors, led tours of churches, was persecuted by the authorities: he was dismissed from work, was treated for two weeks in a mental hospital. About his stay in the asylum institution Shimanov wrote the story "Notes from the Red House" (1971). Its publication abroad brought the author fame as a bright publicist of the dissident movement. Since then, he, who has no other profession, has worked in casual, low-paid jobs.

In 1972, G. M. Shimanov broke off relations with a circle of former Western democrats and became a publicist of the "nationalist" direction. In 1973, in this new capacity, he drew attention to himself with three letters to the editor of the Paris journal "Vestnik R. S. H. D." N. A. Struve about the publication in the 97th issue of "anti-Russian", according to Shimanov, the collection "Metanoia" (translated from Greek. - repent, change your thoughts). The letters were included in the samizdat collection "Letters about Russia" (1973). Here were also placed a specially written article for the collection of Shimanov's "Faith in a miracle", the work of a long-time member of the underground religious structures of F.V.

Karelin (pseudonym N. Radugin) "Budi, Siye, Budi", articles of Candidate of Medical Sciences V. I. Prilutsky (pseudonym L. Ibragimov), D. Dudko and other materials. Edition of the collection (10 copies), went to friends. The criticism of Metanoia made Shimanov the personification of extreme manifestations of Russian chauvinism in the eyes of liberals.

In 1974, Shimanov switched to the position of "national communism". He began to believe that the combination of the power of the Soviets with Orthodoxy would be an ideal state structure for the Russian people. He stated this idea in the article "Letter to Natalia Sergeevna". The article was based on a letter to the wife of human rights activist B. I. Zuckerman, who had left for Israel with her husband. Osipov took it upon himself to oppose Shimanov, addressing him with an open letter. The answer was an even tougher work on "How to treat the Soviet government". The discussion was interrupted by the arrest of Osipov. Later, some articles by G. M. Shimanov's works were published in the "Moscow Collection" by L. Borodin.

In 1980-1982, five issues of the samizdat magazine "Many Summers" were published. Its main authors, in addition to the editor Shimanov, were F. Karelin and V. Prilutsky. A circle of a dozen like-minded people was grouped around them. The volume of each issue was about 200 typewritten pages, 10-15 copies of the magazine were produced, some of the issues were replicated on the photocopiers that had appeared by that time. The main idea of the magazine was to incline the Soviet government to the policy of "common sense", to strengthen power at the expense of communes united by tribal and religious recognition. In 1982. after threats

from the KGB, Shimanov stopped publishing the magazine and with its closure, the organized structures of the Russian dissident national movement ceased to exist.

In religious terms, the Russian national-patriotic movement was not only Christians. By the mid-70s, small but stable groups of "neo-Pagans" had formed, hoping to return to pre-Christian beliefs. The "neo-Pagans" considered the Proto-Slavs and the ancient Slavs to be part of the tribes of the ancient Aryans who shared a common culture and religion from India to Spain. Three leaders stood out among them. One was the aforementioned publicist A. M. Ivanov (Skuratov), the second was a graduate of the Physics Department of Moscow State University, Candidate of Philosophy, former Komsomol functionary V. I. Skurlatov, the third was V. N. Yemelyanov, a graduate of the Moscow Institute of Oriental Languages, Candidate of Economic Sciences, translator from Arabic and English, teacher of the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages and Higher School of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

A. M. Ivanov (Skuratov) turned to Ancient Indian and Ancient Persian treatises (he was a professional translator), scientific works on history, philosophy, philology, and religion in European languages to identify the roots of the ancient Aryan religion. He owns works on exposing Christianity: "The Mystery of the Two Beginnings" (on the origin of Christianity; 1971), "The Christian Plague" (1979). 11 other works popularized the worldview of the Aryan peoples — "Zarathustra spoke wrong" (criticism of Nietzsche), "Fundamentals of the Irian worldview" (1981).

Ivanov did not consider himself a neo-Pagan. He said that he had his own religion, close to Zoroastrianism. And he rejected the "Great Book" promoted by Emelyanov and Skurlatov, considering it historically unreliable. About this he wrote a special work "History as a tool of genocide. A few words in defense of the Wends" (1981).

The activity of V. N. Yemelyanov was versatile. His first appearance dates back to 1973, when the editorial board of the magazine "Veche" received his critical notes of a Russian man about the patriotic magazine "Veche 11". The magazine was described in them as a "Zionist dressing room", while the truly Russian magazine "L" "was, in his opinion," to publish materials about the worthlessness of the scientific works of Zionists-pseudo-scientists". The author criticized Christianity and Islam as "subsidiaries of Judaism", used to enslave the "Goyim".

One of Emelyanov's speeches caused a great resonance not only within the country, but also abroad. This was an article with an overview of the political situation in the Western world, published on February 1, 1979 in Komsomolskaya Pravda, which was published in circulation and in millions (Chief editor V. N. Ganichev). It stated, "The Carter Government is the largest den of Jews and Freemasons that America has ever known." The article's responses appeared in American newspapers and foreign publications in Russian. I.I. Ushkuynik (pseudonym of Major General Yu. M. Larikov, gunner. In the epilogue of his famous "Memo to the Russian Man" (1979), which tells about the negative role of Jews and Freemasons in Russia, he wrote that "I read the article by prof. Emelyanov with a feeling of deep joy

and satisfaction."

Emelyanov was one of the authors who exposed the reactionary nature of Zionism in their books and theoretically justified the Soviet anti-Israeli and pro-Arab policies. This circle also included Yu. S. Ivanov — "Beware: Zionism!" (1969, 1970); V. V. Bolshakov — "Zionism in the Service of Anti-Communism" (1972); E. S. Evseev — "Fascism under the Blue Star" (1971); "Racism under the Blue Star" (1981); V. Ya. Begun — "Invasion without Weapons" (1973, 1979), "Creeping Counter-Revolution" (1974) and "Stories about the Widow's Children" (1986); V. I. Skurlatov - "Zionism and Apartheid" (1975; since 1989, he has been engaged exclusively in political activities, being the chairman of the executive committee of the board of the Liberal-Patriotic Party "Vozrozhdenie" and a member of other organizations); L. A. Modjorian — "Zionism as a form of racism and racial discrimination" (1979) and "International Zionism in the service of imperialist reaction" (1984); V. A. Semenyuk, author of the book "Nationalist Madness" (1976); and others.

In 1979, V. N. Yemelyanov wrote the book "Desionization", produced a small print run of it on rotaprint. In addition to describing the history, structure and methods of functioning of the "Zion-Masonic Concern", it published the charter of the World Anti-Zionist and a Masonic Front (WASAMF) as an organization for protection against Jewish Nazism, the liberation of the peoples of the world, and above all the Slavs, from its occupation. In early 1980, he sent the book to all the members of the Politburo. The latter did not approve of the author's ideas. Moreover, Emelyanov was fired from his job, and on March 26 of the same

year he was expelled from the party, the main reason being the refusal to name the people who helped in the publication of the "anti-Soviet and anti-Semitic" book, according to experts. April 10, 1980

He was arrested and placed in a Leningrad special psychiatric hospital for six years on charges of murdering his wife. (She was killed with an axe and dismembered, Emelyanov claimed that some people brought her in this form to him in a bag. After his release in 1986, he joined the patriotic association "Memory" of D. D. Vasilyev, from which he separated in 1987, creating his own organization. Since 1992 he also calls himself "Chairman of the World Russian Government". Emelyanov continues to be respected in the circles of Moscow pagans who consider themselves Russian patriots. Probably, among the activists of these and other dissident movements, there were others who would not be hurt by timely medical care.

After the famous statement of S. K. Tsvigun about the "neutralization" of the country from all anti-social elements (1981), which meant that the dissidents were mostly isolated from society in places of detention or were under the public supervision of the KGB and the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Russian national-patriotic movement was represented by the mentioned society "Memory". The association was named after the historical and journalistic two-volume book by V. A. Chivilikhin "Pamyat" (1978, 1981), in which from a patriotic position the story unfolded." The book was about Russian history and culture, and showed the greatness of Russia, its heroes and ascetics. It grew out of the society of book lovers of the Ministry of Aviation Industry (1979; head engineer G. I. Frygin) and the

association "Vityaz", created in 1978-1979 to prepare for the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo (it was headed by the head of the Moscow city society VOOPK journalist E. D. Diakonov). The name "Memory" appeared in 1982.

Until the end of 1984 the society was headed by G. I. Frygin and E. D. Diakonov. Then the chairman of the board of the historical and literary association (the new status of "Memory") was briefly E. S. Bekhtereva. The participants of the association were active in the preparation and holding of the celebration of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kulikovo (1980), restoration subbotniks, meetings with Russian writers and historians, discussions of the work of poets and artists of the past, movements against the turn of the northern rivers and in defense of Lake Baikal, and the teetotal movement. The work of "Memory", which was carried out in 1982-1984. of moderate character, prepared the ground for more radical speeches during the period of "glasnost". A new period in the history of the society is associated with the leadership of the photographer D. D. Vasiliev in it since October 1985. In patriotic circles, he is known since 1969, when, as the director of the club of the perfume factory "New Dawn", he arranged a supply of paintings by I. S. Glazunov that caused a stir. When the exhibition closed, the director was taken away from work. Later, he was an employee of the artist.

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